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CONTENTS OF NUMBER 43

ARTICLES—

	PAGE
The Christian Doctrine of Life. By PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE . . .	473
The Buddhist Doctrine of Salvation. By PRINCIPAL J. E. CARPENTER . .	497
The New Spirit in the Drama. By JOHN GALSWORTHY . . .	508
Does Consciousness "Evolve"? By L. P. JACKS . . .	521
Telepathy and Metaphysics. By the Right Hon. G. W. BALFOUR . . .	544
Does Religion need a Philosophy? By PROFESSOR SORLEY . . .	563
The Life of the Russian Clergy: Incidents and Characteristics. By N. JARINZOFF . . .	579
How is Wealth to be Valued? By JOHN A. HOBSON . . .	593
A Century of Change in New Testament Criticism. By PROFESSOR B. W. BACON . . .	611
Biblical Criticism and the Work of the Pastor. By the Rev. HUBERT HANDLEY . . .	623
Social Service. No. 7. The Boy Scout Movement. By Captain W. CECIL PRICE . . .	633

DISCUSSIONS—

The Democratic Conception of God. E. CAPLETON . . .	645
Modernism and the Catholic Consciousness. H. C. CORRANCE . .	648
Consciousness as a Cause of Neural Activity. PROFESSOR G. HENSLOW .	649

(Continued on p. xxv.)

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CONTENTS OF NUMBER 43—*continued*

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE—		PAGE
Philosophy.	By PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS	658
Theology.	By PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT	660

REVIEWS—

SEVEN OXFORD MEN, Foundations.	By the Rev. CANON RASHDALL	668
FREDERICK A. M. SPENCER, The Meaning of Christianity.	By the Rev. CANON LILLEY	686
SIR FRANCIS YOUNGHUSBAND, Within: Thoughts during Convalescence.	By T. W. ROLLESTON	689
RABINDRA NATH TAGORE, Gitanjali.	By T. W. ROLLESTON	692
E. A. SCHÄFER, JACQUES LOEB, AND OTHERS, Life and Mechanism.	By O. W. GRIFFITH	694
"T. F. G.," Heresy and Schism.	By RACHEL FAIRBROTHER	699
VERNON LEE, Vital Lies	By M. E. ROBINSON	702

[*Editorial Communications should be addressed to the Editor, at 28 Holynwell, Oxford, or, in the case of Reviews, to the Assistant Editor, 9 Cranmer Road, Cambridge. They may also be sent c/o the Publishers. Stamps for return of MSS should be enclosed.*]

INDEX TO THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

*Vols. I.-X.
October 1902^a
July 1911*

THE Index will be found to be a guide to the Theological and Philosophical discussions of the last ten years, as well as to the most important literature in both departments published during the period. The alphabetical list contains the names of authors who have contributed to the Journal (whether articles, discussions, or reviews); the subjects of articles and discussions; the titles of books reviewed; and the names of the authors whose books are reviewed.

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THE HIBBERT JOURNAL

THE CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE OF LIFE.¹

PROFESSOR JOSIAH ROYCE.

I.

WHAT is essential to the Christian doctrine of life can be brought to mind more readily than in any other way known to me, by a very brief contrast between some features of the Christian religion and the corresponding features of the greatest historical rival of Christianity, namely, Buddhism.

Both Christianity and Buddhism are products of long and vast processes of religious evolution. Both of them originally appealed to mature and complex civilisations. Yet both of them intended that their appeal should, in the end, be made to all mankind. Both of them deliberately transcended the limits of caste, of rank, of nation, and of race, and undertook to carry their message to all sorts and conditions of men. Both showed, as missionary religions, an immense power of assimilation. Both freely used, so far as they could do so without sacrificing essentials, the religious ideas which they found present in the various lands that their missionaries reached; and, like Paul, both of them became all things to all men, if haply they might thereby win any man to the faith that they thought to be saving.

Both were redemptive religions, which condemned both the mind and the sins of the natural man; and taught salvation

¹ Delivered in Manchester College, Oxford.

through a transformation of the innermost being of this natural man. Each developed a great variety of sects and of forms of social life. Each made use of religious orders as a means of separating those who, while desirous of salvation, were able, in their present existence, to live only in a close contact with the world, from those who could aim directly at the highest grades of perfection.

Each of these two religions attempts, by a frank exposure of the centrally important facts of our life, to banish the illusions which bind us fast to earth, and, as they both maintain, to destruction. Each is therefore, in its own way, austere and unsparing in the speech which it addresses to the natural man. Each shuns mere popularity, and is transparently honest in its estimate of the vanities of the world. Each aims at the heart of our defects. Each says: "What makes your life a wreck and a failure, is that your very essence as a human self is, in advance of the saving process, a necessary source of woe and wrong." Each of the two religions insists upon the inmost life of the heart as the source whence proceeds all that is evil, and whence may proceed all that can become good about man. Each rejects the merely outward show of our deeds as a means for determining whether we are righteous or not. Each demands absolute personal sincerity from its followers. Each blesses the pure in heart, requires strict self-control, and makes an inner concentration of mind upon the good end an essential feature of piety. Each preaches kindness toward all mankind, including our enemies. Each condemns cruelty and malice. Each, in fact, permits no human enmities. Each is a religion that exalts those who, in the world's eyes, are weak.

And not only in these more distinctly ethical ideas do the two religions agree. Each of them has its own world of spiritual exaltation; its realm that is not only moral, but deeply religious; its home land of deliverance, where the soul that is saved finds rest in communion with a peace that the world can neither give nor take away.

In these very important respects, therefore, the distinctly religious features of the two faiths are intimately related. In the case of each of the two religions, but in the case of Buddhism rather more than in the case of Christianity, it is possible, and in fact just and requisite, to distinguish its ideas of the nature and the means and the realm of salvation from the metaphysical opinions which a more or less learned exposition of the doctrines of the faith almost inevitably uses.

Buddhism has its ideas of the moral order of the universe, of Nirvana, and of the Buddhas—the beings who attain supreme enlightenment—and who thereby save the world. These ideas invite metaphysical speculation, and furnish motives that tended towards the building up of a theology, and that, in the end, produced a theology. But each of these religious ideas, in the case of Buddhism, can be defined without defining either a metaphysical or a theological system. The original teaching of Gotama Buddha rejected all metaphysical speculation, and insisted solely upon the ethical foundations of the doctrine, and upon those distinctly religious, but non-metaphysical, views of salvation, and of the higher spiritual life, which Buddha preferred to depict in parables, rather than to render needlessly abstruse through discussions such as, in his opinion, did not tend to edification.

The common ethical and religious features of Christianity and Buddhism are thus both many and impressive. Some of the greatest life questions are faced by both religions, and, in the respects which I have now pointed out, are answered in substantially the same way. Moreover, in several of the ethical and religious ideas in which these two religions agree with each other, they do not closely agree with any other religion. So far as I can venture to judge, no other religions that have attempted to appeal to the deepest and most universal interests of mankind have been so free as both Buddhism and Christianity are from bondage to national, to racial, and to worldly antagonisms and prejudices. No others have made so central, as they both have done, the conception of a personal saviour of

mankind, whose dignity depends both upon the moral merits of his teaching, and of his life, and upon the religious significance of the spiritual level to which he led the way, thus moulding both the thoughts and the lives of his followers.

When we add to all these parallels the fact that each of these religions had an historical founder, whose life later came to be the object of many legendary reports; and that the legends, in each case, were so framed by the religious imagination of the early followers of the faith in question that they include a symbolism, whereby a portion of the true meaning of each faith is expressed in the stories about the founder—when, I say, we add this fact to all the others, we get some hint of the very genuine community of spirit which belongs to these two great world religions. That the imaginative Buddha legends show an unrestrained and often helpless disposition to adorn the religion with an edifying body of miraculous tales, while the relative self-restraint of the early Christian Church in holding in check, as much as it did, its vigorous myth-making tendencies, remains, in many respects, a permanent marvel—all this constitutes a very notable contrast between the two faiths. But this is, in part, a contrast between the two civilisations (so remote, in many ways, from each other) whose development lay at the basis of the two religions. Buddhism was more surrounded by an atmosphere of magic than the Christian Church ever was. Yet in those essentials which I have just reported, the agreements and analogies between the two faiths are both close and momentous. So far the two seem to be genuine co-workers in the same vast task of the ages—the salvation of man, through the transformation of a natural life into a life whose dwelling-place lies beyond human woe and sin.

II.

Wherein, then, lies the most essential contrast between the Christian and the Buddhistic doctrines of life? This contrast, when it once comes to light, is, to my mind, far

more impressive than are the agreements. It has often been discussed.

The most familiar way of stating this contrast is to say that Buddhism is pessimistic, while Christianity is a religion of hope. This is, in part, true; but it is not very enlightening, unless the spirit of Christian hopefulness is more fully explained, and unless the Buddhistic pessimism is quite justly appreciated. Both religions hope for salvation; and, for each of them, salvation means an overcoming of the world. Each deplures humanity as it is, and means to transform us. The contrast is, therefore, hardly to be defined as a contrast of hope with despair. For each undertakes to overcome the world, and assures us that we can be transformed. And each regards our natural state as one worthy of despair, were not the way of salvation opened.

Nearer to the whole truth seems to be that frequently repeated statement of the matter which insists upon the creative attitude which Christianity requires the will to take, as against the quietism of Buddha. Buddhism has as its goal a certain passionless contemplation, in which the distinction of one individual from another is of no import, so that the self, as *this* self, vanishes. Christianity conceives love as positively active, and dwells upon a hope of immortality.

Nevertheless, the concept of beatitude, as the Christian thought of the Middle Ages formulated that concept, sets the contemplative life nearer the goal than the active life, even when the active life is one of charity. Hence, in their more mystical moods and expressions, the two religions are, again, much more largely in agreement than our own very natural partisanship, determined by our Christian traditions, tends to make us admit.

It is also true that Buddhism aims at the extinction of the individual self; while Christianity assigns to the human individual an infinite worth. And this is indeed a vastly important difference. Yet this very importance remains unexplained and a mere formula until you see what it is about

the human individual which constitutes, for the Christian view, his importance. One may answer, in simple terms, that, according to the teachings of Jesus, the individual is infinitely important, because the Father loves him; while Buddhism, in its original Southern form, has nothing to offer that is equivalent to this love of God for the individual man. Yet the further question has to be faced: Why and for what end does the God of Christianity love the individual? And it is here, at last, that you come face to face with the deepest contrast.

For God's love towards the individual is, from the Christian point of view, a love for one whose destiny it is to be a *member of the Kingdom of Heaven*. The Kingdom of Heaven is essentially a Community. And the idea of this community, as the Founder in parables prophetically taught that idea, developed into the conception which the Christian Church formed of its own mission; and through all changes, and despite all human failures, this conception remains a sovereign treasure of the Christian world.

III.

The Individual *and* the Community: this, if I may so express a perfectly human antithesis in religious and deliberately symbolic speech—this pair of terms and of ideas is, so to speak, the *sacred pair*, to whose exposition and to whose practical application the whole Christian doctrine of life is due. This pair it is which, in the first place, enables Christianity to tell the individual why, in his natural isolation and narrowness, he is essentially defective, is inevitably a failure, is doomed, and must be transformed. This, if you choose, is the root and core of man's original sin, namely, the very form of his being as a morally detached individual. This is the bondage of his flesh; this is the soul of his corruption; this is his alienation from true life; this fact, namely, that by nature, as a social animal, he is an individual who, though fast bound by ties which no man can rend to the community wherein he

chances to be born or trained, nevertheless, *until* the true love of a community, and *until* the beloved community itself appear in his life, is a stranger in his father's house—a hater of his only chance of salvation—a worldling, and a worker of evil deeds—a miserable source of misery. *This* is why, for Christianity, the salvation of man means the destruction of his natural self—the sacrifice of what his flesh holds dearest—the utter transformation of the primal core of the social self. I say: It is the merely natural relation of the individual to the community which, for Christianity, explains all this. Here are the two levels of human existence. The individual, born on his own level, is naturally doomed to hatred for what belongs to the other level. Yet there on that higher level his only salvation awaits him.

Buddhism fully knows, and truly teaches, where the root of bitterness is to be found—not in the outward deed, but in the inmost heart of the individual self. But what, so far as I know, the original Southern Buddhism *never* clearly made a positive part of its own plan of the salvation of mankind, is a transformation of the self, *not* through the *mere* destruction of the narrow and corrupt flesh which alienates it from the true life, *but by the simple and yet intensely positive* DEVOTION *of the self to a new task—to its creative office as a loyal member of a beloved community.* Early Buddhism never, so far as I know, clearly defined its ideal of the beloved community in terms which make that community, viewed simply as an ideal, one conscious unity of the business, of the eager hopes, and of the patiently ingenious and endlessly constructive love, of all mankind. The ideal Christian community is one in which compassion is a mere incident in the realisation of the new life, not only of brotherly concord, but also of an interminably positive creation of new social values, all of which exist for many souls in one spirit. The ideal Christian community of all mankind is to be as intimate in its enthusiasm of service as the daily life of a Pauline church was intended by the apostle to be, and as novel in its inventions of new arts of common living as the

gifts of the spirit in the early Christian Church were believed to be novel. The ideal Christian community is to be the community of all mankind, as completely united in its inner life as one conscious self could conceivably become, and as destructive of the natural hostilities and of the narrow passions which estrange individual men, as it is skilful in winning from the infinite realm of bare possibilities concrete arts of control over nature and of joy in its own riches of grace. This free and faithful community of all mankind, wherein the individuals should indeed die to their own natural life, but should also enjoy a newness of positive life—this community never became, so far as I can learn, a conscious ideal for early Buddhism.

How far the Japanese religion of loyalty in its later forms of modified Buddhism, or in its other phases, has approached, or will hereafter approach, to an independent and original definition of the positive and constructive ideal of a conscious and universal human community which is here in question, I am quite unable to judge. The Japanese Buddhist sects well know what salvation by grace is. They well conceive and accept the doctrine of the incarnation of the divine being in a supernatural individual man; and are certainly universal in their general conceptions of some sort of human brotherhood. And they have reached these religious ideas quite apart from any dependence upon Christianity.

But what I miss in their religious conceptions, so far as I have read reports of these conceptions, is such a solution of the problem of human life in terms of loyalty, as *at once* demands the raising of the human self from the level of its natural narrowness, to the level of a complete and conscious personal membership in a beloved community, and *at the same time* defines the ideal community to whose level and in whose spirit we are to live, as the community of all mankind, and as one endlessly creative and conscious human spirit, whose life is to be lived upon its own level, and of whose dominion there is to be, in ideal and in meaning, no end.

The familiar article in the Christian creed which expresses

this perfectly concrete and practical and also religious ideal, and expresses it in terms whose ethical and whose religious value you can test by personal and social experience, whatever may be your own definition of the dogmas of the Church, and whatever your metaphysical opinions may be, and whatever form of the visible or invisible Church chances best to seem to meet this your interpretation—the familiar article of the Christian creed which expresses, I say, this ideal, just as an ideal, uses the words: “I believe in the Holy Ghost, the holy Catholic Church, the communion of saints.” One can understand and accept the spirit of this article of the creed, without accepting the dogmas or the obedience or the practice of any one form of the visible Christian Church. By this, Christianity has furnished mankind with its most impressive and inspiring vision of the homeland of the spirit.

IV.

Ethically speaking, the counsels which this Christian idea of the community implies, include all the familiar maxims of the Sermon on the Mount, and all the lessons of the parables; but tend to give to them such sorts of development as the ideals of the early Church, in Pauline and post-Pauline times, gradually gave to them. Always the difference between the two levels of our human existence must be borne in mind, if the interpretation of Christian love is to become as concrete as Paul made it in his epistles, and as concrete as later ages have attempted to keep it, even while developing its meaning.

You love your neighbour, first, because God loves him. Yes, but how and why does God love him? Because God loves the Kingdom of Heaven; and the Kingdom of Heaven is a perfectly live unity of individual men joined in one divine chorus—an unity of men who, *except* through their attachment to this life which exists on the level of the holy community of the Kingdom of Heaven, would be miserable breeders of woe, and would be lost souls. Let your love for

them be a love for your fellow-members in this Kingdom of Heaven.

Yes, but *this* neighbour is your enemy ; or he belongs to the wrong tribe or cast or sect. Do not consider these unhappy facts as having any bearing on your love for him. For the ethical side of the doctrine of life concerns not what you *find*, but what you are to *create*. Now God means this man to become a member of the community which constitutes the Kingdom of Heaven ; and God loves this man accordingly. View him, then, as the soldier views the comrade who serves the same flag with himself, and who dies for the same cause. In the Kingdom you, and your enemy, and yonder stranger, are one. For the Kingdom is the community of God's beloved.

As for the way in which you are to love, make that way of loving, to your own mind, more alive by recalling the meaning of your own dearest friendships. Think of the *closest* unity of human souls that you know. Then conceive of the Kingdom in terms of such love. When friends really join hands and hearts and lives, it is not the mere collection of sundered organisms and of divided feelings and will that these friends view as their life. Their life, as friends, is the unity which, while above their own level, wins them to itself and gives them meaning. This unity is the vine. They are the branches.

Now of such unity is the Kingdom of Heaven. See, then, in every man the branch of such a vine—the outflowing of such a purpose—the beloved of such a spirit, the incarnation of such a divine concern for many in one. And then your Christian love will be much more than mere pity, will be greater than any amiable sympathy with the longings of those poor creatures of flesh could, of itself, become. Your love will then become the Charity that never faileth. For its object is the beloved community, and the individual as, ideally, a member of that community.

Is such a regard for individuals too impersonal to meet the spirit of the parables ? No, it does not destroy, it fulfils, as

the early Christian Church, in ideal, fulfilled the spirit of the parables. Paul spoke thus, and thereby made Christian love more rather than less personal.

If by person you merely mean the morally detached individual man, then the community, the Kingdom of Heaven, is indeed superpersonal. If, by person, you mean a live unity of knowledge and of will, of love and of deed, then the community of the Kingdom of Heaven is a person on a higher level than is the level of any human individuals, and the Kingdom of Heaven is at once within you, and above you, a human life, and yet a life whose tabernacles are built upon a Mount of Transfiguration.

Reconsider familiar parables in the light of such an interpretation—an interpretation as old and familiar as it is persistently ignored or misunderstood. That, I insist, is a useful way of restating the Christian moral doctrine of life.

Over what does the father in the parable of the Prodigal Son rejoice? Over the mere delight that his son's presence now gives him, and over the feasting and the merriment that his own forgiving power supplies to the repentant outcast? No, the father has won again, not merely his son as a hungry creature who can repent and be fed. The father has won again the unbroken community of his family. It is the father's house that rejoices. It is this community which makes merry; and the father is, for the moment, the incarnation of the spirit of this community.

Why is there more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine just persons? *Why* is the lost sheep sought in the wilderness? Because the individual soul has its infinite meaning in and through the unity of the Kingdom. The one lost sheep, found again—or the one repentant sinner—symbolises the restoration of the unity of this community, as the keystone stands for the sense of the whole arch, as the flag symbolises the country.

And *why*, in the parable of the judgment, does the Judge of all the earth identify himself with "the least of these my

brethren"—with the stranger, with the sick, with the captive? Because the Judge of all the earth is explicitly the spirit of the universal community, who speaks in the name of all who are one in the light and in the life of the Kingdom of Heaven.

V.

These things remind us how ill those interpret the teachings of the Master who see in them a merely amiable fondness for what any morally detached individual happens to love or to suffer or seem. It is the ideal oneness of the life of the Kingdom of Heaven which glorifies and renders significant every human individual who loves the Kingdom, or whom God views as such a lover. And because Paul had before him the life of the churches, while the Master left the Kingdom of Heaven for the future to reveal, Paul's account of Christian morals is an enrichment, and a further fulfilment of what the parables began to tell, and left to the coming of the Kingdom to make manifest.

In suchwise, then, are the familiar precepts to be interpreted, if the Christian doctrine of the moral life is to be what it was intended to be—not a body of maxims and of illustrations, but a living and growing expression of the life-spirit of Christianity.

For the doctrine, if thus interpreted, points you not only backwards to the reported words of the Master, but endlessly forwards into the region where humanity, as it continues through the coming ages, must, with an unwearied patience, labour and experiment, and invent and create. The true moral code of Christianity has always been, and will remain, fluent as well as decisive. Only so could it express the Master's true spirit. It therefore must not view either the parables or the sayings as a storehouse of maxims, or even as a treasury of individual examples and of personal expressions of the Master's mind; expressions such that these maxims, these examples, and these personal sayings of the Master can never be surpassed in their ethical teachings. The doctrine

of the sayings and of the parables actually cries out for reinterpretation, for the creation of a novel life. That seems to me precisely what the Founder himself intended. The early apostolic Churches fulfilled the Master's teaching by surpassing it, and were filled with the spirit of their Master just because they did so. This, to my mind, is a central lesson of the early development of Christianity.

All morality, namely, is, from this point of view, to be judged by the standards of the beloved community of the ideal Kingdom of Heaven. Concretely stated, this means that you are to test every course of action *not* by the question: What can we find in the parables or in the Sermon on the Mount which seems to us more or less directly to bear upon this special matter? The central doctrine of the Master was: "So act that the Kingdom of Heaven may come." This means: So act as to help, however you can, and whenever you can, towards making mankind one loving brotherhood, whose love is not a mere affection for morally detached individuals, but a love of the unity of its own life upon its own divine level, and a love of individuals in so far as they can be raised to communion with the spiritual community itself.

VI.

Now if we speak in purely human, and still postpone any speaking in metaphysical, terms, the community of all mankind is an ideal. Just now, just in this year or on this day, there exists no human community that is adequately conscious of its own unity, adequately creative of what it ought to create, adequately representative, on its own level, of the real and human communion of the spirit. Our best communities of to-day either take account of caste or of nation or of race—as all the political communities do—or else, when deliberately aiming at universality and at religious unity, they exclude one another; and are therefore not, in an ideal sense and degree, beloved communities. Two things, if no other, stand between even the best of them, as they are—between them, I

say, and the attainment of the goal of the truly beloved and the universal human community.

The one thing is their sectarian character—excluding, as they do, the one the other. The other thing is their official organisation, which cultivates in each of the more highly developed communities of this type, a respect for the law at precisely the expense of that which Paul experienced as the result of the legal aspect of the Judaism in which he was trained.

No, the universal and beloved community is still hidden from our imperfect human view, and will remain so, how long we know not.

Nevertheless, the principle of principles in all Christian morals remains this: “Since you cannot *find* the universal and beloved community, *create* it.” And this again, applied to the concrete art of living, means: Do whatever you can to take a step towards it, or to assist anybody—your brother, your friend, your neighbour, your country, mankind—to take steps towards the organisation of that coming community.

That, I say, is the principle of principles for Christian morals. But, for that very reason, there can be no code of Christian morals, nor any one set of personal examples, or of sayings, or of parables, or of other narratives, which will do more than to arouse us to create something new on our way towards the goal. Christian morality will not, either suddenly or gradually, conquer the world. But if Christianity, conceived in its true spirit, retains its hold upon mankind, humanity will go on creating new forms of Christian morality; whose only persistent feature will be that they intend to aid men to make their personal, their friendly, their social, their political, their religious orders and organisations such that mankind comes more and more to resemble the ideal, the beloved, the universal community. And the ethical aspect of the creed of the Christian world always will include this article: “I believe in the beloved community and in the spirit which makes it beloved, and in the communion of all

who are, in will and in deed, its members. I see no such community as yet; but none the less my rule of life is: Act so as to hasten its coming."

Now such an ethical creed is not a vague humanitarian enthusiasm. For it simply requires that we work with whatever concrete human materials we have for creating both the organisation of communities and the love for them. The work is without any human end that we can foresee. But it can be made always definite simply by resoluteness, in union with devotion. *That* is the type of work which always has been characteristically Christian, and which promises to remain so.

VII.

The Christian idea of the community and of its relation to the way of salvation requires for its complete appreciation a comparison and synthesis which shall also include the idea of atonement.

What I have to suggest at this point will set the religious value of the idea of atonement in a light which must be for many minds somewhat novel; for otherwise the idea of atonement would not have been so long and so variously rendered more mysterious by the technically theological treatment which has been freely devoted to it. Nevertheless, in its deepest spirit, this very idea of atonement has been so dear to the religious mind of Christendom, and so familiar in art, in worship, and in contemplation, that it simply ought not to appear so mysterious. The fate of the Christian idea of atonement has been, that what Christian piety felt to be the head of the corner the Christian intellect has either rejected, or else, even in trying to defend the atonement, has made a stone of stumbling and a rock of offence.

Between the idea of the saving community and the idea of atonement, lie the gravest of Christian ideas—those which many optimists find too discouraging to face, or too austere to be wholesome. These are: the idea of sin, the idea of our original bondage to sin, and the idea of the consequences

involved in defining sin as an inner voluntary inclination of the mind, rather than as an outwardly manifest evil deed. These ideas about sin are in part common, as we have said, to Christianity and to Buddhism.

But, as a fact, Christianity has so developed these very ideas, has so united them with the conception of the grace and of the loyalty which save men from their natural sinfulness, that just these conceptions regarding sin, despite the fact that Matthew Arnold thought them too likely to lead to a brooding wherein "many have perished," are ideas such that their rightful definition renders Christianity what, for Paul, it became—a religion of spiritual freedom.

In studying the moral burden of the individual, and the realm of grace, we see that Christianity is a religion dependent, for its conception of original sin, upon the most characteristic features of that social cultivation whereby we are brought to a high level of self-consciousness. Early Buddhism had, so far as I am aware, no views about the nature of the social self as clear as those which Paul attained and, in his own way, expressed. But Paul's very doctrine about "the law"—that is, about the social origin of the individual self, and about that which "causes sin to abound," is a theory which lies at the root of the power and the right of Christianity to say to the self which has first attained sinful cultivation in self-will, and which has then been transformed by "grace" into a loyal self, precisely what Paul said to his converts: "All things are yours." For the doctrine of Paul is, that the escape from original sin comes through the acceptance of a service which is perfect freedom. Out of the Christian doctrine of sin grows the Christian teaching about the freedom of the faithful—a teaching which, in its turn, lies at the basis of some of the most important developments of the modern mind. The doctrine of sin need not lead, then, to brooding. It may lead to spiritual self-possession.

The doctrine of atonement enables us to extend the Pauline theory of salvation by grace, so that not merely our

originally helpless bondage to the results of our social cultivation is removed by the grace of loyalty, but the saddest of all the forms and consequences of wilful sin—namely, the deed and the result of conscious disloyalty—can be brought within the range which the grace of the will of the community can reach. The idea of atonement has a perfectly indispensable office, both in the ethical and in the religious task which the Christian doctrine of life has to accomplish.

VIII.

Let me try to make a little more obvious this interpretation of the idea of atonement. Let me use for this purpose another illustration.

If my view about the essence of the idea of atonement is correct, the first instance of an extended account of an atoning process which the Biblical narratives include would be the story of Joseph and his brethren. Let us treat this story, of course, as obviously a little romance. We study merely its value as an illustration. The brethren sin against Joseph, and against their father. Their deed has some of the characteristics, not of mere youthful folly, but of maturely wilful treason. They assail not merely their brother, but their father's love for the lost son. Their crime is carefully considered, and is deeply treacherous. But it goes still farther. The treason is directed against their whole family community. Now, in the long-run, according to the beautiful tale, Joseph not only comforts his father, and is able to be a forgiving benefactor to his brethren, but in suchwise atones for the sin of his brethren that the family unity is restored. Here, then, is felt to be a genuine atonement. Wherein does it consist?

Does it consist in this, that the brethren have earned a just penalty which, as a fact, they never adequately suffer; while Joseph, guiltless of their wilful sin, vicariously suffers a penalty which he has not deserved? Does the atonement further consist in the fact that Joseph is able and willing freely to offer, for the good of the family, both the merits and the

providential good fortune which this vicarious endurance of his has won?

No; this "penal satisfaction" theory of the atoning work of Joseph, if it were proposed as an example of a doctrine of atonement, certainly would not meet that sense of justice, and of the fitness of things, and of the true value of Joseph's life and deeds—that sense, I say, which every child who first hears the story readily feels—without in the least being able to tell what he feels. If one magnified the deed of Joseph to the infinite, and said, as many have said: "Such a work as Joseph did for his brethren, even such a work, in his own divinely supreme way and sense, Christ did for sinful man"—would *that* theory of the matter make the nature of atonement obvious? Would a vicarious "penal satisfaction" help one to understand either one or the other of these instances of atonement?

But let us turn from such now generally discredited "penal satisfaction" theories to the various forms of modern moral theories. Let us say, applying our explanations once more to the story of Joseph: "God's Providence sent Joseph into captivity, through the sin of his brethren, but still under a divine decree. Joseph was obedient and faithful and pure-minded. God rewarded his patience and fidelity by giving him power in Egypt. Then Joseph, having suffered and triumphed, set before his brethren (not without a due measure of gently stern rebuke for their past misdeeds) an example of love and forgiveness so moving, that they deeply repented, confessed their sins, and loved their brother as never before. *That* was Joseph's atonement. And that, if magnified to the infinite, gives one a view of the sense in which the work of Christ atones for man's sin." Would such an account help us to understand atonement, either in Joseph's case or in the other?

I should reply that such moral theories of atonement, applied to the story of Joseph, miss the most obvious point and beauty of the tale, and also show us in no wise what

genuine atoning work the Joseph of the story did. Would the mere repentance, or the renewed love of the treacherous brethren for Joseph, or their wish to be forgiven, or their confession of their sin, constitute a sufficient ground for the needed reconciliation, in view of their offence against their brother, their father, or their family? If this was all the atonement which Joseph's labours supplied, he failed in his supposed office. Something more is needed to satisfy even the child who enjoys the story.

But now, let us become as little children ourselves. Let us take the tale as a sensitive child takes it, when its power first enters his soul. Let us simply articulate what the child feels. Here, according to the tale, is a patriarchal family invaded by a wilful treason, wounded to the core, desolated, broken. The years go by. The individual who was most directly assailed by the treason is guiltless himself of any share in that treason. He is patient and faithful and obedient. When power comes to him, he uses that power (which only just this act of treason could have put into his hands), first, to accomplish a great work of good for the community of a great kingdom. Herewith, according to the tale, he provides for the future honour and glory of his own family for all time to come. And then, being brought once more into touch with his family, he behaves with such clemency, and justice, and family loyalty; he shows such transient but amiable brotherly severity towards the former traitors, he shows also such tender filial devotion; his weeping when the family unity is restored is so rich in pathos; his care in providing for his father and for the future is so wise; his creative skill in making again into one fair whole what treason had shattered is so wonderful—that all these things together make the situation one whereof the child says without definite words, what we now say: "Through Joseph's work all is made, in fact, better than it would have been had there been no treason at all." Now I submit that Joseph's atoning work consists simply in this triumphantly ingenious creation of good out of

ill. That the brethren confess and repent is inevitable, and is a part of the good result; but by itself that is only a poor offering on their part. It is Joseph who atones. His atonement is, of course, vicarious. But it is perfectly objective. And it is no vicarious "penal satisfaction" whatever. It is simply the triumph of the spirit of the family through the devoted loyalty of an individual.

Joseph turns into a good, for the family, for the world, for his father, for the whole community involved, what his brothers had made ill. In his deed, through his skill, as well as through his suffering, the world is made better than it would have been had the treason never been done. This, I insist, constitutes his atoning work.

As to the brethren, their treason is, of course, irrevocable. Joseph's deed does not wipe out that guilt of their own. But they can stand in the presence of their community and hear the distinctly reconciling word: "You have been the indirect cause of a good that, by the grace and the ingenuity of the community and of its faithful servant, has now been created, while, but for your treason, this good could not have been created. Your sin cannot be cancelled. Nor are you in anywise the doers of the atoning deed. But the community welcomes you to its love again, not as those whose irrevocable deed has been cancelled, but as those whom love has so overruled that you have been made a source whence a spring of good flows."

The repentant and thankful brothers can now accept this reconciliation, never as a destruction of their guilt, but as a new and an objective fact whose significance they are willing to lay at the basis of a new loyalty. The community is renewed; the spirit has triumphed; and the traitors are glad that the irrevocable deed which they condemn has been made a source of a good which never could have existed without it. They are in a new friendship with their community, since the ends that have triumphed unite the new will with the old and evil will, through a new conquest of the evil.

Let my illustration pass for what it is worth. I still insist that an atonement of this sort, if it occurs at all, is a perfectly objective fact, namely, the creation by somebody of a definite individual good on the basis of a definite previous evil. That the total result, in a given case, such as that of Joseph, is something better than would have existed, or than would have been possible, had not that evil deed first been done, to which the atoning deed is the response—all this, I say, is a perfectly proper matter for a purely objective study. Such a study has the difficulties which attend all inquiries into objective values. But these difficulties do not make the matter one of arbitrary whim.

Moreover, if the atoning deed has brought, as a fact, such good out of evil that, despite the evil deed, the world is better than it could have been if the evil deed had not been done—that this very fact has its own reconciling value—a value limited but precious. The repentant sinner, seeing what, in Adam's vision, Milton makes the first human sinner foresee, will rightly find a genuine consolation, and a true reunion with his community, in thus being aware that his iniquity has been overruled for good.

A theory of atonement, founded upon this basis, is capable of as technical treatment as any other, and deals with facts and values which human wit can investigate, so far as the facts in question are accessible to us. Such a theory of atonement could be applied to estimate the atoning work of Christ, by anyone who believed himself to be sufficiently in touch with the facts about Christ's work. It would be capable of as technical a statement as our knowledge warranted.

This then, in brief, is my proposal looking towards an interpretation of the idea of atonement.

IX.

Turning once more to view, in the light of this interpretation, the Christian doctrine of life in its unity, we may see how all the ideas now unite to give to this doctrine a touch

both with the ethical and with the religious interests of humanity.

To sum up: As individuals we are lost; that is, are incapable of attaining the true goal of life. This our loss is due to the fact that we have not love. So the Master taught. But the problem is also the problem: For what love shall I seek? What love will save me? Here, if we restrict our answer to human objects, and deliberately avoid theology, the Christian answer is: Love the community. That is, be loyal.

Yet one further asks: What community shall I love? Speaking still in human terms, we are to love a community which, in ideal, is identical with all mankind, but which can never exist on earth until man has been transfigured and unified, as Paul hoped that his churches would, at the end of the world, soon witness this transfiguration and this union.

So far as this ideal indeed takes possession of us, we can direct our human life in the spirit of this love for the community, far away as the goal may seem and be.

Yet what stands in the way of our being completely absorbed by this ideal? The answer is: Our enemy is what Paul called the flesh, and found further emphasised by "the law." This enemy is due to our nature as social beings, so far as this nature is cultivated by social conditions which, while training our self-consciousness, even thereby inflame our self-will. *This* our social nature, then, is the basis of our natural enmity both towards the law and towards the spirit.

How can this natural enmity be overcome? The answer is: By the means of those unifying social influences which Paul regarded as due to grace. Genius, and only genius—the genius which, in the extreme cases, founds new religions, and which, in the better known cases, creates great social movements of a genuinely saving value—can create the communities which arouse love, which join the faithful into one, and which transform the old man into the new. When once we have come under the spell of such creative genius, and of the communities of which some genius appears to be the spirit, only

then can we too die to the old life, and be renewed in the spirit. The early Christian community is (still speaking in human terms) one great historical instance of such a source of salvation. To be won over to the level of *such* a community is, just in so far, to be saved.

But the will of the loyal is, in the purely human and practical sense, a will that we call free. The higher the spiritual gifts in question are, the greater is the opportunity for wilful treason to the community to which we have once given faith. The consequences of every deed include the great fact that each deed is irrevocable. And the penalty of wilful treason, therefore, is, for the traitor, precisely in so far as he knows himself, and values his life in its larger connections, an essentially endless penalty—the penalty which he assigns to himself, the fact of his sin.

For such penalty is there any aid that can come to us through the atoning deed of another? There is such aid possible. In the human world we can never count upon it. But it is possible. And sometimes by the grace of the community and by the free will of a noble soul, such aid comes. As a fact, the whole life of man gets its highest—one is often disposed to say, its only real and abiding—goods, from the conquest over evil. Atoning deeds, deeds that through sacrifices, win again the lost causes of the moral world, not by undoing the irrevocable deeds, nor by making the old bitterness of defeat as if it never had been, but by creating new good out of ancient ill, and by producing a total realm of life which is better than it would have been had the evil not happened—atonement deeds express the most nearly absolute loyalty which human beings can show. The atoning deeds are the most creative of the expressions which the community gives, through the deed of an individual, to its will that the unity of the spirit should triumph, not only despite, but *through*, the greatest tragedies, the tragedies of deliberate sin.

Through the community, or on its behalf, the atoning deeds are done. The individual who has sinned, but who knows of

free atoning deeds that indeed have been done—deeds whereby good comes out of his evil—can be not wholly reconciled to his own past, but truly restored to the meaning of the loyal life. Upon the hope that such atoning deeds, if they have not been done because of our sins, may yet be done, all of us depend for such rewinning of our spiritual relations to our community as we have sinned away. And thus the idea of the community and the idea of atonement—both of them, still interpreted in purely human fashion, but extended in ideal through the whole realm that the human spirit can ever conquer—form in their inseparable union, and in their relation to the other Christian ideas, the Christian doctrine of life. The Christian life is one that first, as present in the individual, offers to the community practical devotion and absorbing love. This same life, also present in the individual, looks to the community for the grace that saves and for the atonement that, so far as may be, reconciles. As incorporate in the community, or as incarnate in those who act as the spirit of the community, and who create new forms of the community, and originate atoning deeds—as thus present in the community and in its creatively loyal individual members, the Christian life expresses the postulate, the prayer, the world-conquering will, whose word is: Let the spirit triumph. Let no evil deed be done so deep in its treachery but that creative love shall find the way to make the world better than it would have been had that evil deed not been done.

The Christian doctrine of life consists in observing and asserting that these ideas have their real and distinctly human basis. This doctrine also consists in the purely voluntary assertion that, in so far as these ideals are not yet verifiable in human life as it is, this life is to be lived as if they were verifiable, or were sure to become so in the fulness of time. For that fulness of time, for that coming of the Kingdom, we labour and wait.

JOSIAH ROYCE.

THE BUDDHIST DOCTRINE OF SALVATION.

THE REV. PRINCIPAL J. E. CARPENTER, D.D., D.LITT.

ONE great religion alone stands out at once in parallel and in contrast with Christianity as a religion of deliverance. The Buddha has endured the long travail of ages in successive lives that he may lift off from the world the veils of ignorance and sin. It may be worth while to sketch by way of comparison the remarkable process which culminated in this promise of universal salvation.

The ancient hymns of the Rig Veda, sung as the funeral pile was lighted, had pictured the dead as borne aloft in a chariot of fire to the upper world of life and light. There the loyal worshipper, the faithful sacrificer, the godly man who had duly followed the Path, was received into the company of the shining gods. There were the Fathers who had trodden the ancient way. There, under the sovereignty of Varuna, the great god of the sky, and Yama, first of men to die, they dwelt in blessed immortality. The godless and the wicked, on the other hand, passed into the deep pit, the nether darkness. Later theology conceived different worlds, rising under the sway of different gods, and to those who made the proper offerings, or studied the Veda aright, or (putting ritual aside) gained the true knowledge, promised fellowship with the deities in their several realms. They should share the world, nay, even the very self or being, of Brahmā himself. But meantime the irrepressible instinct of speculation was at work.

If death overtook the believer in this scene, might not rebirth in another at last encounter the same close? Each man, it was taught with a profound meaning, would be born into the world that he had made; and if he had laid up for himself good and evil, how could the issues of his deeds possess eternal worth? Must they not be in themselves finite, and was not the realm of the finite a sphere of change, where everything that arose at last declined, and whatever had a beginning must in due time meet its end? This was the philosophical meaning of the doctrine of Karma, the Deed. By what steps it acquired its extraordinary sway over the whole sphere of existence I must not stop to indicate. It ruled the world from the topmost heaven to the lowest hell. It brought the events of every career under its power. It produced the profound conviction that every conscious being, *deva*, man, animal, or demon, always and everywhere got exactly what he deserved. Measure for measure was the fundamental law of the universe. Welfare and calamity, the gifts of fortune, the accidents of disease or loss, the generous temper or the heart of cruelty and lust, exactly matched some past deed or thought or word of good or ill. From age to age the sequences went on beneath an inexorable control. A rigid justice meted out its lots of happiness or pain, and even the dwellers in the radiant heavens could not keep out its messengers or evade its decrees. Rebirth involved the re-awakening of desire. Desire detained the mind amid objects destined to decay. Dissolution, therefore, would in due time claim its prey. Even over the felicity of the gods there crept the shadow of inevitable doom, and life became an endless chain of deaths.

At such a prospect imagination stood appalled. The longing arose for release from its constraint, and men began timidly to inquire "How?" The life of pious faithfulness, in ritual sacrifice or household duty, in diligent study of the Veda, or in generous help to the poor and needy, might secure the believer a place in one of the heavens where his merits

should be rewarded with an appropriate adjustment of duration and delight. But when these were exhausted, he might have to re-enter life below, or pass into a loathsome animal, to expiate a past offence, some deed of shame or wrong, some word of malice or falsehood, some thought of hatred or impurity. Was there no way of ending this succession, and passing out of the temporal into the eternal? That was the aim of one after another of the philosophies which swayed the higher mind of India; and the teachers of the Vedānta held out to those who gained the knowledge of the real unity of their individual selves with the great Self the hope of union with Brahmā under the form of Being, Intelligence, and Bliss.

It was in the midst of the immense variety of answers to these questions that Gotama the Buddha propounded his discipline of the Eightfold Noble Path. Suffering and sorrow were the lot of all who were involved in the vicissitudes of change. They had their roots in ignorance of the true meaning of life, and in the forces of selfish craving and untamed desire. Let a man tread the way of knowledge, master his passions, and he would find peace. How Gotama sought to subdue selfishness by dissipating the notion of a self, I am not now concerned to tell. But the moral discipline which he elaborated, contained the secret of deliverance, and he who fulfilled it severed the bonds of attachment to existence, and was set free from the process of rebirth. It was to preach this hope of release through the victory over ignorance and sin, that he sent forth his disciples into a world of misery and evil, and the long series of Buddhist missions was begun.

The new teaching had the immense advantage of embodiment, first of all, in a great historic personality, and, secondly, in a figure of lofty dignity as the moral ideal. For the Buddha, the completely Enlightened, had only won his knowledge through long lives of preparation, as he slowly toiled in the practice of the Ten Perfections after the supreme goodness which would supply the key to the great mystery. Far far back in distant æons the hermit Sumedha had realised

that he might, if he pleased, then and there cut off the roots of life and cease to be. "But why," he thought to himself, "should I attain deliverance alone? I will embark on the ocean of existence in a ship that will convey men and *devas*."¹ To this purpose of rescuing the perishing he had devoted himself through the long passion of successive existences till the hour arrived which opened to him the solemn secret, and secured for him the power of imparting it to others. This was the task of primitive Buddhism: to make saints, like the first Christians, by the preaching of the word. The Buddha, indeed, had announced that, like all human things, his religion would be exposed to corruption and decline. What provision would then be made for its renewal? Would the Path of release disappear amid the distractions of the world, and the call to salvation be heard no more? An answer was found for a time in the expectation of another Buddha, dwelling now in the Tusita heaven, the Bodhisat (or Buddha-to-be) Metteyya, impersonation of that *mettā* which was the Buddhist parallel to love or charity. When the time was ripe, he would descend like his predecessor, and continue upon earth the sacred line. The teaching of the Pāli tradition looked no further. Its work was done when the saint had perfected his holiness. But a whole people of saints could do no more for the world when they died, except bequeath to posterity the memory of their example.

Meanwhile the leaven of the great idea of deliverance never ceased to work. It impelled Asoka, the first Buddhist king, whose dominions are said to have exceeded those of the British empire in India to-day, to dedicate his son to the cause, and send him, with a branch of the sacred tree, to plant the new truth in Ceylon. In the midst of incredible perils it was carried by a long succession of teachers, Brahmans, princes, nobles, men of various races and conditions, moved

¹ Cp. the Introduction to the Jātakas, *Buddhist Birth Stories*, tr. T. W. Rhys Davids, vol. i. p. 13.

(as the chronicler has it) by a desire to convert the world—for when the world's welfare was concerned, who could be slothful or indifferent?—over the great mountain barrier through Eastern Asia. Under this potent impulse vast new developments took place. The old idea of the saint, weaned from the world's temptations and enjoying his own peace, proved too narrow. Were there not beings in other realms, above, below, who needed the saving knowledge just as much as the children of men? Must not they, too, have the opportunity of hearing the word? Had not the Buddha himself ascended to the Tusita heaven to preach the saving tidings to his mother? His purpose, therefore, must embrace all orders of existence, and extend itself from heaven to hell. So a new type of Buddhism appeared which called on the disciple to devote himself to something more than his own sanctity, his personal escape from the sorrows of transmigration. He must take his part in the vast process of the whole world's release, and share the labours of universal deliverance. For this end he, too, must tread the far-stretching path to Buddhahood, and prepare to enter the ranks of the long warfare with ignorance and suffering and sin. In new and grandiose scenes the Buddha was presented in the midst of multitudes of Buddhas-to-be, countless as the sands of nine Ganges. They belong to the system known as the Great Vehicle, because its aim was to embrace others, in contrast with the Little (or Low) Vehicle, in which the saint rescued himself alone. The disciple now aspires to join their ranks. When an eminent teacher named Jina was converted from the doctrine of the Great Vehicle to the earlier type, it was considered an essentially selfish change. One of the semi-divine forms in which the new Buddhism incorporated so many popular devotions, the sweet-voiced Mañjuçrī, came to him (so Yuan Chwang relates) to expostulate. Wishing to arouse him to the truth, and to awaken him in a moment, "Alas," he said, "how have you given up your great purpose, and only fixed your mind on your own personal benefit, with narrow aims,

giving up the purpose of saving all?"¹ There were those for whom this tension was too great. The price of universal salvation was to know the pain wrapped in the lot of every rank of being.

Out of such impulses arose the story of the mighty vow of the future Buddha Avalokiteṣvara, "the Lord who looks down from heaven." The origin of this beautiful figure is unknown, nor is the interpretation of his name quite certain. He first appears (according to our present knowledge) in the texts about the beginning of our era. His face is turned in all directions that he may see all and save all. He is the Lord of special mercies, the Lord of the pitying glance. In different books and schools he holds a varying place till he becomes the God or Providence of all the living; and in the Kāraṇḍa Vyūha (one of the Sanskrit Scriptures of Nepal) he makes the famous vow not to enter Buddhahood until all creatures in all worlds shall be in possession of the saving knowledge. From age to age, from Buddha to Buddha in the endless series of manifestations, he passes from heaven to earth upon his mission of deliverance. He sets free even the worms and insects from their low estate. He reclaims the sinners, provides food for the famine-stricken, heals the diseased; but mostly is he to be found in the hells, rescuing the wicked from their guilt and pain. In China he is worshipped as Kwan-yin, and the devotion is popular in Japan under the name Kwan-non. Still does the believer make his confession in the terms of a Chinese liturgy published in 1412 with a preface by the Emperor Yang Loh:

"We and all men from the very first, by reason of the grievous sins we have committed in thought, word, and deed, have lived in ignorance of all the Buddhas, and of any way of escape from the consequences of our conduct. We have followed only the course of this evil world, nor have we known aught of Supreme Wisdom; and even now, though enlightened as to our duty, yet with others we still commit grievous sins which prevent us from advancing in true knowledge. Therefore in the presence of Kwan-yin and the Buddhas of the ten regions, we would humble ourselves and repent of our sins. Oh that

¹ *Buddhist Records of the Western World*, tr. Beal, vol. ii. p. 220.

we may have strength to do so aright, and that they may cause all obstacles to be removed! We would separate ourselves from evil and pursue good; ever remembering the blessedness of heaven, and the power of all the Buddhas to deliver and rescue us and all men from evil. O great compassionate Kwan-yin, fit to deliver every sort of creature, may all emerge from the wheel of transmigration and be saved!"¹

This is the prayer of pious aspiration; it is not a prophecy or an assurance. But Kwan-yin (Avalokiteṣvara) is not, after all, supreme. He stands now on the right, now on the left, of one mightier than he. This is Amitābha, the Buddha of boundless light, who bears yet another name, Amitāyus, Buddha of boundless life, for life and light are the highest symbols of Deity. In this supreme figure, already named in the "Lotus of the Good Law" about the beginning of our era,² the Buddhist doctrine of universal salvation culminates. The nature of this wondrous being and of the heavenly life in the Pure Land to which he guides the believer, was revealed, it was supposed, by Çākya Muni as he sat upon the Vulture's Peak, near Rājagaha, one of the traditional scenes of Gotama's teaching.³ Long ages before, as a mendicant named Dharmākara, he had reached the holiness which would have enabled him to pass at once into Nirvāṇa. But he looked out upon the world, and saw his fellow-beings sunk in their ignorance and sin. How could they tread the long and arduous path which he had traversed? Might there not be some simpler way through which the blessed life could be attained? His meditations took the form of a vow or prayer that he might not attain the highest perfect knowledge unless he could avail to deliver those who put their trust in him. When, after long striving, he found himself at the goal of supreme enlightenment and holiness, he knew that his vow was fulfilled. He founded the Paradise in the radiant west, where the saints, shining more brightly than the sun, lived in

¹ Beal, *Catana of Buddhist Scriptures from the Chinese*, pp. 407-9.

² Tr. Kern, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xxi. pp. 178, 389, 417.

³ See "The Larger Sukhāvati-Vyūha," tr. Prof. Max Muller, *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xlix.

the happiness of benevolent, serene, and tender thought. Here there was no idea of "self or others." With love unlimited they resembled the all-embracing sky. By patiently bearing the good and evil deeds of all beings they were like the enduring earth.¹ They dwelt in the presence of infinite light; they had reached the goal, and could "enjoy God for ever."

The new way of salvation had many attractions, and imagination looked eagerly forward without fear to the hour of death when the Lord would himself come with a host of the glorified to conduct the believer to the Pure Land of the West. Not by works could men enter into the scene of bliss: no merits would avail to earn admission. The joy of communion with the ineffable Light and Life depended upon spiritual conditions. Trust in the Great Vow was the saving power, and by faith was the heart enlightened and made clean. When, in the sixth century A.D., Buddhism was carried into Japan, two ideas of the Lotus exerted a vast influence: the conception of the moral order working through the Deed, and the spiritual union of all beings. Under the principle of Karma eternal damnation was unknown. Sin must indeed draw down its punishment. But as the offender belonged to the finite order of time and change, so did the penalty; and the adjustment of guilt and suffering followed with the utmost precision in the train of wrong. This principle of extreme individualism, however, was allied with another of an opposite type. A mystic unity knit all beings in the finite order into one community, folded within the central purpose of the Buddhas. Within this sphere all influences for good were incalculably diffusive; and from the labour of the Buddhas-to-be down to the humblest disciple's lowly acts of piety and love there streamed forth perpetually energies of righteousness making for the great aim of universal deliverance. Had not the Buddha himself declared in the Lotus that he appeared in this world to save? Like a great rain-cloud which refreshed the earth so that

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, vol. xlix. pp. 55-57.

grasses, shrubs, and trees were all vivified according to their several capacities, so did the Buddha pour out the rain of the Truth, promoting the everlasting weal of the whole world, where the moral and the immoral, those who held sound views and those who held false, could all benefit alike.¹ And as the sun and moon shone over all the earth on the virtuous and the wicked, on the high and low, with equal beams, so did the light of the Buddha and the saints penetrate with equal enlightenment among all beings in all stages of existence,² for the Buddhas are always working and embrace all individuals in their infinite wisdom.

Out of such thoughts arose the faith in universal salvation, preached by the votaries of Amida (the "Infinite") in Japan in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries of our era, Honen, and his disciple Shin-ran. While Bernard and Francis were calling men to the discipline of the Cross, the teachers of the Far East were holding up the mercies of Amida in the Great Vow, and preaching the doctrine of Salvation by Faith. It was no new conception, for more than a thousand years before Nāgārjuna (from Southern India, about 120 A.D.) had declared that "In the great sea of the Law of Buddha faith is the only means to enter."³ But at the hands of the Japanese revivalists it received far-reaching applications. The literature of the Jodo Shin-Shu, the True Sect of the Pure Land, founded by Shin-ran, is full of parallels to Western teaching of a later date. Here are the familiar phases of evangelical experience, the conviction of sin, the repudiation of all personal claims, the worthlessness of works, the efficacy of trust in the merits of another, the promise of deliverance to the weary and guilt-laden. Here is the condemnation of pride, for those who professed to be enlightened and resolute were warned that nothing was harder than to lay aside their self-

¹ *Sacred Books of the East*, xxi. pp. 119, 122 ff. •

² *Ibid.*, pp. 128, 136.

³ *Short History of the Twelve Japanese Buddhist Sects*, tr. Bunyiu Nanjio, Tokyo, 1886, p. 113.

reliance, and submit to be saved by another. Here, too, is the assurance that such faith is not self-wrought. It is produced within the soul by the action of Amida himself. It is a divine gift, not a human attainment; and it brings with it the serene calm of present peace and of final perseverance. When each man's *karma* has made him ready to receive the heavenly grace, the watchful eye of the great Deliverer will beam upon him, and the saving faith will be bestowed. And with this faith comes love, which will overcome all the frowardness and hostility of others. For when we consider, says a modern Shin-Shu preacher,¹ "that the Father of mercies forgives us freely for those sins the contemplation of which makes us tremble, and that he takes us just as we are and saves us: if we have been thus forgiven, should not we forgive others? It is the will of the Buddha who forgiveth all men that we too should forgive as he has forgiven." When it is realised that (in the words of another teacher²) "we are all embraced in the light of Amitâbha and living under his loving guidance, our life after the confirmation of faith is filled with joy unspeakable, which is a gift of the Buddha." And in the world to come "those who are born there enjoy a life everlasting, free from the bondage of birth and death. Not only this—they are then able to manifest themselves over and over again in the world of suffering, in order to deliver their fellow-beings from sin and ignorance. All these innumerable happinesses come from no other source than the grace of Amida."

Such is the faith of the most vigorous teachers of the Far East. It represents the natural evolution of the principle of salvation. It issues out of another culture than our own; it is founded upon a different world-view; but its analogies with Christian thought are full of suggestion. It represents the

¹ *The Praises of Amida*, by Tada Kanai (trans. by Rev. Arthur Lloyd), Tokyo, 1907.

² *Principal Teachings of the True Sect of the Pure Land*, by Yejitsu Okusa, Tokyo, 1910.

eternal demand of the human heart for the resolution of the contradictions which our present life involves. It has its answer for the great problems of physical suffering and moral evil. It has its prophecy of the ultimate victory of good. It is not a little significant, however, that while it rests upon a Scripture attributed to the historic Buddha towards the close of his long career, the personality of Gotama fades away in the light of the believer's own experience. Worship may be offered to Amida alone, and his grace suffices for every need. Criticism has not yet assailed the record, or attacked the validity of the story of the Great Vow. But it is really received, not on the strength of a past revelation so much as on the testimony of its actual saving power. When the sinner is converted, and joins in the process of deliverance going on around him, the witness of antiquity is no longer needed. He is already living in the light.

It is to that goal that we slowly tend. No student of the history of religion will assert that all forms of experience are of equal worth; but he will be at the same time clear that none can possess a monopoly of truth. The distinctions of an older day between "revealed" and "natural" will drop away, and with them will disappear the exclusive claims of dogmatic churches and the pleas of lordship and authority. And if something precious seems to vanish with them, the loss will be compensated by an ampler gain. Instead of a world of darkness irradiated only by one spot of light, we see the whole progress of human thought slowly advancing along divers paths towards clearer truth, and the immense resources of the moral experiences of the race converging on a common testimony.

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THE NEW SPIRIT IN THE DRAMA.

JOHN GALSWORTHY.

THERE is a maxim, peculiarly suitable to those who follow any art: "Don't talk about what you do!"

And yet—once in a way—one must clear the mind, and put into words what lies at the back of endeavour.

What then is there lying at the back of any growth or development there may have been of late in our drama?

In my belief, simply an outcrop of Sincerity—of fidelity to mood—to impression—to self. A man here and there has turned up who has imagined something true to what he has really seen and felt, and has projected it across the footlights in such a way as to make other people feel it. This is all that has lately happened on our stage. And if it be growth, it will not be growth in quantity, since there is nothing like sincerity for closing the doors of theatres. For, just consider what sincerity excludes: All care for balance at the author's bank—even when there is no balance. All habit of consulting the expression on the Public's face. All confectioning of French plays. All the convenient practice of adding up your plots on the principle that two and two make five. These it excludes. It includes: Nothing because it pays. Nothing because it makes a sensation. No situations faked. No characters falsified. No fireworks. Only something imagined and put down in a passion of sincerity. What plays, you may say, are left? Well, that is the present development in our drama.

Sincerity in the theatre, and commercial success, are not necessarily, but they are generally, opposed. It is more or less

a happy accident when they coincide. This is a grim truth which it is no use—not the slightest use in the world—blinking. Not till the heavens fall will the majority of the Public demand sincerity. And all that we who care for sincerity can hope for is, that the supply of sincere drama will gradually increase the demand for it—gradually lessen the majority that has no use for that disturbing quality. The burden of this struggle is on the shoulders of us dramatists. It is useless and unworthy for us to complain that the Public will not stand sincerity, that we cannot get sincere plays acted, and so forth. If we have not the backbone to produce what we feel we ought to produce, without regard to what the Public wants, then good-bye to progress of any kind. If we are of the crew who cannot see any good in a fight unless we know it is going to end in victory; if we expect the millennium with every spring—we shall advance nothing. Our job is to set our teeth, do our work in our own way, without thinking much about result, and not at all about reward, except from our own consciences. Those who want sincerity will always be the few, but they may well be more numerous than now; and to increase their number is worth a struggle. That struggle is the much sneered-at, much talked-of, so-called “new” movement in the British drama.

Now it has been the fashion to dub this “new” drama the “serious” drama; the label is deliberately unfortunate, and not particularly true. If Rabelais or Robert Burns appeared again in mortal form and took to writing plays, they would be “new” dramatists with a vengeance—as new as ever Ibsen was; and assuredly they would be sincere; but could they well be called “serious”? Can we call Synge, or St John Hankin, or Mr Shaw, or Mr Barrie serious? Hardly! Yet they are all of this new movement, because they are sincere. The word serious, in fact, has too narrow a significance, and admits a deal of pompous stuff that is not sincere. While the word sincere, though it certainly does not characterise all that is popularly included under the term “new drama,” as

certainly does characterise (if taken in its true sense of fidelity to self), all that is really new in it, and excludes no mood, no temperament, no form of expression that can pass the test of ringing true. Look, for example, at the work of those two whom we could so ill spare—Synge and St John Hankin. They were as far apart as dramatists well could be, except that each had found his form—the one a kind of lyric satire, the other a neat, individual sort of comedy, which seemed exactly to express his spirit. Both forms were highly specialised, in a sense artificial, but both were quite sincere; for through them each of these two dramatists, so utterly dissimilar, shaped forth the essence of his broodings and visions of life, with all their essential flavour and peculiar limitations. And that is all one means by—all that one asks of—Sincerity.

Then why make such a fuss about it?

Because it is rare; and an implicit quality of any true work of art, realistic or romantic.

Art is not art unless it is made from what the artist himself has felt and seen, and not what he has been told he ought to feel and see. For art exists not to confirm people in their tastes and prejudices, not to show them what they have seen before, but to present them with a new vision of life. And if drama be an art (which the Great Public denies daily, but a few of us still believe), it must reasonably be expected to present life as each dramatist sees it, and not to express things because they pander to popular prejudice, or are sensational, or because they pay.

If you want further evidence that the new dramatic movement in this country is marked out by a struggle for sincerity, and by that alone, examine a little the various half-covert oppositions with which it meets.

Why is the commercial manager against it?

Because it is quite naturally his business to cater for the Great Public; and, as before said, the majority of the Public does not, never will, want sincerity; it is too disturbing. The commercial manager will answer: "The Great Public does

not dislike sincerity, it only dislikes dullness." Well! Dullness is not an absolute, but a very relative term—a term likely to have a different meaning for a man who knows something about life and art, from that which it has for a man who knows less. And one may remark that if the Great Public's standard of what is really "amusing" is the true one, it is queer that the plays which tickle the Great Public hardly ever last a decade, and the plays which do not tickle them occasionally last for centuries.

Why are so many actor managers against the new drama?

Because their hearts are quite naturally set on such insincere distortions of values as, unfortunately, are necessary to a constant succession of "big" parts for themselves. Sincerity does not necessarily exclude heroic characters, but it does exclude those mock heroics which actor managers have been known to prefer—not to real heroics, perhaps—but to simple and sound studies of character.

Why is the Censorship against it?

Because Censorship is quite naturally the guardian of the ordinary prejudices of sentiment and taste, and quaintly innocent of knowledge that in any art fidelity of treatment is essential to a theme. Indeed, I am sure that this peculiar office would regard it as fantastic for a poor devil of an artist to want to be faithful or sincere. The demand would appear to it pèdantic, extravagant, bad form.

Some say that the Critics are against the new drama. That is not in the main true. The inclination of most critics is to welcome anything with a flavour of its own; it would be odd indeed if it were not so—they get so much of the other food! They are, in general, friends to sincerity. But the trouble with the critic is the *idée fixe*. He has to print his opinion of an author's work, while other men have only to think it; and when it comes to receiving a fresh impression of the same author, his already recorded words are liable to act upon him rather as the eyes of a snake act upon a rabbit. Indeed, it must be very awkward when you have definitely labelled an author this or

that to find from his next piece of work that he is the other as well. The critic who can make blank his soul of all that he has said before may indeed exist—in Paradise!

Why is the Greater Public against the new drama?

By the Greater Public I in no sense mean the Public who do not pay income-tax—the Greater Public comes from Mayfair as much as ever it comes from Bermondsey. And its opposition to the “new drama” is neither covert, doubtful, nor conscious of itself. The Greater Public is like an aged friend of mine, who, if you put into his hands anything but *Sherlock Holmes*, *Mr Dooley*, or *The Waverley Novels*, says: “Oh! that dreadful book!” His taste is excellent, only he does feel that an operation should be performed on all dramatists and novelists, by which they should be rendered incapable of producing anything but what will amuse my aged friend. The Greater Public, in fact, is either a too well-dined organism that wishes to digest its dinner, or a too hard-worked organism longing for a pleasant dream. I sympathise with the Greater Public! . . .

A friend once said to me: “Champagne has killed the drama.” It was half a truth. Champagne is an excellent thing, and must not be disturbed. Plays should not have anything in them which can excite the mind. They should be of a quality to just remove the fumes by eleven o’clock, and make ready the organism for supper at eleven-thirty. As for sincerity—great heavens! Another friend once said to me: “It is the rush and hurry and strenuousness of modern life that is ‘doing for’ the drama.” It was half a truth. Why should not the hard-worked man have his pleasant dream, his detective story, his good laugh? The pity is that sincere drama would often provide as agreeable dreams for the hard-worked man as some of those reveries in which he now indulges, if only he would try it once or twice. That is the trouble—to get him to give it a chance.

The Greater Public will by preference take the lowest article in art that is offered to it. An awkward remark, and,

unfortunately, true. But if a better article be substituted, the Greater Public very soon enjoys it every bit as much as the article replaced, and so on—up to a point that we need not fear we shall ever reach. But from this it is not to be inferred that “new dramatists” are consciously trying to supply the Public with a better article. Not those who are sincere, anyway. No, no! A man could not write anything sincere with the elevation of the Public as incentive. If he tried he would be as lost as ever were the Pharisees making broad their phylacteries. He can only express himself sincerely *by not considering the Public at all*. This is said quite without desire to flout, simply because it happens to be true. The mockers, of course, cry: “Cant!” Having fixed their eyes on the Public’s face with the intention of serving its every nod, they have no notion that there exists a type of mind which cannot express itself in accordance with what it imagines is required; can only express itself for itself, and take the usually unpleasant consequences. This is, indeed, but an elementary truth, which since the beginning of the world has lain at the bottom of all artistic achievement. It is not cant to say that the only things vital in drama, as in every art, are achieved when the maker has fixed his soul on the making of a thing that shall seem fine to himself. It is the only standard; all the others—success, money, even the pleasure and benefit of other people—lead to confusion in the artist’s spirit, and to the making of dust castles. To please your best self is the only way of being sincere.

Most weavers of drama, of course, are perfectly sincere when they start out to ply their shuttles; but how many persevere in that mood to the end of their plays, in defiance of outside consideration? Here—says one to himself—it will be too strong meat; there it will not be sufficiently convincing; this natural length will be too short; that end too appalling; in such and such a shape I shall never get my play taken; I must write that part up and tone this character down. And when it is all done—effectively, falsely—what is there? A prodigious run, perhaps. But—the grave of all that makes the life

of an artist worth the living. Well, well! We who believe this will never get too many others to believe it! Those heavens will not fall; theatre doors will remain open; the heavy diners will digest, and the over-driven man will dream!

And yet, with each sincere thing made—even if only fit for reposing in a drawer—its maker is stronger, and will some day make that which need not lie covered away, but reach out from him to other men.

It is a wide word—Sincerity. *A Midsummer Night's Dream* is no less sincere than *Hamlet*, *The Mikado* as faithful to its mood of satiric frolicking as Ibsen's *Ghosts* to its mood of moral horror. Sincerity bars out no themes—it only demands that the dramatist's moods and visions should be intense enough to keep him absorbed; that he should have something to say so engrossing to himself that he has no need to stray here and there and gather purple plums to eke out what was intended for an apple tart. Here is the heart of the matter: You cannot get sincere drama out of those who do not see and feel with sufficient fervour; and you cannot get good sincere drama out of persons with a weakness for short cuts. There are no short cuts to the good in art. You may turn out the machine-made article, very natty, but for the real hand-made thing you must have toiled in the sweat of your brow. In this country it is a little difficult to persuade people that the writing of plays and novels is work. To many it remains one of those inventions of a certain potentate for idle hands to do. To certain gentlemen in high life, addicted to field sports, it is still a species of licensed buffoonery, to be regulated by a sort of circus-master with a whip in one hand and a gingerbread-nut in the other. By the truly simple soul it is thus summed up: "Work! Why! 'e sits writin' all day!" To some, both green and young, it shines as a vocation entirely glorious and exhilarating. If one may humbly believe the evidence of one's own senses, it is not any of these, but a patient calling, glamorous now and then, but with fifty minutes of hard labour and of yearning

to every ten of satisfaction. Not a pursuit, maybe, that one would change; but then, what man with a profession flies to others that he knows not of?

Novelists, it is true, even if they have not been taken too seriously by the people of these islands, have for a long time past respected themselves; but the calling of a dramatist till quite of late has been but an invertebrate and spiritless concern. Whipped by the Censor, exploited by the actor, dragooned and slashed by the manager, ignored by the Public, who never even bothered to inquire the names of those who supplied it with digestives—it was a slave's job. Thanks to a little sincerity, it is not now a slave's job, and will not again, I think, become one in this country.

From time to time in that vehicle of Improvisatoreism, that modern fairy tale—our daily paper—we read words such as these: “What has become of the boasted renaissance of our stage?” or “So much for all the trumpeting about the new drama!” When we come across such words, we remember that it is only natural for daily papers to say to-day the opposite of what they said yesterday. They must suit all tastes and preserve a decent equilibrium!

For there is just one new safeguard of the self-respecting dramatist that no amount of improvising for or against will explain away. Plays now are not merely acted, they are read, and will be read more and more. This does not mean, as some say, that they are being written for the study—they were never being written more deliberately, more carefully, for the stage. It does mean that they are tending more and more to comply with fidelity to theme, fidelity to self; and are therefore more and more able to bear the scrutiny of cold daylight. Drama is again taking rank as literature. And for the first time perhaps since the days of Shakespeare, there are dramatists in this country, not a few, faithful to themselves.

Now this concurrence of atoms is not, perhaps, altogether fortuitous. For, however abhorrent such a notion may be to

those yet wedded to Victorian ideals, we are undoubtedly passing through great changes in our philosophy of life. Just as a plant keeps on conforming to its environment, so our beliefs and ideals are conforming to our new social conditions and discoveries. There is in the air a revolt against prejudice, and a feeling that things must be re-tested. The spirit which, dwelling in pleasant places, would never re-test anything is now looked on askance. Even on our stage we are not enamoured of it.

It is not the artist's business (be he dramatist or other) to preach. Admitted! His business is to portray; but portray truly he cannot if he has any of that glib doctrinaire spirit, which, devoid of the insight that comes from instinctive sympathy, does not want to look at life, only at a mirage of life compounded of Authority, Tradition, Comfort, Habit. The sincere artist has not, cannot have, by the very nature of him, anything of this spirit; he is bound to be curious and perceptive, with an instinctive craving to identify himself with the experience of others. This is his value, whether he express it in comedy, epic, satire, or tragedy. Sincerity distrusts Tradition, Authority, Comfort, Habit; cannot breathe the air of Prejudice, and cannot stand the cruelties that arise from it. And so it comes about that the new drama's spirit is essentially, inevitably human—humane—humanitarian, if you will; essentially distasteful to some professing followers of the Great Humanitarian, who if they were but sincere would see that they secretly abhor His teachings, and in practice continually invert them.

It is a fine age we live in!—this age of a developing social conscience; it is worthy of a great and fine art. But, though no art is fine unless it has sincerity, no amount of sincere intention will serve unless the expression of it be well-nigh perfect. An author is judged by what he has written; and criticism is innately inclined to remark first on the peccadillo points of a person, a poem, or a play, and in remarking on them to forget the play, poem, or person. If there be a scar on the forehead; a few false quantities or weak endings; if there is an absence in the third act of someone who appeared

in the first—it is always much simpler to complain of this than to feel or describe the essence of the whole creature. But this very pettiness in our criticism is fortunately a sort of safeguard. The French writer Buffon said: *Bien écrire, c'est tout ; car bien écrire c'est bien sentir, bien penser, et bien dire. . . .* Let the artist then, by all means, make his work impeccable, clothe his ideas, feelings, visions, in just those garments that can withstand the winds of criticism. But he himself must be his cruelest critic. Before cutting his cloth, let him very carefully determine the precise thickness, shape, and colour best suited to the condition of his temperature. For there are still playwrights who, working in the full blast of an *affaire* between a poet and the wife of a strong silent stockbroker, will murmur to themselves: “Now for a little lyricism!” and drop into it. Or when the strong silent stockbroker has brought his wife once more to heel: “Now for the moral!” and give it us. Or when things are getting a little too intense: “Now for humour and variety!” and bring in the curate. This kind of tartan kilt is very pleasant on its native heath of London; but—hardly the garment of good writing. Good writing is only the perfect clothing of mood—the just right form. Shakespeare’s form, indeed, was extraordinarily loose, wide, plastic; but then his spirit was ever changing its mood—a true chameleon. And as to the form of Mr Shaw—who was once compared with Shakespeare—why! there is none. And yet, what form could so perfectly express Mr Shaw’s glorious crusade against stupidity, his wonderfully sincere and lifelong mood of sticking pins into a pig?

We are told indeed, *ad nauseam*, that the stage has laws of its own, to which all dramatists must bow. Quite true! The stage has the highly technical laws of its physical conditions, which cannot be neglected. But even when they are all properly attended to, it is only behind the elbow of him who feels strongly and tries to materialise sincerely what he feels, that right expression stands. The imaginative mood is a tricky comrade, coming who knows when, and staying none

too long. Be true to her while she is there, and when she is not there do not insult her by looking in every face and thinking it will serve. These are the laws of sincerity, which even the past-master in the laws of the stage cannot afford to neglect. For, in playwriting, I venture to think, against a considerable body of opinion, that anything is better than resorting to moral sentiments and solutions simply because they are current coin; or to decoration because it is "the thing." And—as to humour: If an author's characters or his idea inspire him with that genuine topsy-turvy feeling which underlies the precious article, real humour—good; but nothing appears to me so pitifully unfunny as the dragged-in epigram or dismal knockabout that has no connection whatever with the persons or philosophy of the play.

But there is nothing easier in this life than to think one is, and nothing much harder than to be—Sincere. Imagine the smile, and the blue pencil, of the Spirit of Sincerity, if we could appoint him Censor. Ah! if only we could—just for a year! That is a censorship I would not lift my pen against, though he excised—as perhaps he might—the half of my work. Sometimes one has a glimpse of his ironic face and his swift fingers busy with those darkening pages. And once I dreamed about him. It was while a certain Commission was sitting on the censorship that still so admirably guards insincerity.

The Spirit of Sincerity was sitting in a field, speaking to the flowers, who were standing round him in their accustomed attitudes.

"Flowers!" he was saying, "you wish to learn of me what is Sincerity. I shall be very happy to inform you. Look into yourselves; and when you feel that what lies deepest within you is not up in arms against what lies outside you, then you will have found a feeling that you may perhaps dignify with the word Sincere. But do not expect to find Truth in Life and Nature immutable, as you find it in mathematics; for, since each living thing varies from every other living thing, each has its own angle of vision, and never twice

are there quite the same set of premises from which to draw conclusion. Give up, then, asking of any but yourselves for the whereabouts of truth ; and if someone says that he can tell you where it is, do not believe him, for he is as one laying a trail of sand, and thinking it shall stay there for ever."

Having thus spoken, the Spirit of Sincerity covered his eyes with his hand, and I could see him looking through his fingers to see what effect he had made upon the flowers. But the flowers remained without sound, as if they had not heard him. Then, dropping his hand from before his eyes, the Spirit of Sincerity remarked: "Flowers! I perceive that you, at all events, do not care what effect you make on other people. It is I who must learn of you what is sincerity! . . ."

But there is one very common answer to all this: "I entirely deny that this 'new drama' you speak of is any better than the old drama, cut to the pattern of Scribe and Sardou. You may just as well say that these post-impressionist painters are better than what went before them, which is absurd. What you have gained in one way you have lost in another. Novelty is not necessarily improvement."

Very true! Novelty is not necessarily improvement. And all that anyone, who believes in this so-varying "new drama," which has in common but the one main struggle for sincerity, can answer is: That comparison must be left to history. But it is just as well to remember that we are not born connoisseurs of plays. And, certainly, without trying the new we shall not know if it is better than the old. To appreciate even drama at its true value, a man must be educated just a little. I remember that when I first went to the National Gallery I was struck dumb with love of Landseer's stags and a Greuze damsel with her cheek glued to her own shoulder, and became voluble from admiration of the large Turner and the large Claude hung together in that perpetual prize-fight! At a second visit I discovered Sir Joshua's "Countess of Albemarle," and Old Crome's "Mousehold Heath," and did not care quite so much for Landseer's stags.

And again and again I went, and each time saw a little differently, a little clearer; until at last my time was spent before Titian's "Bacchus and Ariadne," Botticelli's "Portrait of a Young Man," the Francescas, Da Messina's little "Crucifixion," the Ucello battle picture (that great test of education), the Velasquez "Admiral," Hogarth's "Five Servants," and the immortal "Death of Procris." Admiration for stags and maiden—where was it?

This analogy of pictures is not used for the purpose of suggesting that our "new drama" is as far in front of the old as the "Death of Procris" is in front of Landseer's stags. Alas, no! It is used for the purpose of enforcing the suggestion that taste is encouraged by an open mind, and is a matter of gradual education.

A certain gentleman lately appointed to assist in the control of the exuberance of plays has stated in public print that there have been no plays of any value written since 1885. To every man his sincere opinion! But before we share it, let us walk a little through our National Gallery of drama, with inquiring eye and open mind, to see and know for ourselves. For, *to know*, a man cannot begin too young; cannot leave off too old. And always he must have a mind that feels it will never know enough. In this way alone he *will* perhaps know something before he dies.

And even if he require of the drama only buffoonery, or a digestive for his dinner, why not be able to discern good buffoonery from bad, and the pure digestive from the drug?

I am, I suppose, prejudiced in favour of this "new drama" of sincerity, of these poor productions of the last ten years or so. It may be, indeed, that many of them will perish and fade away. But they are, at all events, the expression of the sincere moods of men who ask no more than to serve an art, which, God knows, has need of a little serving in this country.

JOHN GALSWORTHY.

DOES CONSCIOUSNESS “EVOLVE”?

L. P. JACKS.

“THE Idealist only insists,” says Dr Ritchie,¹ “that . . . we are justified in looking back from our vantage ground and seeing in the past evolution the gradual ‘unrolling’ of the meaning that we only fully understand at the end of the process.”

What is conveyed by these words, “*the gradual unrolling of a meaning*”?

Pressing hard upon the words I find myself in the presence of absurdities. It is absurd to say of any *meaning* that it “unrolls” either gradually or suddenly: not less absurd than to say it “unties,” “unbuttons,” “uncorks.” Do *meanings* behave in that manner? Are they rolled up to begin with, as they needs must be if they are to be subsequently unrolled? Surely not.

One would hardly have thought of trying this experiment of hard pressure had not Dr Ritchie used the word “unrolls.” Had he retained its Latin equivalent “*evolves*,” suspicion might not have been aroused. Plain Anglo-Saxon invites pressure. Say, for example, that the jelly-fish has “unrolled” into Shakespeare, that the code of a savage has “unrolled” into the Sermon on the Mount, and you will be condemned out of your own mouth. But say instead that the jelly-fish has *evolved* into Shakespeare, the savage code *evolved* into the Sermon on the Mount, that my consciousness of this or that

¹ *Darwin and Hegel*, p. 76.

has *evolved* into a consciousness of that or this, and instantly a light seems to fall on the origin of Shakespeare and the wonderful ways of the mind. But the light should not be trusted too far.

“The mind,” says Professor Wallace,¹ expounding Schelling, “is the necessary outcome of a process of development. We must see thought grow up from its simplest element, from the bare point of being, the mere speck of being which, if actually no better than nothing, is yet a germ which in the air of thought will grow and spread. . . . [The mind] is a mediated unity which has grown up through a complex interaction of forces and which lives in differences through comprehending and reconciling antagonisms.”

Let us try to do what it is said we *must* do. We must *see* the mind-germ growing; the unity breaking into differences and the differences returning to unity. Well, up to a point, there is no difficulty in obeying this behest. Told to see a germ, or the growth of a germ through all the stages from first to last, I readily respond. I can see the story step by step; and, what seems to be the essential matter, I can see the story as a whole. Whether in detail or in sum the movement, the story is apprehensible enough. But what I cannot *see* is the *mind*, which is said to be doing these things or passing through this process. There is no trouble with my seeing of the germ; but by no manner of means can I see a germ of *consciousness*. I can no more see consciousness as a germ than I can see it as an egg or a baby—or as Dr Ritchie’s “roll.” True, having seen a germ of some sort I can mentally label it “mind”: I can see the various stages of growth with my label hanging to each; I can see the growth as a whole with the label still there; but when all is done it is not “mind” that I have seen but only a label, with “mind” written upon it, attached to a germ which is neither mind nor thought nor consciousness. It is the label alone which saves this language, when put under pressure, from turning into rank materialism. A slender

¹ *Logic of Hegel*, p. 265.

safeguard. Frankly, I know not what is meant by a speck of *mind*.

I can find no difference in principle between the description of the mind as a growing germ and the description of some great sorrow as a "broken heart." Suppose we were told that in order to understand the sorrows of Lear we must "see" a developing heart-break starting from a mere speck of a fracture on the surface, actually no better than nothing, yet a beginning which, when once introduced into the heart-substance, grows and spreads, until we "see" the heart split clean in two and then become a whole heart again by the union of the two halves. Here, we should say, is a metaphor whose legitimate function is to awaken a faint, far-off echo of resemblance, but which, by hard pressure, has now been turned into a formula *pour rire*. Such a formula I find myself constructing when I try to see *thought* as a germ or mere speck which grows and spreads until, etc., etc.

Let us turn to the work of the Cairds and Green, the classical exposition in English of the doctrine of an evolving consciousness. In certain crucial chapters of Edward Caird we find the phrases "germinating consciousness," "the germinal form of consciousness," with their equivalents and cognates, present on every page. We read of a consciousness involved (rolled up?) in a wider consciousness,¹ and of an unconscious "movement" from implication to explication. Green assures us that the "life of primitive humanity expresses a consciousness in germ,"² and he speaks of "the developed consciousness which is ours." The process from the germ to the developed consciousness is governed by "operative ideas" which are present in the mind, though not present to it, and which "act unconsciously" (par. 241); and these ideas that act unconsciously are defined in a footnote (par. 153) as the "immediate object of the mind in thinking."

¹ "The religious consciousness is involved in all our consciousness of the universe and of ourselves" (*Evolution of Theology*, i, 38).

² *Proleg. to Ethics*, par. 204.

They have to be "ideas" in order that they may fulfil the spiritual end assigned them; they have to be "unconscious" in order that there may be an end as yet unfulfilled; when the former need is prominent they are frankly called "idéas"; when the latter, they usually appear as "principles" or as "presuppositions."

Now, in reading all this are we intended to press lightly or to press hard? Gladly will we relax the pressure if suffered to do so, and content ourselves with such faint, far-off echoes as reach us when we hear the horns of elf-land faintly blowing. But we are not suffered. This is the language of metaphysical science and has to be taken seriously. These thinkers are constructing formulæ, not writing poetry, and formulæ cannot be made out of words "thrown out" at their objects. *Aut Cæsar aut nihil*. Taken lightly the theory has no theoretical value.

For not only have we to understand it; we have to "reproduce" the whole "movement" in our own consciousness; to reproduce it step by step and as a whole; nay, our understanding of it is nothing less than this reproduction. This is a difficult mental feat; it involves, as Professor Wallace insists, an almost superhuman tension of mind; and it can be performed, if at all, only by following our directions to the letter. Reading between the lines, so often needed in the study of great philosophers, is here out of the question. So we find ourselves compelled against our will to press hard—to press with all our might. We envisage the "germ" of consciousness with all the intensity of mental vision we are able to command. We learn the story of consciousness by heart; see all we are told we must see; reproduce the movement so faithfully that the rhythm of it comes into our dreams. And suddenly we wake to a discovery. Pressing hard upon the story, as we evidently must, we find that it has ceased to be the story of consciousness; pressing hard upon "consciousness," we find it impossible that consciousness should have this *story*. Pressing hard upon both, we have the double difficulty. Pressing hard

upon neither, we catch only a faint, far-off echo, as though we were reading of a "broken heart."

The reader may try his own experiment on the following instance. Caird¹ argues that, just as the science of Grammar is implied in a child's or savage's use of language, so the idea of an Absolute Unity embracing all difference is implied in his simplest consciousness of an object. The savage who says "I will kill you" is ignorant of the controlling grammar of his sentence; but the grammar is "there all the same"; and I suppose that he needs only to reflect sufficiently upon his words to become a grammarian. In like manner his consciousness of any object is unaware of the unity of subject and object which is its "controlling idea"; but that idea is *in* his consciousness "all the same," even as the grammar is in his speech. Both the grammar and the unity are "presupposed." For unless there were grammar he couldn't say anything; unless there were a unity of all differences he couldn't be conscious of anything.

So far from confirming the theory of mental evolution, this analogy seems to me to betray it. When you tell me that the *idea* of the Absolute Unity is implied in the *idea* of the simplest object, I understand that the former idea is the deeper meaning of the latter; and, indeed, you tell me that I have only to reflect on my idea of the simple object and lo! it will "evolve" into a consciousness of the Absolute Unity. Now turn to the savage and his grammar. Surely it cannot be contended that his deeper *meaning* in "I will kill you" is that "I" is a personal pronoun, "kill" a verb, and "you" the object; it cannot be contended that reflection on his first meaning will lead him to parse the sentence instead of splitting your skull.* And yet this is what the analogy ought to mean if it is to hold good. Truly the grammar "is there all the same" whether he knows it or not. But *where*? Not in the consciousness of the *savage*; but in that of the *grammarian*. So too the idea of the underlying unity may be "there all the same." But

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, i. 70.

where? In the theory of the philosopher; not in the mind of the savage. Could anything betray more effectually than this analogy does that what we have to do with here is a theory of the fact made to do duty for the fact itself?

It would appear that in modern thought the word "evolution" has acquired the efficacy of an incantation, so potent that none of us can wholly escape from its spell. That there is some witchery in the term is suggested on the one hand by the extraordinary loss of power which current expositions undergo when for the magical "evolution" we substitute Dr Ritchie's plain "unrolling," and on the other by the sudden revival of argumentative interest which takes place on "evolution" being restored.

This word, or the idea which it connotes, seems to have inspired some thinkers with a genial faith that there are no wrong roads in history. What appear to be such are in fact right roads which have not yet reached their goal; and they only need "completing" to bring this to light. You must not say the worshipper of Mumbo Jumbo is in the errors of heathen darkness; for "the completed totality is the truth of the whole movement of the process"; and Mumbo Jumbo has his place in that truth along with the Eternal God. "In the consciousness of the simplest and most uncultured individual," says Caird, "there are contained all the principles that can be evolved by the wisest philosopher of the most cultivated time; and even the rudest religions have represented in them—though, no doubt, in a shadowy and distorted way—all the elements that enter into the highest Christian worship." "The trouble with the bad man, again, is not that he turns aside from the right road; it lies in the incompleteness with which he has realised the implications of his moral nature. "The standard of morality in a circle of horse-dealers," says Professor Muirhead, "is different from that recognised by a Christian congregation. . . . In the case of the horse-dealer the higher standard is rather latent than non-existent,

as is shown by the fact that it is possible to convict him of inconsistency and convert him." All conduct, we are assured by Green, "whether virtuous or vicious, expresses a motive consisting in an idea of personal good which the man seeks to realise by action." Thus the distinction between right and wrong is a distinction between the "degrees of adequacy" with which the idea is presented by the subject to himself; and I presume Professor Muirhead would say to the dealer who had sold him a foundered horse precisely what he says to M. Bergson about the work of thought, that his moral standard only needs "completing" in order that it may become all that it should be.¹ Similarly, we are told by Caird that the only distinction in man's view of the world "is between the world as imperfectly conceived and the world as more adequately interpreted."² Thus our seeming errors about the world only need completing to become truths. So once more the only differences, in thought as in conduct, are differences of adequacy; if ever we seem to be on the wrong road, we have only to go a mile or two further and we shall find it coming right.

Most persons, however, who have not been initiated into these Mysteries would be inclined to think that the certain result of "developing" the standard of the horse-dealer would be to make him worse to deal with than ever before. "The penalty of the unjust man," says Socrates, "is that he becomes more unjust." Macbeth "developed his implications," with the result that instead of washing his hands of blood he dyed them deeper. According to Shakespeare the line of Macbeth's evolution went from bad to worse; according to the system above quoted it should go from bad to good. The latter may assure us that Macbeth's mistake was in not developing his implications *enough*; but I think that most people will be glad that he didn't develop them any more. The "move-

¹ "The error is to be corrected not by cancelling the work of thought, but by completing it." *Hibbert Journal*, ix. 902.

² *Evolution of Theology*, i. 362.

ment" of his consciousness so far as it went—and it went pretty far—showed no sign of approximating to the Sermon on the Mount: the direction was plumb opposite to that.

No, horse-dealers are not made honest by leaving their consciousness to develop its latent implications. "The most violent revolution to which human nature can be subjected," says Caird,¹ "can never be more than the emergence into light of something that has been growing for a long time beneath the surface." But this statement, even if true, helps us not a whit; for it is as good a description of the honest soldier (Macbeth) who develops into a bloodthirsty assassin as of the horse-dealer who develops into a saint. Here is no ground for "confidence in the universe," nor for the assurance that the good will prevail. Men do not gather grapes of thorns nor figs of thistles; and unfortunately thorns and thistles "grow for a long time beneath the surface" as well as grapes and figs. •

A closer scrutiny of the doctrine I am venturing to examine will confirm these objections. Two short quotations will indicate its outline. "The completed totality," says Lord Haldane, in words already quoted, "is the truth of the whole movement of the process." "The end," says Professor Muirhead, is "the principle of unity which harmonises and explains the successive steps."² It is obvious that these two statements mean the same thing. They show us that the theory is dominated by the conception of an "end"; and this "end" is actually present in any consciousness which has grasped the principle of unity which harmonises the steps of the process. Evolution is thus admittedly circular, for its "end" is nothing else than a revelation of the principle of unity which makes it a process; in other words, the process "returns upon itself" in becoming conscious of its own principle. In so becoming conscious of its principle the process becomes an object to itself, *i.e.* it becomes self-

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, i. 200.

² *Elements of Ethics*, 239.

conscious; thus the "end" is reached. It is a curious performance; but it has the sanction of great authorities.

Apparently this process does not take place in time; though a reader who studies the literature of the subject will find that the process is placed by different writers, and by the same writer in different passages, either in or out of time according to the momentary exigencies of his argument—a procedure as bewildering to the mind of the student as it is trying to his patience. "It is not only in time," says Lord Haldane, "that you have evolution; you have evolution in thought, in the stages of comprehension, when what comes last in time is first in thought." In Dr Caird's more detailed exposition the various stages of the evolution of consciousness are represented as following one another in historical order, like any other secular process, and the reader constantly awakens with a shock of bewildered surprise on discovering that what he has been reading is not history but metaphysics, or rather logic, and that he must forthwith transport a series of successive events into a changeless universe *sub specie æternitatis*. To do justice to his author he must, at one and the same time, take what is given him as a completed picture and as a moving story; if he criticises the picture he is bidden remember the story; if he finds fault with the story he is told to remember the picture. This, to say the least of it, gives him an uncomfortable feeling that he is in the toils.

Nor is that feeling relieved by the constant reminder that we must "translate the evolution in time into the timeless evolution of thought."¹ The word "translate" as here used is wholly misleading and merely serves the purpose, of course unintentional, of loading the dice in favour of the operator. To "translate" is to reproduce the *same* meaning in other terms; to "translate" time into the timeless is to put *opposite* meanings into the same terms. The "translation" is therefore the grossest possible mistranslation, and the injunction to

¹ "Philosophy translates an evolution in time into a process of thought which transcends time." John Caird, *Introduction*, p. 298.

“translate” amounts to this: “When you find yourself in a contradiction, get out of it by substituting the opposite meaning for one of the terms.”

The “end” of this process is attained, as I have said, when the mind grasps the principle of unity which explains the process, for that principle, as we are expressly told, *is* the end. And here a simple question will occur to most minds—and not only to those who are making their first acquaintance with this subject. If the story before us is that of the evolution of *consciousness*, and if the “end” of that story is conscious recognition of the principle of unity implied in its successive phases, what *further* story remains to be told of any consciousness which at last has become conscious of the principle? Apparently none. The evolution of consciousness should *stop* with our attainment of this insight. Accepting the definition of the “end” as given, then, as soon as my consciousness is at the “principle of unity” I am fully entitled to claim *that I am at the end of all things*, and the question “What next?” cannot arise. “We who have reached the present stage of religious thought,” says John Caird, “have all the essential elements of the historic movement in our own consciousness.”¹ History can bring no further enlightenment, and is henceforth meaningless.

To overcome this simple objection Green labours through some portentous paragraphs. Speaking of the Moral Ideal, which of course is only an *alias* for the “principle of unity,” he says that *what* that Ideal in its fullness is we can never fully know, but the conviction *that* it is, is the moving spring of Moral Evolution. But is the recognition *that there is such a principle* equivalent to that conscious recognition *of* the principle which these thinkers hold out as the “end” of evolution? How would a principle of which we know only *that* it is, but cannot say with any approach to fullness *what* it is, set about “explaining and harmonising” the entire series of steps in the history of the Cosmos up-to-date? And if it should turn out, as Green has everywhere to admit, that the “end” of which

¹ *Intr. Phil. of Rel.*, p. 298.

we have become "conscious" has still to be "realised" in some other way than that of merely becoming conscious of it, is it not obvious that such an "end" has parted with all the significance by possessing which it has enabled the Finalist to conduct his argument up to this fatal point? I do not know what, for example, would become of Professor Muirhead's statement that the standard of morality is supplied by the conception of an "end," were he to add, that the "end" in question serves a double function by being also a beginning; in short, that it is not an "end" at all. The sweet savour of the term evaporates when it is thus rudely turned inside out.

As the "end" turns out to be the name for a new beginning, the *πov στῶ* of moral development, so too we shall find that the alleged *beginning* of the evolution might, with equal fitness, be designated an end. In the account of the evolution of consciousness given by Caird we find, perhaps to our surprise, that the movement described takes place between a definite beginning and a definite end. It has three stages: it begins with the consciousness of the object; passes thence to the consciousness of the subject; and ends in the consciousness of the underlying unity of the two. We are, however, expressly and repeatedly forbidden to suppose that the three stages follow in such a way that the one is completed before the next begins. Along with the first consciousness of the finite object there goes a little consciousness of the self, and somewhat less consciousness of the underlying unity. The evolution is thus the "explication of a confused totality in which the three factors are *at first* merged and mingled, but is never the sudden emergence of any quite new factor."¹ Elsewhere the progress is described as the "coming into prominence" of some elements, and the sinking into the background of the others.²

Now, we read in another place: "The essential characteristic of development is that nothing arises in it *de novo*, which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning."

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, i, 186.

² *Ibid.*, 182.

What then of the *beginning itself*? Is that not *de novo*? Then it is not a beginning.

The force of this simple difficulty is, as before, apt to be overlooked owing to a fast-and-loose handling of the word "beginning." We are not allowed to treat it as indicating merely the first member in a series of events. On the contrary, the "beginning" is charged with all that is to follow; it contains within itself, as a germ is said to do, the whole of its posterity; it is in short nothing but the entire process in germ. It is one of the delightful conveniences of this mode of thought, that *any* stage of the process is convertible at will into the whole process at that stage. This enables you to treat any stage as end, middle, or beginning according to your point of view; which is all very well so long as your point of view, being *sub specie æternitatis*, requires the process to have neither end, middle, nor beginning; but is highly inconvenient when you have to *tell the story* of evolution, inasmuch as all three words have now lost the meanings which are indispensable to the purpose of the story-teller. To tell the story you must start somewhere; you must have your "at first"; and to justify the words you must start with something which in some way is different from what comes next. It matters not the least that what you begin with is the confused totality in a high degree of confusion. However confused the totality may be at the point where you first pick it up, your principles require you to admit that it has issued from a state of confusion still greater. Hence, strictly speaking, you can never begin. There is of course no fixed point at which confusion commences its march to order. All this, therefore, of what mind does "at first," or "in the first instance"; all this of the "earliest" forms of the religious or other consciousness, is violent and arbitrary. An evolution which admits nothing *de novo* declines to allow you to "begin" its story.

"At first," we are told, man "goes outward to the object." But before man went outward to the object he must have done something else; and you have no better reason to begin at the

point when he went out to the object than you would have to begin at the point when he went in to the subject, or round to the principle of unity. The evolution of mind up to the point when it goes outward to the object needs accounting for no less than any subsequent stages of its development; hence you are merely depriving us of an interesting chapter of the story by thus starting, *in mediis rebus*, at the point where consciousness is preoccupied with the finite.

It seems to me, in addition, that to speak of man's consciousness "as at first confused" is misleading. The consciousness of the savage is just as "clear" about its own business as ours is about our business; the difference is that it is concerned with other things. The savage might with equal propriety describe the consciousness of the modern Finalist as being "confused" with regard to many things that are "clear" to him, *e.g.* the flight of a boomerang, or the value of a scalp, or the presence of water beneath the surface of the ground, or the malignancy of the Big Fetish. The simple fact is that the savage and the civilised man are conscious of different objects; not that one is confusedly conscious and the other clearly conscious of the same.

Thus our philosophers are asking a hard thing when they claim a licence to strike in at the consciousness of the object, ruled by "inchoate" ideas of a subject and an underlying unity, as the absolute "at first"—the point where the evolution of mind necessarily and properly begins. If you plant yourself in imagination at the point so selected, you see at once that though the point is "at first" in relation to what follows, it is "at last" in relation to what has gone before; in short, that wherever you begin, you strike into the *course* of a history and encounter ideas which, however "shadowy and distorted," are already, on this theory, the evolved products of a process.

Up to this point the theory involves a twofold disappointment. It bases our faith on an end which turns out to be a beginning, and it starts our speculations from a beginning

which turns out to be an end. Seeking to relieve our disappointment, it introduces the conception of a "whole," which strictly speaking has neither beginning nor end, but which nevertheless begins by being a confused totality and ends by being an ordered system. Is this thinkable? Is it consistent with itself?

The next difficulty, which is perhaps even more serious, arises from the combination of these two.

The reader who peruses this evolution-story needs to give himself a stern reminder, at the end of almost every sentence, that it is the evolution of *consciousness* that is being related. If he forgets this and, misled by the constant introduction of biological metaphor, permits the image of an acorn, or some such *unconscious* germ, to guide his thoughts, he may easily overlook the swarming difficulties of the theory. For instance, with the acorn in mind he will probably accept without much demur the statement that evolution of consciousness is controlled by *ideas* of which the subject is at first *unaware*; and that these controlling ideas are present in consciousness without being present to consciousness. But let him banish the acorn and remember *consciousness*, and such a statement will become a mere nest of confusion. What are these ideas, he will ask, which remain ideas even when the subject, in whose *consciousness* they are, is unaware of them? Again, with the acorn still in mind, let him contemplate the innumerable instances of arrested development in the history of the human mind, and of religion, and these instances will present no difficulty at all. The growth of acorns (and other germs) is subject to arrest; so that when we hear of men who stick fast at an early point of their spiritual development, as savages often do, or of others who, like Spencer, having reached an advanced point suddenly decline to take the step which next follows, we at once suppose that they resemble those acorns which for some intelligible reason have failed to become oaks.

But now let him give himself the needed reminder and reconsider the position. The evolution of consciousness, as presented by the Finalist, is determined by the necessities of an inner logic from the impetus of which there is no escape. John Caird speaks of the process as one in which "the human spirit is forced onwards by an immanent logic" (*Introduction*, p. 296). It is "a necessary process" (p. 294). There are no alternatives. Consciousness *must* evolve in that way and in no other. There is no room for any option, contingency, mistake, arrest, or failure. This is confirmed emphatically by T. H. Green. The process, he declares, is "a development of the intelligence in a direction which it does not rest with the individual to follow or no" (*Prolegomena*, par. 63). How, then, we ask, did Mr Herbert Spencer manage to develop in another direction? Nay, more. The theory not only leaves the failures unaccounted for; it refuses equally to provide for the different rates of progress by which the "end" is reached in different individuals or races which are alleged to have reached it. What have the eternal necessities of logic to do with the course of time; with gradual and sudden; with slow and quick; with retardation or promptitude?

It is therefore most perplexing to the docile student, who has done his best "to translate the evolution in time into an evolution in thought," to receive a solemn reminder that this latter process is necessarily a "slow" affair. This word is seldom absent for long from any exposition of the evolution of consciousness.¹ "The slow and cyclical movement," says John Caird. "The idea of God is of slow and late growth," says Ritchie. "The human mind is from the ~~beginning~~ moulded by ideas of which it can become directly conscious only by a slow and gradual process": "from the nature of the case [the process] must be long," says Edward Caird.

What, then, is the process whose nature is to be "slow"

¹ I have noticed, however, that Green avoids it: whether accidentally or deliberately, I do not know.

and "long" and [blessed word!] "gradual"? The word "cyclical," which J. Caird combines with "slow," gives the key. It is the life of reason translated into its timeless evolution; the process in which the human spirit is "forced onward by an immanent logic," the direction of which, and I suppose the rate also, "it does not rest with the individual' to choose.

Now what has the epithet "slow" to do with this process? Why must it be "necessarily" long? Why should anybody—the savage or the civilised Agnostic—have to *wait* for its results? What wonderful power is that in the savage which enables him to keep the "inner dialectic" of his consciousness at a walking pace for thousands of years? What accident of climate, geography, or race has rendered the immanent logic so active in India and so torpid in the Solomon Islands? Is "consciousness" in the latter place bereft of its immanent logic? Have not the Solomon Islanders made a good start by "letting their consciousness go out to the object"? Why, then, do they fail to rehearse the rest of the programme—and to rehearse it *at once*? And what, once more, of Mr Herbert Spencer? How is it that he, having accomplished the process of reflection up to the point from which the next step would take him to the "end," suddenly sheers off, in defiance of all "inner necessities," evolutionary formulæ, and warnings that it rests not with the individual to choose the way he will go? To *confute* Mr Spencer is one thing; but to *account for* him, on this theory, is another.

In short, the thesis that every higher form of consciousness has been evolved from a lower form, even if well established, is not to the purpose. What the theory we are criticising requires is obviously the converse, viz., that every lower form evolves into a higher. It must do so if controlled by "inner necessities." We ought to see, therefore, a universal, nay, an instantaneous, submission of consciousness to the evolutionary programme. We see nothing of the sort. Oftener than not the worshipper of Mumbo Jumbo gets no further. His

consciousness sticks fast, and ever faster, at the "objective" stage; and it is not until the arrival of St Paul at his islands that he gets a new start.

Nor is the situation to be saved by the assertion, so often made, that "on the whole" consciousness evolves according to the programme assigned by these thinkers. "On the whole," like many other phrases used in this connection, is little else than a verbal contrivance for saving a fallacious argument from being brought to book, and merely serves to confuse the issue. The authors of this theory have appealed to history, and to history they must go. By what right, then, logical or other, can it be claimed that the particular movement of thought which "ends" thus is representative of the mode in which consciousness, "on the whole," evolves or must evolve? Many movements have ended otherwise. In spite of Green's ruling, the human intelligence has followed other directions in the past and is following others now, not to speak of innumerable arrested races whose consciousness, in the sense assigned, has not "moved" at all. Might we not say with equal truth, or with equal error, that consciousness "on the whole" does *not* evolve according to the formula under consideration? Consciousness, in the person of Bergson and James, and others who need not be named, has "leaped over the wall." Some, like Professor Pringle-Pattison, after reaching the "end," have subsequently deserted it. Plainly this one movement has no claim to stand as a privileged representative of how consciousness evolves "on the whole." And should not the philosopher feel embarrassed when, after decreeing how mind *must* evolve, he finds himself compelled to argue with a mind which has *not* evolved as he says it must?

At this point I am again reminded of Professor Muirhead's horse-dealer. It is tempting to apply these last considerations to the evolution of the moral consciousness—with the emphasis once more on the last word. For the theory which the higher standards of conduct develops out of the lower suffers from the same difficulty, viz. that it can exhibit no necessity. It

may be true that high standards or high qualities are developed out of low ones, but it is not true that the low invariably develop into the high.

It is not without the dread of presumption upon me that I proceed to name the fallacy which seems to me to underlie the argument of the distinguished thinkers whose words I have quoted. I believe it to be the familiar pathetic fallacy, against which, sure enough, the school to which they belong has been foremost in protesting, but which has here invaded the very citadel of their metaphysics. Not, however, till he views the theory as a whole is the presence of this fallacy suggested to the student's mind. Then he will become aware of it; not indeed in a form which is easy to bring to book, for it appears under many disguises, and enters into the argument by steps so gradual that the reader is hardly aware of the road along which he is being led. Turning round at last to consider his steps, he may, however, suddenly discern that throughout the whole of this fascinating and ingenious argument the process of reflecting on consciousness has been put back into the consciousness reflected upon, and the whole process of mental evolution has thus been turned into a *consciously acted logic*.

This will be understood if we consider the paradoxical problem which the evolution theory of consciousness sets out to solve. If the story you are going to tell is that of the *evolution of consciousness*, then it is plain that the ends which are being evolved must be *in* consciousness from the first. On the other hand, if the story is to be one of the *evolution of consciousness*, it is equally plain that the mind cannot be conscious of them all to begin with; for in that case there would be nothing to evolve. Thus a mode of statement has to be contrived which shall represent these ends (or stages) as at first present in consciousness though not consciously present. But here a great difficulty presents itself. If you lay emphasis on the fact that the ends are not consciously present, you are

open to the retort that it is not the evolution of *consciousness* you are talking about. If, to escape this, you emphasise their presence *in* consciousness, it would seem that the mind is conscious of them already, and no story of how it *becomes* conscious of them remains to be told. Thus there arises a perpetual see-saw of emphasis between the words evolution and consciousness. So far as evolution is needed there can be no consciousness; so far as there is consciousness there need be no evolution.

To meet this difficulty a step is taken which I cannot but regard as a wholly illegitimate compromise. "To begin with," the mind is represented as neither totally unconscious nor completely conscious of the ends to be evolved. A doctrine of betwixt and between is set up, according to which the mind along with a clear consciousness of the stage already reached, has a dim consciousness of the stages to come. The sharp distinction "present in *but not* present to" is thus qualified by an understanding that "present in" means *dimly* "present to." "It cannot be," says Caird (*italics mine*), "but that in *some form or other* the elements which belong to fully developed rational consciousness should present themselves to the mind of the savage."¹ And further on,² "he could not go out of himself unless there were present *in* his consciousness the idea of an absolute unity which embraces all difference." The words "in some form or other" thus become a means of reconciling these apparently inconsistent views. Indeed the vocabulary which Caird employs to describe the twilight region in which the two views are mingled is peculiarly rich. The main adjectives are "dim," "inchoate," "obscure," "latent," "confused," "incoherent," "implicit," "shadowy," "vague," "distorted," "incomplete," "imperfect," "anticipative," "haunted," "masked." With one or other of these words the mouth of the objector is instantly closed when he raises the difficulties aforesaid; and over the whole group broods that other word against the seductions of which every

¹ *Evolution of Religion*, i, 219.

² *Ibid.*

student of evolution should be religiously on his guard—the word “gradual.”

Now here, I venture to submit, the psychologist's fallacy is easily detected. It consists, of course, in treating a consciousness of what is dim to the person who is being studied as though it were a dim consciousness of what is clear to the person who is studying him; a consciousness of what is confused as though it were a confused consciousness of what is orderly; a consciousness of an evolving world as though it were the evolving consciousness of a world; a consciousness of low gods (or goods) as though it were a low consciousness of high gods. In short, “consciousness of degrees” is converted into “degrees of consciousness,” and the idea of development becomes the development of the idea.

No one needs to be told that if two sheets of metal, one of dull lead, the other of burnished silver, were hung on the wall before him, it would be flagrantly absurd to treat his perception of the dull lead as though it were a dull perception of the bright silver. Nor will he make the mistake of supposing that his perception of the lead can by any process of development be turned into a perception of the silver, as though the one thing were the germ of the other. The more he develops his consciousness of the lead, the more lead-like, if I may so say, and the less silver-like that consciousness will become. Self-evident, too, is the statement that the idea of a confused crowd is not a confused idea of an ordered regiment; and that no amount of “reflection” on my idea of a crowd will ever convert it into an idea of a regiment. And may we not be forgiven for asking what difference there is between these easily detected fallacies and a mode of statement which represents the savage's clear conceptions of Mumbo Jumbo as though they were dim conceptions of the Eternal God and the horse-dealer's code of ethics as though it contained a “latent” Sermon on the Mount? Is it not plain that the philosopher has here put back his own interpretative consciousness into the mind he is studying?

The doctrine of evolution as presented by the great thinkers I have named illustrates the degree to which, in modern times, metaphysics has fallen under the heel of biology. Our philosophers must not be described as having assimilated that science, which it was their duty to do; it should rather be said that they have succumbed to it, just as their predecessors succumbed to mechanics. Of the two masters, were a forced option put upon me, I would choose mechanics; for that is a master who, with all his crudities, at least allows us to make plausible explanations. In succumbing to biology we have burdened ourselves with all its difficulties, which are many, and failed, at the same time, to acquire the precision of its methods. The doctrine of an evolving consciousness is not only biology, but bad biology. It is easy enough to see that behind the entire treatment of mind, to which this servitude has led, there lurks the notion that mind is a *thing* with a hidden structure like the living body, or even with hidden works like a church clock—for the mechanical obsession is not altogether extinct even in these high latitudes: Consciousness becomes an envelope which wraps up or "implicates" certain secrets and keeps them there in the darkness, until by a "gradual" evolution it brings them into the light. But the moment we remind ourselves that it is consciousness we are talking about, all this imagery of implications and explications, of wrappings-up and unfoldings, of masks and disguises, of shells and kernels, acorns and oaks, becomes as inapplicable to the facts before us as the crudest of mechanical metaphors.

Before "evolution" can be used to explain consciousness or anything else an agreement must be reached as to what the term conveys. As yet philosophy is far from such agreement. It is not enough to say that the meaning of the word is obscure. Contending schools are using it in senses diametrically opposed to one another, each affirming it to mean precisely what the other excludes from its meaning. Hence the application of the word to the Life of Reason is in any case premature; thinking will never consent to be dominated

by a concept which has no defined status in the world of thought.

A comparison of the parallel passages quoted below will show this, and may possibly serve as a warning against the hasty use of "evolution" as a key to all the mysteries:—

EDWARD CAIRD.

1. "The essential characteristic of development is that nothing arises in it *de novo* which is not in some way preformed and anticipated from the beginning."—*Evolution of Religion*, i. 182.

2. "The idea of development excludes anything like an absolute break between one stage and another. The identity of a being that lives and develops is shown, above all, in the fact that, though it is continually changing in its whole nature, nothing absolutely new is ever introduced into it."—*Ibid.*, 199.

JOHN CAIRD.

"The whole future of the religious life is given in its beginning, but it is given implicitly as a principle which has yet to enfold its hidden riches and its all-subduing power. . . . Consciousness is a unity of difference which has developed by a necessary process."—*Introduction to Phil. of Rel.*, 281, 294.

HUXLEY.

"If the fundamental proposition of evolution is true, . . . it is no less certain that the existing world lay, potentially, in the cosmic vapour, and that a sufficient intellect could, from a knowledge of the properties of that vapour, have predicted, say, the Fauna of Great Britain in 1869, with as much

JAMES MARTINEAU.

1. "It is a contradiction of the idea of growth or evolution that the adult should have no characteristic predicates absent from the nature in its germ. . . . The very essence of the process is that it is made up of old and new. It brings the surprise of something fresh and incalculable."—*Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. 355.

2. "When an animal takes a step of evolution, the unity splits up into a plurality, the members of which are not alike, and among them are some (at least one) never present before. . . . In every instance the *new* elements contributed by evolution are the *true* elements."—*Ibid.*

JAMES MARTINEAU.

"The growth of the human mind is not like a process . . . in which ingredients are compounded and under every transformation may be recovered by analysis without anything over: as it advances it is not only *other* than it was, but more; and . . . conscience is a fact altogether fresh."—*Study of Religion*, ii. 27.

BERGSON.

"Of course the evolution of the organic world cannot be predetermined as a whole"; . . . "hence the unforeseeable variety of forms which life, in evolving, sends along its path."—*Creative Evolution*, pp. 91, 102.

"Most often when experience has finally shown in how life goes to work

certainly as one can say what will happen to the vapour of the breath on a cold winter's day."—Quoted by Bergson, *Creative Evolution*, p. 40.

to obtain a certain result, we find its way of working is just that of which we should never have thought."—*Ibid.*, x.

"Even a superhuman intelligence would not have been able to foresee the simple indivisible form which gives to these purely abstract elements their concrete organisation."—*Ibid.*, p. 6.

HEGEL.

"The time-difference has no interest whatever for thought."—*Natur-phil.*, 33.

BERGSON.

"The flux of time is the reality itself, and the things we study are the things that flow."—*Ibid.*, p. 363.¹

L. P. JACKS.

OXFORD.

¹ This paper was read before the Aristotelian Society.

TELEPATHY AND METAPHYSICS.

THE RIGHT HON. G. W. BALFOUR.

IN a well-known passage in the Introduction to his *Elemente der Psycho-physik*, Fechner comments on the apparent impossibility of observing at the same time the psychical process and the brain-process which seems so inseparably connected with it. This impossibility, Fechner thinks, must have its ground very deep in the nature of things. He compares the case to that of the curve of a circle seen alternatively from within the circle or from outside of it; or, again, to the different aspects of the solar system according as it is viewed from the earth or from the sun. The same observer will never be able to see both aspects at once; yet the two aspects belong inseparably together, and are, in fact, but different appearances of the same thing seen from different standpoints.

These illustrations are, however, confessedly inadequate to represent the nature of the relation between mind and brain as Fechner conceives it, and he continues as follows:¹ "What appears to you, who yourself are spirit, when at the inner standpoint as spirit, appears from the outer standpoint as the bodily substratum of this spirit. The difference of standpoint is whether one thinks with one's brain, or looks into the brain of another thinker. The appearances are then quite different; but the standpoints are very different—there an inner, here an outer standpoint; and they are indescribably

¹ The passage has been translated in Mr M'Dougall's *Body and Mind*, and I avail myself of his version.

more different than in the foregoing example [of the circle and the solar system], and just for that reason the difference of the modes of appearance is indescribably greater. For the double mode of appearance of the circle, or of the solar system, is after all only obtained from two different outer standpoints over against it; at the centre of the circle, or on the sun, the observer remains outside the line of the circle or outside the planets. But the appearance of the spirit to itself is obtained from a truly inner standpoint of that underlying being over against itself—namely, the standpoint of coincidence with itself; while the appearance of the bodily self is obtained from a standpoint truly external to it—namely, one which does not coincide with it.

*“Therefore no spirit perceives immediately another spirit, although one might suppose that it should most easily apprehend a being of like nature with itself; it perceives, in so far as the other does not coincide with it, only the bodily appearance of that other. Therefore no spirit can in any way become aware of another save by aid of its corporeality; for what of spirit appears outwardly is just its bodily mode of appearance.”*¹

If we supplement this statement with another favourite doctrine of Fechner's, that of panspsychism, it is evident that a long step has been taken towards the Parallelistic view of the Universe in its most modern form. This modern form of Parallelism, which Professor Strong calls “Psycho-physical Idealism,” and Mr M'Dougall “Psychical Monism,” may be summed up in three fundamental propositions:—

- (1) Consciousness is the only reality.
- (2) No consciousness can directly apprehend another consciousness in its true nature as consciousness; but only as material phenomenon.
- (3) The relation between reality and phenomenon is such that physical process is everywhere the exact, complete, and sufficient counterpart of psychical process—a counterpart so exact, complete, and

¹ The italics are mine.

sufficient as to make it possible to explain all the processes which constitute the Universe in terms of the physical laws of matter.

It is important to bear in mind that these propositions, however naturally one may seem to lead on to another, are not connected by any logical necessity. Proposition (1) does not necessarily imply proposition (2); and propositions (1) and (2) might both be true without carrying proposition (3) as their inevitable conclusion.

If we start by excluding the hypothesis of solipsism, we may legitimately infer from the proposition that consciousness is the only reality the conclusion that matter is the phenomenal appearance of *some* other consciousness to our own consciousness. We cannot legitimately infer that *all* consciousness, so far as it is apprehended by other consciousness, must be apprehended solely in the form of material phenomenon. And, similarly, even if the truth of this latter proposition be granted in its fullest extent, it is evident that bodily form may be the only possible mode of apprehension of one consciousness by another, and yet essentially inadequate as an exact counterpart of the consciousness apprehended.

It is against the assumed adequacy of bodily form as the correlative phenomenon of consciousness in general that the opponents of Parallelism have for the most part directed their main assault. Proposition (2), which is the equivalent of Fechner's dictum that no spirit can immediately perceive another spirit, has, until within quite recent years, been allowed to remain practically unchallenged. In fact, not only Parallelism but the whole course of philosophic speculation has hitherto ~~rejected~~ the notion that one consciousness can directly apprehend another, or that the contents of different consciousnesses are in any way communicable otherwise than by signs or symbols which are in their nature physical. This imperviousness of mind to mind has for the most part been treated as self-evident and indisputable. I might give many quotations to illustrate this, but I content myself with one, which I take

from William James's *Principles of Psychology*. It has an interest of its own, because James in his latest writings adopted a view quite inconsistent with the one which he here treats as too obvious to be seriously controverted.

"The only states of consciousness," he says,¹ "that we naturally deal with are found in personal consciousnesses, minds, selves, concrete particular I's and you's. Each of these minds keeps its own thought to itself. There is no giving or bartering between them. No thought ever comes into direct *sight* of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being owned. Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature. Everyone," he goes on to say, "will recognise this to be true, so long as the existence of *something* corresponding to the term 'personal mind' is all that is insisted on without any particular view of its nature being implied."

This may sound decisive. Yet a doubt still lingers. "One might suppose," says Fechner, "that a spirit should most easily apprehend a being of like nature with itself." Considered as an abstract proposition, this is just what one *would* suppose. Moreover, the religious beliefs held by the mass of mankind certainly seem at first sight inconsistent with the denial of it. The religious consciousness, at all events in its higher developments, has never accepted mutual exclusiveness as a true account of the relation between the human mind and the Divine mind. In prayer on the one side, and inspiration on the other, it sees, not a mediated, but a direct communion between God and man. Not only are our thoughts supposed to be directly known to God, but the human mind, according

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 266.

to its measure, is regarded as capable of directly apprehending the thoughts and purposes of the Divine mind. This conception has of course also had its philosophic expression in more than one metaphysical system.

What both religion and philosophy have in view, however, is the relation between the finite mind and the infinite—a relation which it is natural to treat as something absolutely *sui generis*, and having nothing in common with the relation between one finite mind and another. Leibnitz, for instance, while admitting real interaction between the finite monads and God, expressly refused to recognise any interaction between one finite monad and another; and not altogether dissimilar is the doctrine held by Berkeley and others that we see all things in God.

Is there any reason to believe that between one finite mind and another there exists anything analogous to the direct communion which is assumed alike by religious and philosophic thought to exist between the human mind and the Divine mind?

An affirmative answer to this question is, in my opinion, forced upon any candid inquirer who will take the trouble to make a thorough study of the steadily accumulating evidence in favour of what is known as Telepathy.

Telepathy is commonly defined in a non-committal way as “the communication of impressions of any kind from one mind to another independently of the recognised channels of sense.” Taken thus broadly and without any ulterior implications, the case which can be made out for it is in my judgment overwhelming; but this case rests upon a multitude of details, covering so wide a field of observation and experiment that for the purpose of the present paper I must be content to assume that telepathy in the above sense is an established fact.

As to the significance of the fact, there is no doubt room for difference of opinion. Is telepathy essentially psychical in its nature, or is it physically mediated throughout? On our answer to this question must depend any estimate we may

form of its importance as a factor to be taken account of in psychology and philosophy. If it will allow of a physical explanation—for instance, if the transmission of an idea from one mind to another is to be ascribed to ether waves, as suggested by Sir William Crookes—the phenomenon, however remarkable and interesting, would not require us to accept any principle of action hitherto unknown to science. The alternative view is that telepathy involves direct apprehension by one mind of the contents of another. In that case we are in presence of a far-reaching discovery, the importance of which in the general scheme of things has, I believe, been very insufficiently appreciated. For my own part, having regard to the nature of the communications, and the great distances often separating the communicating minds without apparently affecting the result, I am unable to accept as even plausible any suggestion of a physical explanation that has yet been put forward. In this matter I am glad to find that I have the powerful support of Mr M'Dougall. In his recent work on *Body and Mind* he has expressed his views on the subject with an emphasis and a vigour of conviction which is quite refreshing:—

“So long,” he writes, “as we consider only the evidence of telepathy between persons at no great distance from one another, it is possible to make the facts appear compatible with the mechanistic assumption by uttering the ‘blessed’ word ‘brain waves.’ But the strain upon the mechanistic assumption becomes insupportable by it when we consider the following facts: Minute studies of automatic writings, and especially those recently reported under the head of ‘Cross-correspondences,’ have shown that such writings frequently reveal knowledge of facts which could not have been acquired by the writer by normal means, and could not have been telepathically communicated by any living person in the neighbourhood of the writer. In short, the evidence is such that the keenest adverse critics of the view which sees in these writings the expression of the surviving personalities of deceased persons

are driven to postulate as the only possible explanation of some of them the direct communication of complex and subtle thoughts between persons separated by hundreds and even thousands of miles. . . . There is good evidence also that in some cases three persons widely separated in space have taken part in expressing by automatic writing a single thought. Unless, then, we are prepared to adopt the supposition of a senseless and motiveless conspiracy of fraud among a number of persons who have shown themselves to be perfectly upright and earnest in every other relation, we must recognise that we stand before the dilemma—survival or telepathy of this far-reaching kind. The acceptance of either horn of the dilemma is fatal to the mechanistic scheme of things. For, even if the hypothesis of ‘brain waves’ be regarded as affording a possible explanation of simple telepathic communication at short range, it becomes wholly incredible if it is suggested as an explanation of the co-operation of widely-separated ‘automatic’ writers in the expression of one thought.”

I hope the importance of this statement of opinion, coming as it does from so competent a psychologist, may excuse the length of the quotation. The dilemma is, I think, exactly what Mr M'Dougall states it to be. Telepathy between the living “of this far-reaching kind” involves some very strange suppositions concerning the capacities and moral character of the “secondary selves” of the automatists. But no other sufficient account can be given of the cross-correspondences in some of the cases referred to save by calling in the agency of spirit communication. For my present purpose it is indifferent which alternative is adopted. Either of them would seem to imply a direct apprehension by one mind of the thought of another. In what follows I shall use the term telepathy in this distinctively psychical sense, *i.e.* as implying a communion of mind with mind which, if established, would carry with it a refutation of Fechner's dictum, that no spirit perceives immediately another spirit, but only the bodily appearance of that spirit; and of William James's, that no personal conscious-

ness comes into direct sight of a thought in another personal consciousness.

It is only right to say that much has been learnt on this subject since Fechner's day, and even since James published his *Principles of Psychology*. In James's later works the "absolute insulation" view was gradually given up. Already in his Gifford Lectures, published in 1902, on *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, he had come to doubt whether the phenomena of Religious Mysticism, in which the Mystic appears to himself to pass over into direct communion with some higher Spiritual Power, and in a manner even to become one with it, are entirely subjective. "It must always remain," he says, "an open question whether mystical states may not possibly be . . . superior points of view, windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world." He does not, indeed, himself accept this view, preferring to regard such states as a merging of the "supraliminal" in the "subliminal" self; but there is still room, he holds, even so, for the possibility that the subliminal self may on its part be merging in some spiritual influence beyond it.

In his Lectures on *A Pluralistic Universe*, James goes yet further. He has now come fully under the influence of Fechner's theory of the compounding of consciousnesses, and affirms that the drift of all the evidence we have seems to him to "sweep us very strongly towards the belief in some form of superhuman life with which we may, unknown to ourselves, be co-conscious."

All these mystical experiences I claim to be allowed to gather within the telepathic net. Whether you describe them as the merging of one consciousness in another, or the interpenetration of one consciousness by another, or the interaction between two or more consciousnesses, they are all cases in which one consciousness does perceive immediately another consciousness, and not its bodily appearance; they are all cases in which the supposed absolute insulation and impermeability of the personal self is broken down.

I maintain that this is the essential character of mystical experiences, even if we abandon the idea of a superhuman consciousness altogether, and ascribe them, as James does in his Gifford Lectures, to a merging of the supraliminal consciousness in the subliminal. Two consciousnesses cannot merge into each other, so as to produce these experiences, unless they are in some sense distinct from each other to begin with. Nor, if this be the true explanation, can we reasonably stop at mystical experiences. Once admit that there can be co-conscious selves or distinct psychical centres, associated together in the same human organism, it is hardly possible to resist the conclusion that their interaction must determine a large part of the normal psychic life of every one of us. And once admit that telepathy, in the sense of direct psychic interaction, actually takes place between one individual and another, it becomes at least plausible to conjecture that the interaction between co-conscious psychical centres in the same human organism is also of the same nature.

This view was maintained by me in a Presidential Address to the Society for Psychical Research more than six years ago ; and I see no reason to abandon the main conclusions there set forth.

That the human individual is *polypsychic*, that an indefinite number of streams of consciousness co-exist in each of us which can be variously and in varying degrees associated or dissociated, is now a doctrine widely accepted even by "orthodox psychology." The evidence for it is strong: on the other hand, there is the direct certitude that each of us seems to have of his true self as a strictly unitary consciousness. How are the two conceptions to be reconciled? How are we to conceive the relations of this true self to the organism as a whole and to the subordinate streams of consciousness associated with it, in such a way as to do justice at once to the unitary character of the personal consciousness and to the multiplicity of the factors which appear to constitute it?

This is perhaps the most fundamental problem of psycho-

logy. The answer I gave to it in the address above referred to is substantially the answer I give now. The true self of which we have immediate certitude is neither the organism as a whole nor any grouping of psychical centres within the organism. It is a single psychical centre, whose field of consciousness at any given moment is the expression of its interaction with its entire environment. In the larger sense its environment is the whole Universe other than itself. In the narrower sense its environment is the physical organism, and every psychical centre associated therewith, other than itself. With the physical organism and with these other psychical centres it is in a state of continual interaction of a more intimate kind than that which goes on between it and all other existences; and I see no reason to suppose that the interaction between it and the other concurrently active streams of consciousness within the organism, as well as between these streams of consciousness themselves, is not essentially of the same character as that which, as between distinct living organisms, we call telepathic.

If the views so far presented are well founded, the field of telepathic action must be regarded as a very wide one. It includes interaction between one embodied consciousness and another: between embodied consciousness and disembodied consciousness, if disembodied consciousness there be, and *a fortiori* between one disembodied consciousness and another; and last, but not least, between the different conscious elements associated in a single organism.¹ If all these forms of intercommunication really exist, we are clearly within sight of Frederic Myers' conception of telepathy as

¹ Interaction of the latter kind would naturally include the case of parent and offspring during the prenatal stage. The problems of heredity and embryonic development seem to be requiring ever more and more the assumption of a psychic element for their solution; and I venture to commend the above suggestion to Professor James Ward and others who uphold the "mnemonic theory" of heredity, but are dissatisfied with a purely physical explanation of the *modus operandi* (see Professor Ward's Henry Sidgwick Memorial Lecture for 1912 on "Heredity and Memory").

occupying "in the spiritual world some such place as gravitation occupies in the material world," and as lying, to use his expression, "at the very centre of cosmic evolution."

But the moment we begin to conceive of telepathy, not as something which occurs now and again in exceptional circumstances, but as the fundamental law of conscious life, many insistent questions arise; and with one of these, at all events, I will try to deal here.

If telepathy is the fundamental law of conscious life—in other words, if it belongs to the very essence of minds to interact with each other and in this way to reflect, in a greater or less degree, each other's content of consciousness—how comes it that the phenomena to which we can appeal as direct evidence of the law are comparatively few and far between? How comes it that it was not until the latter end of the nineteenth century that any such interaction began to be suspected?

On the hypothesis we are considering, the general answer to this question must be that, though the interaction is universal, the cases that force it upon our notice are exceptional. And if we examine the matter more in detail, I think we shall see that this was to be expected. Telepathy implies a modification of our consciousness arising from a cause in some sense extraneous to it, and yet not affecting us through the channels of sense-perception. The cases likely, in the ordinary course of things, so to arrest our attention as to lead us to assume such a cause, must satisfy one of two conditions. The first of these is that the modification of consciousness should come to us with a coercive force analogous to that which, in the case of sense-perception, carries with it to the unsophisticated mind immediate conviction of an external reality as its cause. The second condition is that there should be an observed coincidence between the contents of two minds which we find it difficult to regard as accidental or to explain in any mechanical fashion. The mystical experiences already referred to—ordinary hallucinations, specially vivid dreams, im-

pressions felt to be mysterious and unaccountable—are examples of the first case. Experimental telepathy, coincidental hallucinations and impressions, and cross-correspondences between automatic writers, are instances of the second.

None of these phenomena, with the exception of dreams, are of very common occurrence. But in addition to that, experiences of the first class, however convincing to those immediately concerned, are so easily explained away as “purely subjective” that it was not until the second class of cases began to be studied that the possibility of any other explanation was thought worthy of scientific attention. Now, however, in the light of the accumulating evidence for telepathic communication between persons at a distance, and of that afforded by certain of the phenomena of hypnotism and abnormal psychology, we are driven to face the possibility—which I believe to be more than a possibility—of a hidden telepathic interaction even in the normal everyday flow of ideas which we are accustomed to regard as wholly subjective and devoid of all cognitive significance.

But even when all this has been said, we shall probably feel that, if we are here dealing with a cosmic law, the rarity of what I may call evidential cases of telepathy between living human beings is greater than we should have expected, and calls for some further explanation.

I venture, therefore, to offer the following suggestions on the subject:—

Let me, for shortness' sake, call the spiritual interaction which, on my hypothesis, is continuous between different psychical centres directly associated with the organism, *intra-corporeal telepathy*; and that which takes place between different human beings, *extra-corporeal telepathy*. It seems to me that we have good grounds for supposing that the relative activity or intensity of intra-corporeal telepathy greatly exceeds that of extra-corporeal. Indeed, having got thus far, it would be not excessively rash to conjecture that one of the purposes served by the organism is to create and

maintain a special rapport between the psychic centres attached to it, and that, the field of clear consciousness being limited, the increased *internal* rapport thus produced would of itself operate to diminish the external rapport with other minds. Save in exceptional circumstances, therefore, the only external reality we are in conscious rapport with is that which affects our bodies, and which we cognise through the senses. Yet the interaction between mind and mind may be going on all the time, although its effects fail to reach the level of clear consciousness, and remain nothing more than an obscure modification of the total psychical content.

This speculation I pluck up courage to supplement by another, not put forward now for the first time, but possibly new to the readers of the HIBBERT JOURNAL.

Evidential cases of extra-corporeal telepathy depend for their cogency upon coincidence beyond what chance might produce. Such coincidences must, from the very nature of the case, be coincidences of particular with particular, and the more detailed they are the more convincing they will be. But detailed coincidences must, again from the nature of the case, be confined to a limited number of minds; and in practice, in what we call evidential cases, the observed telepathic correspondence is confined to two or at most three individuals. On the other hand, if telepathic interaction is universal, as we have supposed, the number of minds between which it takes place is unlimited. What form can we most easily conceive the expression of such general reciprocity to take?

I suggest that if an all-embracing psychical interaction is a reality, it is in the region of *universals* that we must expect to find it most clearly present. It will express itself in widely pervading general ideas; still more, perhaps, in the ultimate constitutive forms and categories which lie at the foundation of all cognition, and make a common universe for our common reason. Much stress has been laid of late years on the *intra-subjective* aspect of our conceptions, but this has usually been traced to the fact that we are not isolated individuals but members of

a society, communicating with each other not directly, but indirectly, after the familiar external fashion. My suggestion is that there is an intra-subjective intercourse that goes much deeper than this—namely, a direct intercourse of mind with mind; and that it is this latter intercourse which makes us, in a far more intimate sense, to be truly members one of another. *Evidential* cases of telepathic communication are rare, because *particular* telepathic impressions rarely reach the level of clear consciousness. When they do, they are generally accompanied by indications of what is known as psychic dissociation, of which trance is an extreme form. But cosmic telepathy may none the less be universal, only it is in universals that it finds its clearest expression.

Let me now turn back to the Psycho-physical Idealism which I made the starting-point of the present paper.

As we have already noted, the characteristic doctrines of this variety of Parallelism are, first, that all reality is of the nature of consciousness; secondly, that all reality other than our own consciousness is directly apprehended by us only in the form of material phenomena. I have no quarrel with the first of these doctrines, if taken in a sufficiently general sense. Broadly interpreted, it is not peculiar to Psycho-physical Idealism. No doubt, for many Idealists consciousness implies a conscious entity or soul, an implication which Psycho-physical Idealism is careful to exclude. But this is a distinction which need not trouble us for the moment. We may ignore it and still hold the view that that which we apprehend as physical phenomenon is in its real nature psychic and not physical.

But because *some* reality, although in its true nature psychic, may nevertheless appear to us as physical, it by no means follows that *all* reality must so appear. That this is the form in which all consciousness must appear to all other consciousness is a proposition forced on Psycho-physical Idealism by its third fundamental doctrine—namely, that the

physical Universe, though phenomenal, is an exact counterpart of the real or psychical Universe, which latter, therefore, can be adequately represented and explained in purely mechanistic terms.

Paradoxical and untenable as the dogma of a point-to-point correspondence between the psychical and the physical world appears to me to be, I do not propose in the short remainder of this paper to argue against Parallelism, but rather to use some of the Parallelistic positions in order to illustrate, if only by way of contrast, certain ideas of my own.

Let us consider, then, how Psycho-physical Idealism meets the central argument of Animism—the contention, namely, that the human consciousness, as we know it, runs in personal streams, each constituting a unity *sui generis* to which no collocation of the material particles composing a brain can possibly afford a complete correlative.

Fechner's answer practically comes to this, that the human individual is polypsychic (a view which I accept), and that his consciousness consists of many consciousnesses fused together into one. The answer seems to me to fall very short of what is required by the doctrine of a point-to-point correspondence between consciousness and the brain; for, whatever else may be said of the material elements composing the brain, there is no sense in which they can be said to fuse together into a unity. But, passing this by, let us look a little more closely at this conception of the compounding of consciousnesses. We are expressly told that, though the unity resulting from the composition is itself nothing but the components, nevertheless the components retain their separate individuality inside the larger unity, and may even serve as components not of one merely, but of many larger unities.

The logical perplexities attaching to this conception are notorious; but the way in which I would put the difficulty for my own purpose is this: If the fusion is complete, the individuality of the components is *ipso facto* destroyed; if the individuality of the components is in any degree maintained,

the fusion can only be partial. But a partial fusion of component consciousnesses is, I contend, only another way of expressing what I have employed the term telepathy to describe: it is a direct apprehension of one consciousness by another.

From this point of view we can see, I think, what Fechner meant by certain qualifying words which he added to his dictum that "no spirit perceives immediately another spirit"—words included in the quotation already given, although for the moment I passed them by without notice. Let me quote the passage again: "No spirit," says Fechner, "perceives immediately another spirit, although one might suppose that it should most easily apprehend a being of like nature with itself; it perceives, in so far as the other does not coincide with it, only the bodily appearance of that spirit." The qualifying words are: "in so far as the other does not coincide with it." I think this language must be taken to imply that in the compounding or fusion of one consciousness with another there are no degrees. Either the fusion must be complete, in which case the two consciousnesses coincide and become one; or else they remain external to each other, in which case the one can apprehend the other only in corporeal form.

Thus the Parallelists' assertion that the one consciousness is many consciousnesses, and that many consciousnesses *are* one consciousness, simply leaves us with an unsolved problem. They still conceive their unity with an absoluteness that excludes multiplicity, and their multiplicity with an absoluteness that makes unity unintelligible.

The result is, as it seems to me, that Parallelism loses all the advantage which its conception of a pampsychic Universe, consisting of consciousnesses graded down from the highest to the lowest, is capable of yielding. All immediate knowledge is, for Parallelism of this type, either of the absolutely real or of the absolutely phenomenal, and there is no middle term. Either we *are* what we know, and knowledge and being

coincide; or we are distinct from what we know, and then our knowledge is not of reality but of its phenomenon—a phenomenon as widely sundered from reality as extension is from thought, although nevertheless conceived as in some mysterious manner an exact counterpart of the psychic reality of which it is the phenomenon.

Now, if once we admit that one consciousness can apprehend another consciousness directly, and as consciousness, all these rigid distinctions go by the board. It is true that Parallelism and the assertion of the sufficiency of a mechanistic interpretation of the Universe go with them. But this is a loss which for my part I should contemplate without regret or misgiving.

I go with Psycho-physical Idealism so far as to conceive the Universe as consisting of psychical unities—let me call them centres of consciousness. These centres, however, I hold to be neither fused completely into one consciousness, nor yet to be isolated and independent of each other. Each reflects all the rest in different degrees of perfection like Leibnitz's monads. Only, unlike Leibnitz's monads, the relation between them is not one of pre-established harmony; it is a relation of real reciprocity. The relation may be variously described as interaction, interpenetration, merging, partial fusion, and the like, but its fundamental nature is *awareness of other*. As between the higher centres of consciousness this awareness of other is *telepathy* in the sense given to the term in this paper. As between *our* consciousness and the lower centres of consciousness which constitute the reality underlying material existence, the awareness (on our side) takes the form of perception. What it may be from the side of the lower centres themselves, and what the psychic relation of these centres *inter se* may be like, we have no means of imagining. But between telepathy and perception there is no unbridgable chasm. Awareness of other is the essence of both. And in both cases the knowledge which comes of this awareness is a knowledge of *appearance* in the sense that

it is knowledge arising from *interaction*, partaking therefore of the nature both of that which apprehends and of that which is apprehended. But we have no reason to suppose it to be *mere appearance*, or wholly unlike the content of the apprehended consciousness, as we should have to suppose if the human brain is the appearance to us of the human consciousness. This idea I reject *in toto*. In my way of looking at things, the brain is an assemblage of lower psychic existents, standing in a peculiar and special relation to human consciousness, modifying it and at the same time serving as its instrument, but certainly not to be identified with it. If the consciousness of the lower psychic existents which appear to us as matter could become known to us as it is in itself, we might after all find that the difference between the reality and its phenomenon was not so great as we are led to conceive it when we take human thought as the type of the reality and extension in space as the essence of the phenomenon.

The foregoing remarks, fragmentary as they have been, will perhaps suffice to explain why I have coupled together Metaphysics and Telepathy in the title to my paper. Telepathy, the reader will have noticed, has grown and grown until, under the name of "awareness of other," it has threatened to extend to the entire field of Being. It can only cease where the fusion between two minds is so complete that they cease to be two and become one. Fechner (if I understand him rightly) assumes the complete fusion to take place even in the human consciousness, although, illogically, as I think, he claims a continued existence for the many as such, notwithstanding their fusion into one. It was easy for him, therefore, to postulate a hierarchy of super-souls, culminating in a Pantheistic Absolute. William James recognised that Fechner's conception was incompatible with logic; but he required it, or at all events thought he required it, for his Pluralistic Universe. He accordingly threw logic deliberately to the winds, encouraged by the Bergsonian doctrine that reality is essentially

illogical, or at least alogical. But in this James seems to have had the worst of the bargain all round. If "the Absolute," *i.e.* the Pantheistic Absolute, had been the goal of his metaphysical speculation, the sacrifice of logic might have been a price worth paying in order to attain it. But James rejects "the Absolute," and ultimately presents us with a *Weltanschauung* which is rather pluralistic and theistic than pantheistic. This humbler goal, I believe, he might have reached without giving up logic, and even without being forced to accept that (to him) still more unpalatable alternative, namely, the hypothesis of a soul as an entity distinct from its passing conscious states. For myself, I am a believer in the Soul-theory; but in the language I have used I have sought to avoid raising this question, because, for the purpose of my argument, it appears to me that "personal streams of consciousness" will serve as well as "souls."

I may be wrong in imagining that my own view can be held without the sacrifice of logic, except of that type which James calls "vicious intellectualism"; and in any case I admit that it points to conclusions in other respects not so far from his—that is to say, to pluralism and theism rather than to monism and pantheism. For although it may be the final destiny of the individual consciousness to lose its individuality by becoming absolutely one with, and merged in, the Divine consciousness, I conceive this to be only the last stage in a progress of the individual from the lowest to the highest—a progress itself conditioned throughout by the interaction of all the psychic existences which together constitute the sum of things.

G. W. BALFOUR.

DOES RELIGION NEED A PHILOSOPHY ?

PROFESSOR W. R. SORLEY.

THE philosophy of religion has no monopoly of its topics. The questions concerning the being of God, the destiny of man, creation, providence, freedom, and the like belong to the philosophy of religion, but not to it only. They are the time-honoured subjects of discussion in many theological works whose writers would certainly object to being mistaken for philosophers; and they also occupy a prominent place in investigations which are purely historical or descriptive. To a large extent, at any rate, the philosophy of religion shares its subject-matter with other studies which do not profess to be, and are not, philosophical. If it is possible to vindicate for it an independent position of its own, it must have some characteristic point of view, or some characteristic method, which distinguishes it from the inquiries into the same topics carried out by the scholastic theologian or by the modern anthropologist.

How, then, shall we define the philosophy of religion? The question is not an easy one to answer. We are familiar with theology, which ought to mean—and I suppose does mean—the doctrine of God, whether as creator and providence of the world, or as its inner nature and essential reality; and theology, it may be held, is simply one branch—the highest branch—of philosophy. But then, if philosophy of religion simply means theology, it would seem better to keep to the old name. Again, we know that religion is a fact both of

the individual consciousness and of the social order ; and inquiries into the history of religion and the various forms which it has assumed are by no means a new thing, although new impetus has been given to them in our own day as a result of the larger range and exacter methods of historical and psychological investigation. This branch of inquiry also, therefore, belongs to a well-recognised science or pair of sciences, for which no other names than anthropology and psychology are needed. If, then, it may be said, we wish to know the true doctrine of God and set about seeking it, we are engaged in the study of theology ; on the other hand, if we are interested in human ideas about God as they rise and change in the development of races and individuals, we must seek an answer to our questions from the sciences of society and of mind. Theology we know ; and we know anthropology and psychology ; they are recognised fields of investigation ; but where is the place for this new department—philosophy of religion ? Or is it just a new name for the old studies or for some amalgam of them ?

It is indeed a new name ; and this fact is itself significant. However familiar the name is to us at the present day, it is still relatively new. In our terminology the term “theology” dates from Aristotle ; but I doubt whether the term “philosophy of religion” will be found in any writer previous to Kant. It does not seem to have been used even by Kant himself in his published writings ; but his work on *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason* is divided into four parts, each of which is described in the title as a portion of the “philosophical doctrine of religion.” The term “philosophy of religion” seems to have been used for the first time as a title for books or articles in the last decade of the eighteenth century ; it was common in the first decade of the nineteenth century ; and in 1821 a *Zeitschrift für Moral und Religionsphilosophie* began to appear.¹

¹ Cf. Krug, *Handwörterbuch der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, 2nd ed., 1833, iii. 507 ff.

The term, therefore, may be said to have come into use through the influence of Kant; and Kant was the destroyer of speculative theology. Towards the close of his *Critique of Pure Reason* he summarised all the interests of the human reason in the three questions: What can I know? What ought I to do? What may I hope? and in a letter written in 1793, at the time of the publication of his *Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason*, he speaks of these three questions as covering the whole field of pure philosophy—the field which it had long been his ambition to cultivate—and he assigns the first question to Metaphysics, the second to Morals, and the third to Religion.¹ Religion, accordingly, is regarded by him as the third and final part of pure philosophy; and its problem, like the two other problems, is stated in a characteristically human form: not, What is *God*? but, What may *I hope*?

In religion, accordingly, as in metaphysics and in morals, the problem is made to arise out of and depend upon the consciousness of man. The point of view is shifted from the nature of the object as something independent of the subject, to the capacity and interest of the subject himself. The change is characteristic; it is, of course, an expression of the critical revolution which began by substituting theory of knowledge for the traditional ontology. It is nevertheless worthy of note that it is carried out in this complete fashion—that it is made to apply to morality and religion as well as to metaphysics.

The change was not specially great as regards morals, for the purely objective treatment of ethics was rare even before Kant's day. But for theology it is salient and striking: both the method of approach and the method of treatment are altered. The older theology had, in various ways, offered proofs of the existence of God, and then gone on to investigate the divine attributes and the relation of God to man and the world. Kant proceeds in a different manner. He begins with the human consciousness, its interests and needs, and

¹ *Werke*, ed. Hartenstein, viii. 791.

makes them his point of approach towards an interpretation of life as spiritual. Just as his ethics starts from an analysis of the moral consciousness, so, in his theory of religion, he may be said to make everything follow from an analysis of the religious consciousness.

This emphasis on the religious consciousness, or on the facts of religious experience generally, is a characteristic of the philosophy of religion which has succeeded Kant's own inquiry, even when that philosophy has diverged most completely from Kant's own estimate of speculative theology. Accordingly, philosophy of religion is a new name, because it has to express a new thing—a method and point of view which differ from the old. In this lies the primary distinction between philosophy of religion, as it has been studied for the last hundred years or more, and the theology which preceded it, and which, needless to say, has survived in spite of the Kantian criticism, although not unaffected by it. The traditional theology was a doctrine of God, much as physical science is a doctrine of nature; philosophy of religion starts with an inquiry into certain features of human experience—the religious consciousness, to wit; it does generally rise to a conception of God and to certain theorems regarding his nature and relation to man; in content it covers a great deal of the same ground as the older study; but the difference of initial standpoint affects its method of dealing with the problems, even when the problems are the same.

The speculative theology which Kant criticised had formed the climax of mediæval thought; it had been systematised anew by Wolf, in whose hands the doctrines of Leibnitz had assumed the shape of a neo-scholasticism. The origin of the scholastic doctrine can be traced ultimately to two influences very different in kind from one another, both of which left upon it their mark. On the one hand there was the influence of Greek metaphysics which culminated in Aristotle, from whom the term "theology" comes. This theology or 'metaphysics' was the result of an effort purely intellectual—an attempt to

understand the nature of reality—and it found the explanation of the universe in mind or reason, from which all life and movement proceed. On the other hand, into the forms of this system of thought there had been thrown the content of Christian experience. This content had little in common with the material of Greek metaphysics. It was not primarily intellectual, and it did not trouble about the analysis of concepts. It had its roots in the historical tradition of the Jews, whose whole national consciousness was a consciousness of their race as chosen and controlled by a personal God; and this consciousness had, for the Christians, culminated in the life and death of Christ, chosen, forsaken, triumphant. His followers lived through his experience in their own lives; their religion lost its racial character; but their consciousness of God as the source and guide of their lives gained in inwardness and in fitness for universal application.

How these two factors became united and issued in Western theology is a long story; and, although the result concerns us, we need not linger over the historical process. Indeed, the process was no mere result of historical accidents; it had its roots in the fact that the two elements which interacted and united were derived from different aspects of a common life; they represented two interests which appealed to the same consciousness and could not have been kept permanently apart. •

Theism is arrived at in two different ways, and the creed varies according as one or other of these ways is taken. From one point of view it is a philosophical theory meant, like any other philosophical theory, to explain the universe. It gives a solution of the question which materialism, idealism, and agnosticism have, each of them, its own way of dealing with; and it has on occasion been allied with each. But its own essential characteristic is the doctrine that the universe as a whole must be interpreted in terms of that which is highest in the universe as known to us—in terms, that is, of mind or consciousness. It investigates the traces of intelligence in

the order of the world ; it follows out the principles, such as causality, which make knowledge of detail possible, and passes thereby to a view of the whole ; it elaborates the thought or idea of a perfect being. In this way it supports its conclusion by the well-known teleological, cosmological, and ontological arguments. It is a theory of the universe derived from a criticism of the conceptions by means of which things in detail and as a whole admit of explanation. It appeals to the same test as other and conflicting theories of the universe do ; and the test is this : Do the conceptions which it introduces fit the facts, and fit them better than other and competing conceptions do ? Theism, therefore, is a philosophical theory ; it has the same purpose in view as other philosophical theories, must submit to the same tests as they, and be justified by its superior ability to satisfy these tests. Once accepted, it may affect the emotional and active attitude of a man, just as materialism or agnosticism might do, though in a different direction, were they accepted ; but this result is a consequence of the philosophical theory, not its essence.

This is one way of theism ; and it appeals to a purely intellectual interest — the reason's interest in attaining a harmonious view of reality. But there is another way in which theism appears and in which it expresses primarily an attitude of the personal life as a whole. Reference to another topic may illustrate the difference. We can imagine, though it may be difficult to do so, a solipsist, that is, someone who thinks that he is the only conscious being in the world, and that everything else, including what we call other men and women, are simply modifications of his own consciousness. Or, better, we can imagine someone who, on intellectual grounds, is attempting to decide between the theory of solipsism and the theory that there are other centres of conscious life than himself, and similarly embodied to him. He weighs the arguments for and against solipsism in order that he may decide which theory gives the more satisfactory account of his experience. If he conclude in favour of the view that

there are other conscious beings like himself, he is not likely to behave towards others just as he would have done if he had come to the conclusion that they were only unconscious appearances. He is like the philosophical theist who has been convinced by argument that there is a Supreme Conscious Being, whose creation or manifestation the world is, and by that argument has had his practical and emotional attitude, as well as his intellectual convictions, profoundly modified. But in the case of most men (or rather of all men) it is not by any such process of reasoning that they reach the belief that there are other minds than theirs, and that they themselves are members of a society. On the contrary, they find the consciousness of others bound up with the consciousness of self, and they never need to question its validity.

What holds of most or all in the recognition of the conscious lives of others holds also of many as regards belief in God. It is not the solution of an intellectual puzzle, but the recognition of an object bound up with their own self-consciousness. The life of the spirit is not primarily an affair of the intellect; knowledge enters into it, but theory is in the interests of life. As a man's spirit awakens and expands, he experiences division and discord in his own nature and in his attitude to life; and, in his search for satisfaction or harmony, the more salient features of the religious consciousness emerge: he becomes conscious of a spiritual power not his own in which he can trust, which reconciles him to the purpose of life and gives him confidence of victory. This consciousness appears in many different forms, and perhaps no general description will fit them all; a satisfactory definition of religion is perhaps hardly possible, for religion is a principle of growth. Its cognitive aspect also varies greatly. At times the consciousness of God would appear to be as immediate and vivid as our consciousness of other men, and even more immediate and vivid than that consciousness, so that the spirit of man holds intimate communion with the spirit of God. At other times, and perhaps for the majority of religious people, there is no

such clear and intimate consciousness, *but a trust in a spiritual power less distinctly grasped, and yet sufficient to sustain the will and transform the attitude to life.*

This form of theism is of the nature of a personal attitude—a belief in something near and present—rather than a philosophical theory of the universe. But once adopt this personal attitude, and the world can no longer bear the same aspect as it might have done before. It cannot be a purposeless play of atoms, or the stage-furniture of some tragic-comedian, or the veil of an unknowable. The power that transforms the personal life transforms the world also for the believer. He sees all things in the light of a divine idea, and as fitted to achieve a divine purpose. If he thinks of the world at all—and he must think of it—the religious man brings to it an interpretative conception: he too has his theory of the universe.

These two ways of theism may be illustrated by a quotation borrowed from Dr Ward: “Suppose the earth were wrapped in cloud all day while the sky was clear at night, so that we were able to see the planets and observe their movements as we do now, though the sun itself was invisible. The best account we could give of the planetary motions would still be to refer them to what for us, in accordance with our supposition, would only be an imaginary focus, but one to which was assigned a position identical with the sun’s position.”¹ To adapt this example to the present purpose. For the first way of theism, God is the imaginary focus, hidden by the clouds of day, but postulated to account for the behaviour of objects which are seen by the clear though pale light of the night-time. But for the man of religious vision it is not so. The heavens are clear by day as by night, and he can see God plain—see Him in the very position of the philosopher’s postulated Deity, the focus about which all wandering souls revolve. The distinction, however, is not absolute between the philosopher and the man of divine vision. Our illustra-

¹ *The Realm of Ends*, p. 230.

Fog, indeed, might suggest so much. It is not often, at least in this climate, that no mist or cloud obscures the light ; but the mist is seldom so opaque as to prevent some rays of the sun from shining on our path ; and the drifting clouds alternately hide and reveal the source of day. It is the same with the religious consciousness : sometimes shrouded in utter darkness, sometimes wrapped in the glory of God, but more often seeing darkly as in a glass, or alternating between hours of gloom and moments of vision.

The two ways of theism start from different sides, but they tend to meet and overrun each other's path. The theism of philosophical theory passes on to affect a man's active and emotional attitude ; and the theism of religious experience, in its turn, tends to produce a world-conception of its own. It would be strange indeed if the two ways did not overlap, different as they are in their inception : if religion were a mere matter of personal experience, and had no influence on one's view of the nature and purpose of the world-movement, or if theism were simply a philosophical theory which left the imagination cold and the springs of action untouched. Yet the mind of man is complex enough to admit of this strangeness happening—if only on occasion. Religion may be little more than an emotional experience, and the subject may turn his eyes away altogether from the riddles of life ; or, on the other hand, the theistic proposition may be kept so strictly within intellectual bounds that life is never quickened by it. Something like this is the case when God is represented as "afar off," and only related to us as the creator of the world and the author of the laws of nature. This view, which represents Deism in its extreme form (as defined by the tradition of the historians of philosophy and theology), does not involve any logical contradiction ; but it betrays a certain incompleteness of understanding which amounts almost to incoherence. God is, no doubt, according to this view ; and He is a spiritual being ; but by His own original act in creating a world He is prevented from having any direct influence on the spiritual beings

whom He has also made. They cannot know Him ; they can only know about Him by inference from the world and its laws ; spirit and spirit do not meet, but are sundered by material things.

Thus it comes about that the two ways of theism—the philosophical way which arrives at and uses the concept God for the purpose of constructing a theory of reality, and the religious way which starts from the facts of spiritual experience—do each of them spread outwards over the whole realm of thought, so that they combine and conflict. The history of theology is, to a large extent, the history of their interaction. Christian theology is a particular example of it. The purely speculative or theoretical framework came originally from Aristotle ; the religious impulse from Christian experience and the doctrines in which that experience was first expressed. This expression, however, had certain marked and enduring features : it was embodied in early records of the Christian life and teaching, and it was controlled and directed by the organisation of the Church. It was in formulating their doctrines that the leaders of Church thought came gradually under the influence of the conceptions already current in Greek speculation. There was sufficient affinity between them to admit of the old philosophy giving its form to the new doctrines whose basis and content were due to Christian experience. But the wealth and directness of this experience, and the teaching of the writings in which its earlier manifestations were recorded, resulted in a system of doctrine which diverged notably from the purely theoretical speculation of the Greek philosophers. Nevertheless, the latter's general conceptions were sufficiently flexible to give form to the new thought, and to make it possible to elaborate a complete doctrine of God and His relation to the world and man, which could be presented as derived from the Scriptures, and which could receive the imprimatur of the Church.

Accordingly, ecclesiastical theology was put forward as a system of revealed doctrine—not arrived at by mere reason,

but communicated by divine authority. It is certainly clear that, apart from the facts of Christian experience as recorded in the Scriptures, this system of theology could not have been arrived at. At the same time it was obvious that it included a number of doctrines which were common to it with alien, purely theoretical systems, which took no account of Christian experience and made no claim to any special revelation. In the interests of clearness a need thus arose for a discrimination between doctrines of the former sort not peculiar to Christianity and its special and characteristic tenets. Long before scholastic times there were many anticipations of the scholastic distinction between Natural Theology (which consisted of all the doctrines that could be arrived at by the "unaided" human reason) and Revealed Theology (which included both these doctrines and others which could not have been discovered without a special revelation). This is the traditional distinction between two kinds of theology, which has taken the place of the two ways of theism (and consequent two types of theology) of which I have spoken. Instead of the deeper distinction of the theism of philosophical thought and the theism of religious experience, we have the familiar distinction between reason and revelation. But this latter distinction, though familiar, is not really fundamental. Revealed Theology adheres to the interpretation of documents (or perhaps of the decisions of the Church). The special concern of this type of theology with the facts of the religious consciousness is, in this way, often obscured. But behind the Scriptures and behind the Church lies the experience which they express; and it is to this experience—not to the documents, and not to the ecclesiastical organisation—that revelation applies.

Both Hume and Kant, the great iconoclasts, were chary of references to Revealed Theology; it was against Natural Theology, or Speculative Theology, that they, and especially Kant, directed their criticisms. The validity of this criticism I do not discuss at present; but it is notorious that Kant's

criticism has completely changed the prevailing attitude of philosophers to the old natural theology. In more recent days a corresponding attack has been made upon the whole structure of Revealed Theology: it has been undermined by historical criticism of the documents on which it rests. How far these critical results are correct, and whether they imply the conclusion drawn from them, are questions which may be left without formal discussion; indeed I have no claim to enter upon such a discussion. But this at least is true, that they have produced upon the mind of the time a conviction that there is not—and even cannot be—in written documents or in the decisions of bodies of men, any valid ultimate authority for belief whether in the things of daily life or in the final meaning of the universe.

Both Natural Theology and Revealed Theology have thus fallen at least into comparative discredit. And I think that this fact is to some extent responsible for the shifting of interest from theology to philosophy of religion, and thus even for the currency of the latter term.

Here, again, we may be faced with the questions, After all, is there any real distinction between the two except the name? Is not this new-fangled philosophy of religion just the old theology dressed up in modern fashion? An opponent of the whole type of thought might complain that he is being confronted with two rogues in buckram suits, where there is only one real enemy. And a sympathiser with the old ways may suspect guile in the change of name, and fear that, in return for a light which is new and strange, the “candle of the Lord” is being snatched from his grasp. “If there is no such stratagem,” it may be said, “why should theology with its definite doctrines be supplanted by a subject whose name is suggestive of barren dialectics?”

Perhaps there is some reason in this complaint. It would certainly be absurd to suggest that the term theology should be dropped; and there is not the remotest probability that it ever will be. But theology has suffered from the tendency

of theologians to imitate the distinctions and precision of the departmental sciences. First we have the division into Natural and Revealed, and the limitation of the former to a philosophical inquiry in which religious experience has no place; and then we have Revealed Theology treating documents and not experience as the revelation. Apart from this historical circumstance, there might be no reason for the distinction between theology and philosophy of religion; but the latter term is useful because it indicates a certain difference from the method and scope of the traditional theologies.

The preceding discussion may enable us to formulate certain general characteristics of the philosophy of religion.

1. In this way of looking at it, the philosophy of religion is brought into line with other departments of philosophy, if we regard philosophy as an interpretation of experience. It is not the whole of philosophy, for not all our experience is religious; but it has to do with that portion of our experience which may be regarded as the highest and most comprehensive: for in it our life is brought into relation not with particular facts only or immediate issues, but with the ground and meaning of reality. Thus we may distinguish, within philosophy, a theory of knowledge which has to do with the intellectual attitude to things; theories of morals and æsthetics which are concerned with the values which we seek or find in experience and which we describe as good or beautiful; and a theory of religion, which starts from the specifically religious experience and rises from this and other data to inquire into the significance of man's life in the cosmos, and of the nature of that cosmos which contains within it man and his ideals.

The older metaphysics had also its three departments. These were commonly enumerated as Rational Psychology, Rational Cosmology or Natural Philosophy, and Theology—theories, that is to say, of the soul, the world, and God, regarded as separate objects of knowledge. The characteristic distinction between this doctrine and the method of treatment

which I have indicated is that the latter begins in each case from experience, from consciousness. By its very name the philosophy of religion makes a more intimate and human claim than theology—the doctrine of God. It too must rise, if it can, to a doctrine of God ; but it begins with man. When a purely agnostic position is adopted, theology ceases to exist ; but even for the agnostic religion must rank as a fact of mind and history, and as such it claims recognition and interpretation.

2. This explicit recognition of a region of experience as its basis is a second characteristic of the philosophy of religion. The facts of the religious consciousness, it is true, were not altogether neglected in the traditional theology. The idea of God was the starting-point of the ontological proof ; the feeling of dependence had been often appealed to in theistic argument ; and theologians possessed in the Bible the most complete record in literature of the religious experiences of a race and of individuals. But these experiences tended to occupy a secondary place in theology as compared with the doctrines about them laid down in, or inferred from, the Scriptures ; and the recognition and treatment of the facts themselves, whether as in the record or as in the consciousness of present worshippers, were apt to be unsystematic and incomplete. The philosophy of religion, in the modern sense, makes a deliberate effort to estimate these facts, and to estimate them in their entirety—whether they are of the nature of personal experiences revealed by the inquirer's own consciousness or recorded by others, or whether they are in the larger sense historical : displayed on the stage where nations play their parts, and exhibiting religion as a world-force, both in the continuous march of human development and at those unique epochs when men have seen a special revelation of the divine spirit.

3. An objection may easily arise at this point which will bring out a third characteristic of the philosophy of religion. "All this emphasis," it may be said, "on facts and on the

religious consciousness is so familiar as to leave us cold. We have seen in our own time sciences of this subject arise and flourish; but they have told us nothing which we wished to know on the questions to which the old theology at least professed to give an answer. They provide us with an abundance of facts, but have nothing to say about the significance of these facts for our own belief."

This objection leads up to the distinction which marks the true place of the philosophy of religion. It is true that the whole doctrine is based upon facts of experience; that, among these, the facts of religious experience occupy the central place; and that anthropology and psychology deal with the same region of facts. But the latter sciences only describe the nature and history of these facts; it is the business of the philosophy of religion to interpret them and estimate their validity. The distinction is one between description and interpretation. Religious belief is a fact which points beyond itself and beyond antecedent and consequent facts of like nature; and its significance consists in this further reference. The problem of interpretation requires us both to give precision to this significance—Does it, for instance, involve consciousness of a special relation between the self and a higher power, or belief in God? or in immortality? or in freedom?—and also to investigate the validity of this reference to something beyond itself.

4. In this way the question of the interpretation of religious experience allies itself with the old questions of speculative theology. If the religious consciousness points to God, the question also arises concerning the moral consciousness and our consciousness of the world: do they also point in the same direction or in a different? Even if we may not assume, as a postulate of method, that inquiry along each line must lead to the same kind of final explanation, we are certainly not at liberty to make the opposite assumption and to treat experience as a chaos which may be expected to suggest different explanations according to the

point from which one begins the investigation. We are at least justified in being on the look-out for harmony; and the philosophy of religion must bring its special results into relation with the results of metaphysical and ethical philosophy before it can regard its answers as complete to the questions of the significance and validity of religious experience.

If the religious consciousness were the sole ground for a spiritual interpretation of reality, and all other evidence were hostile or neutral, any philosophical solution would be blocked. For philosophy must seek an explanation of experience as a whole. This point has been already brought out in distinguishing the two ways of theism. For the theism which is based on religious experience alters the meaning of the world for the man who possesses that experience: he cannot be conscious of the presence of God in his soul and yet look upon the universe as the materialist looks upon it. If he attempt to do so, in the supposed interests of religion on the one side and science on the other, he sunders his experience arbitrarily into two discordant parts and satisfies the claims of neither. For each has interests across the frontier which is looked upon as dividing it from the other. Religion implies a faith that the values which it cherishes will be manifested in the real world; and it is impossible to fix the limits of science and exclude it from any department of human experience, even the religious. The philosophy which starts from religion and the philosophy which is based on science have had many conflicts in the history of thought. The former has nearly always allied itself with some form of idealism; the latter has frequently tended towards a materialism or naturalism in which the religious consciousness may be recognised as a fact but its claims to validity are set aside. Consequently, in the controversy between them it is impossible for the philosophy of religion to avoid taking part.

W. R. SORLEY.

INCIDENTS AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE LIFE OF THE RUSSIAN CLERGY, PAST AND PRESENT.

N. JARINTZOFF.

ONE sometimes finds statements in the English press about the "true piety" of the Russian. As a proof one is told, for instance, that the word *peasant* in Russian means a *Christian*. It does not. The Russian for "Christian" is *khrisianin*, while the "peasant" is *krestianin*. Young children mix up the spelling of these two words, and teachers in lower forms constantly have to explain that "*krestianin*" *does not mean* "Christian." It approaches the meaning in this way: The root of the word—*krest*—means a *cross*; with the picturesqueness of our language, it conveys the idea of the hardships of a Russian peasant's life—which are plentiful enough, Heaven knows, but scarcely a proof that Christianity is flourishing in Russia.

The religion of a Russian peasant is akin to fetishism. The miracle-working ikons, for instance, are strictly classified: the Holy Virgin of one place is "good for having children"—and childless people come from hundreds of miles to kneel before her nights long to "pray out" a child; while the Holy Virgin of another place is "good to keep childbirth away."

Similarly, one St Nicholas is the image to pray to for rain, and another St Nicholas is known for producing sunshine; and so on. Strangely enough, people know that both images are

meant to represent the same saint; yet the two different pieces of canvas are supposed to produce opposite effects.

The ordinary ikons can be seen in all houses except those of "unbelievers," and people—even belonging to "society"—are in the habit of crossing themselves and bowing to the ikons both before and after meals. It is a mere act of magic ritual. One often sees a man from the upper merchants' class (supposed to be very pious) crossing his chest with a dozen quick gestures of the bejewelled hand, keeping his cigar between his fingers all the time. Merchants as well as workmen often cross themselves before "overturning" (*oprokinut*) a glass of vodka into their mouths. Many pious people cross their mouths whenever they yawn. This is to prevent the Evil Spirit from entering one's scul through the aperture. These actions are typical of Russian "piety."

Thousands of babies have perished simply because, when the child is in any kind of fit, the women of the poorer classes have a habit of throwing a thick shawl over it and making the sign of the cross, which they continue to do until, often, the child is suffocated. As another instance of the same kind I recall a rich lady who has spoiled her grandson; when the boy—nearly ten years old—flings himself on the floor kicking and screaming in a fit of temper, she piously bends over him and crosses him again and again, repeating the words: "In the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost! . . . In the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost!" Only the other day the present writer received a letter from Russia which began with a common short prayer and went on thus: "You must copy this prayer and this letter nine times and send them to nine friends of yours. If you do, you will have a joy in the course of the next seven days. If you don't, a disaster will happen to you." Such is Christianity in Russia.

Every Russian is meant to wear all his life the little cross that is put round his neck at the sacrament of baptism. Only the "unbelievers" dare to take it off. But those who believe in its power most—peasants, soldiers, sailors—very often wear

on the same chain or silk cord a *ladouka*: this is a piece of cloth with something sewn into it—a bit of incense (*ladon*) against the powers of darkness, or a fish-tooth for luck, or a certain kind of grass to attract a lover, or another kind to make the beloved hate a rival.

The priests never argue against all this: it does not occur to them to do so. Of course, exceptions are found, but I speak of what is typical. Usually, the clergyman would not be listened to even if he did interfere; he would be deliberately told to “stick in his cassock” (*Znai, batiushka, svoi podriashnik*).

Certainly there is religious feeling in the hearts of millions of Russians, but it is not due to any influence on the part of the degenerate clergy. The form of religion with which the Church has to do is a blend of fetishism, ignorance, superstition, mingled with traces of artistic feeling. Educated society is drifting away from the ignorant clergy, who now in consequence begin to demand reform. But nothing will reform them until fresh currents of intellectual life flow freely in their midst.

A glance at the history of the Russian clergy will help us to understand the conditions now existing.

In the ninth century some Byzantine priests came to Kiev, “the mother of Russian towns,” and, according to the wish of the energetic Prince Vladimir, baptized the unsophisticated people all over his country. They knew next to nothing about Christianity, and in some places literally fought against the party of priests and the Prince’s soldiers who assisted in the mission. “Throwing off their boots, they ran out of their town gates to meet the intruders, and fought with them for two days and two nights vigorously,” says the history of the ancient trade-republic Novgorod.

This party of the Byzantine clergy, having won their position, gave a tone of superiority to their class in Russia at the very start, especially as they were really educated people, while the Russian folk were absolutely ignorant. The grandson

of Vladimir gave the clergy all judicial rights, and the ecclesiastical class in *his* time seems to have been fairly intelligent.

But later on, by a natural course of things, the clergy became purely Russian. All that was left of the Byzantine influence were the outside picturesque character of all Greek Church rites, the fascination of them over the poetical and emotional Russian nature, and the stamp of official significance which the monastic clergy had acquired. Neither the Russian hermits and monks nor the parish clergy had any moral or intellectual education, but the mutual help of Church and monarchy helped Moscow to attain absolute autocracy. The great Princes, later Czars, would bend their heads only to receive the benediction of the "Patriarchs of all Russia."

Many causes account for the dominant position of the monastic clergy—so-called *Black Clergy*. They had all possible support from the princes, owned monasteries and lands which flourished thanks to the gifts of the pious rich, and were free from taxation. Besides, every bishop received parish dues, victuals, and labour from the *White Clergy* (secular clergy) of his diocese. The monks received instruction in Scripture and in old Slavonic, which remains the language of the Church. The prominent monks took a notable part in the affairs of the principalities, and the Black Clergy thus grew into a superior caste.

The White Clergy was a caste too—through the custom that the son should inherit the profession, the post, and the parish of his father. But their condition was miserable. The caste had to provide for itself. The secular priesthood never had any regular pay, nor even casual support, from the government, and had to make its living from the voluntary donations of the parishes, while the parish churches mostly owned no land, and had to pay money and labour for the use of their grounds to the landowners. What is more, the White Clergy were treated by the government on equal lines with the peasantry: each priest and curate had to pay the humiliating *podushnaya podat*, which means so much "for each living

soul." They were relieved from the latter tax only by Peter the Great (1711). No system of regular pay was introduced till 1886, and it is only lately that a scheme of regular payment has been partly carried out. Only the "military," "naval," and "foreign" Russian clergy get a regular pay, because they are in the Civil Service. The parish churches occasionally own some lands, and the parish priesthood gets a casual support from the government for keeping their under-staff. But chiefly it still depends on the *Treby*—the rites performed on private demands of the parish. The only definite thing is "the pension for thirty-five years of irreproachable service," which amounts to £13 a year. The widows of the secular vicars receive £9 a year; the widows of the curates £6.

What can a Russian workman or peasant afford to pay his village priest for his services? What can he spare for building and keeping his village church? As to his private need of the clergyman's services, the *Treby*, he pays literally coppers for them, whatever they are: baptisms, funerals, marriages, reading the "passing-away prayers" over the dying, or "singing off the expiring," reading the Bible aloud through the three nights while the dead are left in the house, or giving benediction to a new hut or to a scanty Easter meal.

In towns, where the parishes largely consist of the merchants' class, the White Clergy are safe; but in small villages they were—and often are—actually harassed by want as much as the peasants themselves.

The state of constant need makes them fellow-sufferers, and causes the Russian peasant to look upon his instructor and spiritual leader with good-natured compassion, very often with humour. Few things can be more pathetic than the slight, dingy-looking figure of a hungry *batiushka* in his long, shabby robes, with his long hair made into a thin plait, treated by an equally hungry peasant with a philosophical good-humour. . . . "You stick to your psalm-book, *batiushka*, and don't you interfere with my business. Come along and

have a drink." And the dishevelled, thin figure is oftentimes seen of a night—rather embarrassed by the length of his robes—carefully led to his home by the stronger arms of his sturdy though melancholy companion.

On his Easter benediction round, the village priest has refreshment in each hut he visits, and carries home to his "old popadia" all little bits of eatables he cannot manage himself, wrapped up in scraps of paper. This is always done, and the peasants smile with satisfaction, and also with apprehension, when the poor man gradually becomes "jolly" and has to be helped or carried home, together with his bag of simple but sympathetically given presents.

It would be unfair to exact from these "spiritual leaders" a higher level of life than that of the rest of the country-folk. Each of them is struggling to get some sort of a parish; for centuries they were all of them left as ignorant as their flocks. Right up to the eighteenth century there were no organised schools for theological or any other teaching; the majority of the White Clergy could not read or write, and took the service by heart; those who could read had learned it privately, thanks to some lucky chance, and were teaching it only occasionally in their turn. How they managed the task of teaching can be seen from the fact that, less than a century ago, it usually took two years for a boy to learn his alphabet from his private tutor, some curate or psalm-singer.

Up to Peter the Great's time, the only educational centres for the clergy were the small schools at the monasteries, called academies, and the secular schools at the "bishops' homes and yards." These places were simply large inns belonging to the bishops, with churches attached to them. The bishops used to stay there on their rounds and take the services. Dozens, often hundreds, of people—everyone who liked—stayed there waiting for months to see and to hear the bishop, spending their money meanwhile on board and lodging, donations to the Church, and gifts to the numerous staff of the Black Clergy, monks and novices. There were small and quaint schools for

boys in these "yards," which were supposed to give ample education to the future priests.

Some of these places still exist, although they have lost their educational purpose. For instance, the "yard" of the well-known Father John of Cronstadt used to be, in the last decades of the last century, overfilled with religiously hysterical women. They came from the hungry peasantry as well as from the well-fed tradesman class. They did not ask for any teaching, but they were pining to see Father John's "miracles," and waited there for their chance to touch his robes and to be one of the suffocating crowd through which he squeezed himself while blessing it. To have him for a few minutes in one's own room in this inn cost a great deal of extra money; only gorgeously dressed women could afford it, while the poor, dirty peasantry breathlessly flocked outside the doors and down the staircases.

But cases of personal influence (good or bad) are rare in the history of the Russian priesthood. It needs some exceptional personal power to make the simple and yet independent Russian mind want a religious leader or instructor in his private beliefs and difficulties. This power of attraction is rare, and hence that striking absence of any moral bond between the clergy and the rest of the population—an absence which was hotly discussed by the two great statesmen, Count Witte and Pobiedonostzeff (in 1905), and which is now openly brought forward as an indication that "the Russian Church needs reform."

Besides, the lack of influence is certainly due to the lack of education amongst the mass of the priesthood. The general intellectual and spiritual standard of the White Clergy in the past can be illustrated by the fact that till the eighteenth century groups of priests who had their rank bestowed on them officially used to stand on the crescents and in the squares of the towns "looking for jobs." There were not enough churches in the land to provide posts for all of them, yet they did not like to leave their caste, as this meant either

soldiering or serfdom. They would even take monastic orders to avoid taxation and starvation combined. There is no need to add that this did not raise the standard of enlightenment in the monasteries. The unemployed White Clergy were so numerous that they were officially acknowledged as the "Crescent Clergy," and wandered about freely—ready to perform marriage, to bury anyone for a pittance in money, or to make monks of all who wished.

Besides the inheriting of the ecclesiastical posts, there existed a system of elections by village parishes; but towards the end of the eighteenth century this was announced by the government to be too "worldly" and was prohibited. True, the election system did work in a "worldly" way: those candidates would get the parishes who asked the lowest fees for the *Treby*.

Once a parish was obtained, it was usually *fixed* for one of the priest's sons beforehand; this was done officially by the bishop of the district. The other sons had to look out for parishes for themselves. When there were no sons in the family, it was the usual thing to have the post *fixed* in favour of the priest's daughter: this meant that the parish was to come into the hands of any man from the ecclesiastical caste who would marry the girl. This state of things lasted till the intellectual upheaval of the sixties, and was abolished only in 1869. On the other hand, a young man of clerical education (whatever that might mean) had no chance to get a post as a curate or vicar if he was married to a "worldly girl"—not a priest's daughter; but marry he must, because a bachelor could not and cannot become a priest in the Greek Church.

Needless to say, no trace of "holiness" was to be found in such marriages. One of the Russian writers of the last century, Pomialovsky, published in the sixties a series of reminiscences. Himself the son of a curate in the suburbs of Petersburg, he was sent to one of the elementary ecclesiastical boarding-schools, called Bursa, near the capital. Most of its

pupils became, on leaving, curates, under-curates, or psalm-readers, who are the undergraduates in the scale of ecclesiastical rank; the less fortunate Bursarians became shepherds, scribes, or vagabonds.

Like many other schools of this class, the Bursa existed on voluntary contributions of the district—but its nine hundred pupils were indeed the nightmare of the local donors! The details of the appalling squalor and filth, and the cruel, stupid, ugly, fiendish relations between the ignorant masters and their pupils, were such that it would be utterly impossible to offer them to an English reader. Dickens's picture of the old work-houses is a light thing in comparison. No imagination could depict the horrors of such a place. It must suffice to say that most of the boys remained there as long as fourteen years, and emerged from this hell when they were nearly thirty. In this period of time they were flogged four hundred times on the average. All human and humane aspirations were crushed out of them; and the knowledge knocked into them, at best, amounted to bad reading, a little spelling, some Scripture, odds and ends of rhetoric, geography, and arithmetic, and Slavonic for use in the church-services: all this was learned in one way only—by heart.

It was due to an exceptionally lucky chance of a friendship with the Samson of the school that Pomialovsky had the possibility of preserving his brain clear. Although he was himself turned by the horrors of the surroundings into a "sung-off-one" (hopeless, dead), his intellect helped him to observe things, and even to retain the capacity of feeling—which was next to impossible. The result was a minute description of these fourteen years of schooling, or, rather, of degrading the boys morally and physically. Pomialovsky's account created a sensation, and the general social movement of our "epoch of great reforms" finally made the existence of the Bursa itself impossible. Yet, one century has not elapsed since the time when the following incidents were common.

Some old and shabby woman would appear in the gloomy

buildings of the Bursa and, first of all, throw herself down on her knees before the inspector (headmaster), presenting him with dried mushrooms, or eggs, or a suckling pig, or plum-paste. With tears of humiliation she would ask him to "be a father" and to send some bridegrooms to see her orphan daughter, who had a parish fixed for her future husband, but nothing to eat until she was married.

The moment she was gone, a jovial cry would rise like a thundering wave and fill the foetid atmosphere of the immense building—a place of miasma and insects: "Bridegrooms! Bridegrooms wanted! Who is ready to marry? The inspector wants to see the bridegrooms at once!"

Queer individuals would answer to that call. They would emerge from the back benches—the so-called Kamchatka (remotest corner of Siberia for the criminals). On those benches they slept in their everlasting sheepskin coats, dressing-gowns, and old under-robcs inherited from their fathers, the village curates; there they drank and tortured each other for the sake of sport, year in and year out; and thence they were summoned "to the threshold" every day, to be flogged by their comrades or by the watchmen to the order of the infuriated instructors.

But now a dramatic situation would come, the whole place throbbing with excitement and joy. Those who came forward were the eldest, and therefore the possible candidates. The day was theirs! They were the centre of the school, envied by all the rest.

Several of them would go to the inspector, while nine hundred of their comrades remained eagerly waiting for the decision: who of the candidates would be permitted to go and see the fiancée on the next day?

Back they came to the evil-smelling classes (there were no other rooms to live in)—some of them only to be flogged for their impudence, others with the inspector's blessing, just according to his whim at the moment.

On the following day the heroes were rigged out by their

comrades' zeal and generosity. Off they would go, with five hours' leave for the interview. Pomialovsky says that some of them would find the expectant fiancée "too much of an old hag," and the resources from the parish too thin, and—brutes as they were—proudly decline. Others actually thought more of having a lark than of matrimonial considerations, and were content with the interview, the tea-party, and with "borrowing" some silk handkerchiefs which were on show, or pipes, or coppers. But the least exacting would marry on such occasions just to break the monotony of the abominable existence at school. Once married, they would receive the parish and the post of vicar or curate as the girl's "dot." Such marriages took place constantly, and were treated as a matter of course.

Let us pass from the middle of the last century back to the beginning of the eighteenth, when Peter the Great first took the question of both the White and Black Clergy in hand.

With the upright and public-spirited nature of a tyrant-reformer, he did not hesitate to apply his own measures. He ordered the foundation of numerous elementary schools at the monasteries, besides those depending on voluntary contributions, like Bursa. He founded secondary ecclesiastical schools, improved the "academies," and introduced a regular, though narrowly scholastic, programme of theological education. The village priests henceforth were to be examined by the bishops personally, before being appointed. But all the same he acknowledged the inheriting of the profession, which made the secular clergy a regular caste more definitely than ever.

Peter freed it from the soul-tax, but he made up the loss in other ways; thus the White Clergy had to provide villages and country towns with night-watchmen, the barracks with workmen, the prisons with instructors, and the cities with fire-brigades. All these odd duties continued to exist for a number of years after Peter's reign. His creative imagination breathed

life into everything he approached—*more often than not* a most unexpected sort of life.

Peter was most concerned with the Black Clergy: the more enlightened monks, their treasures and lands, their habit of interfering with the Czar's power, their luxurious manners of life in their seclusion, and their want of any spiritual influence over the masses.

It may be added here, referring to the last point, that Peter himself was typically Russian in this respect, and did not differ from any peasant. It usually happens that the Russian is fond of the atmosphere of church, of its imposing beauty, of the really beautiful singing (without any organ accompaniment), even of the Bysantine gorgeousness of the service; but, as we have seen, he dislikes any form of private preaching and personal instruction, any moralising and interfering with what religion he has in his heart. Save as he is influenced unconsciously by elevating surroundings, he minds his soul himself, and the church forms only a poetical framework to his own thoughts. A Russian peasant prays his own prayers, which he never read or learned, without books or music of any description in his hands. Everyone stands for hours in the Russian churches—there are no seats in them; and one can easily see how individual are the prayers of the people as they kneel and cross themselves and touch the floor with their foreheads, in all sincerity and simplicity of mind, whenever their spontaneous prayer prompts them to do so. No one takes any prayer-books or psalm-books to church; hardly anyone has them.

This characteristic of Russian piety explains the quaint way in which the clergy are treated: their performance of the ritual and all the ostensible part of their work is in demand, but the interference with private life and private beliefs is not wanted. In the ancient times, the women, children, and servants in the well-off houses would find it a pastime in their seclusion to entertain the wandering monks of any degree, and have pious chats with them over a refreshment. But a

Russian priest of the last half-century, especially in towns, takes care *not* to “go round and see how the people in his parish are getting on.”

When a vicar is quite sure that the members of some family are not unbelievers, he will call with his curate and under-curate just to give his benediction to a new home, or to a young mother with her baby, or to an Easter meal after the seven weeks of Lent. But he will be tactful enough not to go beyond his formal duties: he will slip on his golden brocade robes the moment he enters the hall, smooth his long hair, cover it with a tall purple-velvet hat, at once proceed to the corner of the sitting-room where the ikons are hanging on the wall, and start the special service without delay. His curate, in similar garments but without the velvet hat—his usually glorious mass of long hair forming a brilliant display—will assist the vicar with his enormous bass voice, which is the ambition and the pride of all good curates, and will fill the room with the blue smoke of the incense coming from his silver censer. The under-curate (psalm-singer) will light the incense and the wax candles which he gives to all those present (oh, the oppressive awe of all that in childhood!), and then will do his part in a high tenor. Whatever the hour of the day, all three of them will be offered refreshments after this service, and will have the money gently slipped into their palms at the handshaking when parting. But no vicar will ever think of giving moral advice or influencing his erring flock, even if he “knew all about them!” outside his official church sermon. The clergy are as far from this as from the Western way of organising village clubs or lectures, or funds for the poor. Their work is—ritual. Their flock is the source of their own living. The Russian mind is not inclined to listen to religious moralising, and it needs an exceptional personality to attain any influence over it.

In 1869 the bonds of the White Clergy as a caste were broken, the inheriting of the ecclesiastical posts was abolished, and these are given now to anyone who has the special clerical

education (which never includes a university course); the sons of the modern clergy enter any profession, their marriages to "worldly girls" are not exceptional, and no objectionable Bursa-matches take place any longer.

But there still remains a pathetic stamp of narrowness about the masses of the White Clergy—whether hopelessly poor in villages or well-off in big towns. Those parish priests who go beyond the sphere prescribed to them are promptly disrobed: instance the brilliant religious philosopher Father Gregory Petrov, in St Petersburg, whose sermons attracted all educated society in the nineties.

As to the Black Clergy, of whom all the higher ecclesiastical administrative centres consist, they still retain a distinctly official and reactionary character. When bestowed by Peter the Great, the official character represented a radical reform; but two hundred years have elapsed since, and modern reform, whenever it comes, will have to affect the "Spiritual Calling" in a somewhat different way.

N. JARINTZOFF.

HOW IS WEALTH TO BE VALUED ?

JOHN A. HOBSON.

A SCIENTIFIC valuation of anything can only proceed by way of quantitative analysis. A standard of valuation which should regard qualitative differences as ultimate would not be scientific at all. It might be æsthetic or hygienic or ethical, according to the nature of the qualitative differences involved. A strictly scientific valuation of wealth, or of cost, or of utility, or of life itself, must apply a single standard of measurement to all the various objects it seeks to value, *i.e.* it must reduce all the different objects to terms of this common denominator. It can measure and value all forms of purchasable goods or services, however various in nature, through the market processes which reduce them to a single monetary equivalent. It can measure and value labour-costs of different sorts, either by a monetary standard or by some measure of fatigue or vital expenditure. It can measure the utility of various sorts of food or of fuel, by comparing the quantities of working-power or output which upon an average they yield. It can ascertain the vital values of different towns and occupations, incomes, races, in terms of longevity, fertility, susceptibility to diseases, etc.

This method, essential to scientific analysis, carries an assumption that £1 worth of bad books is of the same value as £1 worth of good books. This assumption is true for the purpose to which it is applied, that of a market valuation. It assumes that a year's life of an imbecile or a loafer is worth

the same as a year's life of a saint or a genius, and so it is for the purpose of vital statistics.

This is, of course, universally admitted. Science proceeds by abstraction; it does not pretend to describe or explain the individuality or particular qualities of individual cases, but to discover common attributes of structure or composition or behaviour among numbers of cases, and to explain them in terms of these common characters.

So far, then, as the so-called value of anything, or any happening, consists in its uniqueness or idiosyncrasy, this value necessarily evades scientific analysis. It is only the common properties, the regularities, the conformities, that count for scientific valuation. Nay, more. So far as science takes account of individual qualities, it is in the capacity of eccentricities, *i.e.* it measures *the amount* of their variation from the average or normal. It cannot entertain the notion that there is any sort of difference which is inherently immeasurable, *i.e.* that there is difference in kind as well as in degree.¹

A scientific analysis treats all differences as differences of degree. So-called differences of quality or kind it either ignores or seeks to reduce them to and express them in differences of quantity. This endeavour to reduce qualitative to quantitative difference is the great stumbling-block in all organic science, but particularly in the departments of psychology and sociology. The difficulty is best illustrated in the recent extension of quantitative analysis into economics by the method of marginal preferences. Not content with the assumption that the particular costs, consumable qualities, etc., of any two articles selling for £1 each may be disregarded, and the single property of their market value abstracted for consideration, the mathematical economists now insist that the

¹ It was precisely on this rock that J. S. Mill's Utilitarianism split. He tried to incorporate in the quantitative calculus of Benthamite pleasure and pain distinctions of the quality or worth of different sorts of pleasure and pain, and failed to furnish any method of reducing them to common terms.

study of marginal preferences discloses important laws of the psychology of individuals and societies.

The whole process of expenditure of income appears to be replete with instances of the capacity of the human mind to measure and apply a quantitative comparison to things which seem to be different in kind. It might seem as if my desire to help the starving population of India in a famine and my desire to attend a Queen's Hall concert this evening were feelings, not merely of different intensity, but of such widely different nature that they could not be accurately measured against each other. And yet this miracle is said to be actually performed when I decide upon due consideration to divide the 7s. 6d. in my purse so as to give 5s. to the Famine Fund and to buy a 2s. 6d. ticket for the concert, instead of the more expensive ticket I should have bought had I not been lured to the famine meeting. I might have given the whole 7s. 6d. to the Famine Fund, and missed the concert. Why did I not? I must have performed the very delicate spiritual operation of reducing my humanitarian feeling to common terms with my love of music, and to have struck a balance which can only mean that I consider the additional satisfaction I would have got from giving another 2s. 6d. to the Famine Fund to be a little less than the satisfaction I would get from the concert. But this, of course, is a single crude instance of a far more elaborate process of comparison which underlies the whole expenditure of my income. After the routine expenditure upon necessities and comforts, which may be said to represent my habitual standard of consumption, has been defrayed, there are various attractive uses to which every other sovereign and shilling may be put. All sorts of different appeals of pleasure, duty, pride, press their claims through a thousand different channels. In order to apportion my expenditure as I do, I must be conceived as reducing all these claims to some common standard of desirability, and deciding how much to lay out on this, how much on that. That physical satisfactions can be compared with

one another by the application of some standard of pleasure may appear intelligible. But that a sense of moral duty can be brought into direct comparison with a physical pleasure, or that various duties can be compared in size or strength with one another, would seem almost impossible. Yet this seems to be done incessantly and quickly, if not easily. Even when it is claimed that some duties are so paramount that a good man will refuse to "weigh" any other claim against them, assigning them a value which, he says, is "infinite," the marginal economist will not admit the claim to exemption. "This only means that to him the total difference between the command of things in the circle of exchange that he already enjoys, and an indefinite or unlimited command of them, *does not weigh as heavy in his mind* as the dishonour or the discomfort of the specific thing he is required to do. It does not mean that his objection is 'infinite.' It merely means that it is larger than his estimate of all the satisfaction that he could derive from unlimited command of articles in the circle of exchange, and this is a strictly, perhaps narrowly, limited quantity."¹

For though there are men whose honour is so incorruptible as always to "outweigh" other considerations, the ethics of bribery make it clear that a weaker sense of honour can be measured against material satisfaction, and that is all that seems necessary to support the view that such qualitative distinctions can "be reduced to questions of quantity." Nor is it merely a matter of the monetary valuation through expenditure of incomes. Precisely the same problem arises in the disposal of one's time or energy. How much shall be given to the performance of this or that personal or family duty, to recreation, or to study? In what proportions shall we combine these activities? If a curtailment of money or of time is necessary, how much shall be taken from this, how much from that employment?

¹ P. H. Wicksteed, *The Common Sense of Political Economy*, p. 405. The italics are mine.—J. A. H.

But it is needless to multiply examples. When any scientific valuation is taken, all qualities are abstracted and quantities only are compared and estimated. As in economics, so in ethics. The moral struggle to resist a temptation is nearly always set in scientific psychology as a mechanical problem, for when the ethicist professes to introduce some imponderable "freedom of the will" he has to throw overboard his science. A "conflict of duties," as Mr Wicksteed recognises, implies that "duty itself is a quantitative conception."¹

Similarly with the scientific politician who seeks to make full use of quantitative analysis. He too is compelled to visualise and represent the psychological operation through which a political judgment is reached as a mechanical one, conceived in terms of size, weight, strain, or intensity. In his *Human Nature in Politics*, Mr Graham Wallas gives a very interesting example of the scientific valuation of a process of political thinking, viz. the process by which Mr Gladstone, in the autumn and winter of 1885-6, must be conceived to have arrived at his Home Rule policy, "thinking incessantly about the matter" and "preparing myself by study and reflection."

After describing, with the aid of Lord Morley's *Life*, the various studies and courses of reflection employed, the "calculations" of the state of feeling in England and Ireland, the examination of various types of federation, as found in past and current history, the statistical reports upon finance, law, and other concrete issues, considerations of the time and opportunity, the play of the emotional valuations, "the irresistible attraction for him of all the grand and external commonplaces of liberty and self-government," Mr Wallas sees the results of all this acquisition of knowledge and reflection gathering and being co-ordinated into a problem in which the factors are quantities and the solution "a quantitative solution," "a delicate adjustment between many varying forces."² "A large part of this work of complex co-ordination

¹ P. 409.

² *Human Nature in Politics*, p. 153.

was apparently in Mr Gladstone's case unconscious," an operation, he declares, "rather of art than of science." Now, since "the history of human progress consists in the gradual and partial substitution of science for art," it is desirable to bring out with clearer consciousness, and fortify with greater accuracy of knowledge, the processes of political thinking. "Quantitative method must spread in politics and must transform the vocabulary and the associations of that mental world into which the young politician enters. Fortunately, such a change seems at least to be beginning. Every year larger and more exact collections of detached political facts are being accumulated; and collections of detached facts, if they are to be used at all in political reasoning, must be used quantitatively."¹ Since the problems of political conduct are thus essentially quantitative, they can, in theory at any rate, be "solved" by science. "The final decisions which will be taken either by the Commons or by Parliament in questions of administrative policy and electoral machinery must therefore *involve* the balancing of all these and many more considerations by an essentially quantitative process."²

Now, how far is it true that any political problem is essentially quantitative and soluble by a quantitative process? It is, of course, to be admitted at once that the science of statistics will feed a statesman's mind with a variety of ordered and measured facts. But will this mind, working either scientifically or artistically, consciously or subconsciously, go through a distinctively mechanical process of balancing and measuring and register a quantitative judgment? A scientific setting of the process must indeed so present it. But then a scientific setting of any process whatsoever sets it thus in purely quantitative form. The real issue is how far this scientific setting is competent to interpret and explain the facts, and to deliver a judgment which shall be authoritative for the conduct of an individual or a society.

In order to test the scientific claim, let us take what seems

¹ P. 156.

² P. 159. The italics are mine.—J. A. H.

to be a very different sort of action from that of the politician or the business man—that of the artist. Follow the mind of the painter as he plies his art. Each of his operations, too, *involves* considerations of quantity and measurement, scope and focus, adjustment, co-ordination, balance, the application of definite blends of colours; optics, anatomy, and other sciences feed his mind with exact knowledge. A delicate adjustment of quantities in line and colour is *involved* in every part of his artistic operations. But does the operation consist of these quantitative arrangements, and can it be understood or “appreciated” by analysing them? Evidently not. Why not? Because in such an analysis or explanation the essentially qualitative or creative action of the artist, which gives unity and artistic value to the whole operation, escapes notice. Science kills in order to dissect. So in the case of every other art. A poem *involves* certain ordered arrangements of sound which may be expressed in quantitative terms of rhythm and prosody. But any attempt to “resolve” it into these forms loses its spirit, its unity, its value as poem. Students of the drama have sometimes explained or interpreted a tragedy of Sophocles or Shakespeare in terms of the gradation of intensity of the various emotions involved; the length of pauses or suspense; the balancing, relief, and interlacing of the plots or episodes; the relative strength or height of the climaxes and subclimaxes; the growing rapidity of movement towards the catastrophe. But can it be pretended that this “mechanics” of the drama can furnish a standard of appreciation, or supply laws according to which a “good” drama may be constructed or appreciated? No. An artistic operation is essentially organic, creative, and qualitative. None of these characters can really be reduced to quantity. Science by quantitative analysis can only account for the skeleton, not for the life that informs it.

I think this eternal inability of science adequately to interpret artistic value, or explain a work of art, will be generally admitted. It is due to the fact that this work and its value are inherently incapable of being expressed in quantities. The

difference between one picture and another, one poem and another, is a difference of quality. It is, of course, true that by a merely linguistic necessity we often speak of a picture as being "much" finer than another, and compare the "greatness" of one poet with that of another. But we are aware all the time that we are really comparing unlikes, dealing with qualitative differences. On no other supposition, indeed, can we understand the valuation set upon a work of genius as compared with one of talent.

"A little more, and what a difference !

A little less, and oh ! what worlds apart !"

What, then, do economists mean when they insist that qualitative differences, the desires and satisfactions which have such widely diverse origins and natures, can be weighed and measured against one another, and that problems of industry are essentially and ultimately quantitative ? Our examination of artistic activities has shown that in each case quantities are involved, and that in no case do quantities constitute the problem of action. But how, it may be said, do you dispose of the admitted facts that by means of monetary valuations these diverse desires and satisfactions are reduced to a common standard, are compared, and that a course of conduct is apparently based upon these quantitative considerations ?

The answer is that this is an entirely illusory account of the psychical process by which a man lays out his money, or his time, or his energy. He does not take the several uses to which he might apply the means at his disposal, reduce them, in thought or in feeling, to some common term, and so measure the amount he will expend upon each object that the "marginal" or "final" portion of each use shall be exactly equal in the utility it yields. The "marginalist" is correct in saying that the utility imputed to the last sovereign I expend on bread during the year must be considered to be neither greater nor less than that imputed to the last sovereign's worth of tobacco or books, holiday or charitable subscriptions. In precisely the same sense it is true that the last brushful of

green and brown and turkey-red expended on a picture has the same art-value to the painter.

Perhaps the issue can be made clearer by reference to an art usually considered less "fine" and more closely affected by quantitative considerations than painting—the culinary art. The composition of a dish is here expressed in proportions of its various ingredients: so much flour, so many ounces of raisins, so many eggs, so much sugar, etc. The marginalist would dwell upon the crucial fact that the last pennyweight of the flour, raisins, eggs, and sugar, taken severally, had an equal value for the pudding; and that these marginal or final increments were in some way causal determinants of the composition of the pudding, because, in using the ingredients, the cook took care to use just so much of each, and neither more nor less. And it is quite true that the delicacy of the culinary art will in fact be displayed in deciding whether to put in another handful of raisins, another egg, or a spoonful more sugar. But, from the standpoint of trying to appreciate the virtue or worth of the dish as a culinary creation, it cannot be admitted that any special importance or causal determination attaches to the last increments of the several ingredients. For it is evident that the "how much," and therefore the "margin," of each ingredient is itself determined by the conception of the *tout ensemble* in the mind of the creator or inventor.

And this evidently applies to every form of composition embodying some unity of design or purpose, whether the treatment of a subject in pictorial or dramatic art, the making of a new dish, the construction of a machine, the arrangement of a business, or the laying out of a garden or a fortune. So far as an economical use is made of materials or means of any kind for the attainment of any end this marginal equivalence is *implied*. The scientific analysis of any composite arrangement—mechanical, organic, conscious—involves this marginal assumption. It is an axiom of all "economy" whatsoever.

But it explains nothing. Nay, in dealing with any organic

being on any plane of action, it darkens counsel. It does so in several ways. First, by assuming or asserting that the human mind can and does get rid of qualitative differences by referring them to a quantitative standard; secondly, by assuming or asserting that organic unity can be broken up into its constituent parts and explained in terms of these measured parts; thirdly, by assuming or asserting a uniformity of nature which conflicts with the "novelties" in which creative energy expresses itself. All these fallacies are just as much involved in the attempt to explain the expenditure of an income as a purely quantitative problem, as in the attempt to explain the art-value of a picture in terms of the respective quantities of space and colour. In each case the root-fallacy is the same, the illicit substitution of the abstract "quantity" for the actual stuff, which is always qualitative, and is never identical in any two cases or at any two times.

In laying out my income, I do not, in fact, compare all my several needs or tastes, and, having assigned so much utility or desirability to each, plan my expenditure so as to spend on each just as much as it is worth, equalising all expenditure at the margins so as to maximise the aggregate. Even Benjamin Franklin or Samuel Smiles would not really do this, though they might think they did, and perhaps draw up schedules to enforce the notion. So far as I act like a free, rational being, not a creature of blind custom or routine, I employ all my personal resources of knowledge, taste, affection, energy, time, and command of material resources in trying to realise my ideal of a good or desirable life. In the execution of this design, however it be regarded, self-realisation or career, I utilise my various resources in a manner strictly analogous to that in which the artist employs the materials and instruments of his art. Upon the canvas of time I paint myself, using all the means at my disposal to realise my ideal. Among these means is my money income. Its expenditure goes into the execution of my design. So far as I am justified in separating my expenditure of money from the expenditure

of my time and other resources, and in regarding the design as an "economic picture," I can readily perceive that the unity of my artistic purpose involves and determines the expenditure of my income in definite proportions upon the various objects whose "consumption" contributes to the design. But these proportions are not determined by a calculation of the separate values of the various items. For, strictly speaking, they have no separate value, any more than have the lines or colours in a picture. Only by consideration of what we may term indifferently the artistic or organic purpose of the whole can a true appreciation or valuation be attained. The full absurdity of suggesting that anything is learned, either in the way of valuation or of guidance, by the quantitative analysis, or the wonderful discovery of equivalence of value at the margins, will now be apparent. This mathematical analysis can do no more towards explaining the expenditure of income than explaining the expenditure of paint. Of course, the expenditure at the margins appears to produce an equal utility; that truth is obviously contained in the very logic of the quantitative analysis. But that quantitative analysis, necessarily ignoring, as it does, the qualitative character which the organic union of the whole confers upon its parts, fails to perform the psychological interpretation claimed for it.

So far as it is true that the last sovereign of my expenditure in bread equals in utility the last sovereign of my expenditure in books, that fact proceeds not from a comparison, conscious or unconscious, of these separate items at this margin, but from the parts assigned respectively to bread and books in the organic plan of my life. Quantitative analysis, inherently incapable of comprehending qualitative unity or qualitative differences, can only pretend to reduce the latter to quantitative differences. What it actually does is to ignore alike the unity of the whole and the qualitative-ness of the parts.

Nor is this all. It is not even true that an application of

quantitative analysis does find exact equivalence of values at the margins. Taking a concrete instance, it is not true that the last sovereign of my expenditure in books equals, or even tends exactly to equal, in utility that of my last sovereign's expenditure on bread. This would be the case if the future tended precisely to repeat the past. In that event my experience of the economy of last year's expenditure would progressively correct any errors, and I should come to employ my resources with greater economy or exactitude to the attainment of the same design. But I am not the same this year as last, my environment is not the same, my resources are not the same, and the plan of life I make will not be the same. This awkward factor of novelty, involved in organic nature, enters into every creative art, being indeed of the very essence alike of art and of creation, and impairs to an incalculable extent the quantitative calculus and its marginal interpretation. An addition of £100 to my income this year cannot be laid out by calculation so as to increase each sort of expenditure to an extent which will secure marginal equivalence of utility. That is to say, I cannot tell what will be the best employment of my larger income until I have tried. The larger income will produce nowhere a strictly proportionate increase of expenditure on a number of several objects. It would shift my economic plan of life, making a new kind of life, and involving all sorts of changes in the items, which follow as consequences from the changed organic plan. This new plan I cannot accurately calculate or forecast. It will work itself out as I proceed. Its execution involves, no doubt, elements of forethought and even calculation; but the central and essential change will proceed from some novelty of conception, some qualitative change of purpose. In a word, it is the creative power of man, the artist, that is ever at work, and the art faculties of inspiration, faith, and adventure will lead him to experiment anew with his resources. As a man gains more intelligence, undergoes some new critical experience of his outer or his inner life, encounters some new personal

influence, his entire mode of living will change, and innumerable alterations in the outlay of his income will take place. Some articles of earlier expenditure will disappear, new articles will take their place, and the respective importance of many articles remaining in the expenditure will be shifted. A change of residence from country to town, a "conversion," religious or dietetic, a transfer from an outdoor manual to an indoor sedentary employment, marriage, or any other critical event, must bring about some such large complex organic alteration. A comparison of the items of expenditure before and after will shed interesting light upon the results of the psycho-economic change of which they afford a quantitative register; but it cannot be regarded as an explanation of the change of heart or of outlook which is the determinant act from which these shifts of values flow.

The life of a society presents this same problem on a larger scale. On the plane of economic conduct which directly concerns us, every one of the innumerable and incessant alterations in methods of production and consumption ranks as an organic novelty, and, in so far as it is novel, necessarily baffles qualitative analysis and scientific prediction. It would, of course, be incorrect, either in the case of an individual or of a society, to represent any change as entirely novel. Organic growth itself is largely a quantitative conception: the changes are proportionate in size to former changes, and are in definite quantitative relations to one another. The doctrine of continuity thus enables us to go far in calculating the character of future changes. So far the scientific interpretation of uniformity of nature carries us. But quantitative growth, or any other set of quantitative changes, however calculable, always carries some qualitative and essentially incalculable elements of change. These are what we signify by novelty. It is their occurrence in evolution that baffles the clean logic of the geologist, still more of the biologist, and far more of the psychologist. Whether they show themselves as "faults" or "sports" or "mutations," they represent

the disability of past experience to furnish "laws" for their calculation, and the practical importance which attaches to these incalculable or qualitative changes is very considerable. Though they may be comparatively infrequent and may appear on first inspection almost negligible breaks in the otherwise calculable continuity of the evolutionary process, their determinant importance is receiving ever greater recognition. In human conduct, individual or social, these mutations seem to play a larger part, chiefly by reason of the operation of the so-called "freedom" of the human will. For whatever philosophic view be held regarding the determination of the acts of the will, its operation scatters mutations thickly over the realm of human conduct. Hence it remains true that science can do so much less in explaining and predicting human history than in any other department of nature. No doubt here, as elsewhere, science hopes to apply quantitative analysis of such increasing accuracy as to enable it to determine and predict a larger and a larger number of such mutations. Since there doubtless exist quantitative conditions for every qualitative change, it may seem theoretically possible for science some day to catch up with "the art of creation." This supposition, however, assumes that the number of permutations and combinations in "nature" is limited, and that, therefore, in some extensive run history does repeat itself. The final victory of science thus seems to depend upon the adoption of a cyclical view of the history of the universe. But, for all present practical purposes of social processes, science is so far removed from this perfection that the economist and the sociologist are continually compelled to allow for unpredictable changes of such frequency and of such determinate importance that their claim to direct "the general will" and to mould the conscious policy of a society must be very modestly expressed.

Such laws of causation as they derive from past observation and experiment must usually be conceived as laws of tendencies, seldom endowed with any rigorous authority of close deter-

mination, and still more seldom with accuracy of quantitative prediction.

It is sometimes supposed that this hampering effect of the uniqueness, irregularity, novelty, and freedom of the individual and social organisms can be got rid of by a process of multiplication in which particular eccentricities will cancel. To economists, in particular, there is a strong temptation to fall back upon the average man, in the belief that scientific determinism justifies itself through averages. Now, the radical defect of measurement by averages, as a mode of social valuation, has already been disclosed. The ascertained fact that the average money income, or even the average real income, of the British people had risen 10 per cent. within the last decade disables itself, *by the very process of averaging*, from informing us as to the effect of this increase of national wealth upon national welfare. For this effect depends upon the distribution of the increase, and the process of averaging consists in ignoring this vital fact of distribution.

This defect of averages for purposes of interpretation, of course, involves a consequent defect for purposes of guidance in economic conduct. The calculation that a given course of national conduct—*e.g.* the expenditure of so many millions upon improved transport—will raise the national or average income by so much, loses all the worth of its superficial exactitude unless we know how much of the increase is going to the landlord in rising rent, how much to the labourer in rising wages.

This, of course, involves no repudiation of the true utility of averages, but only of the spurious accuracy which their forms suggest. The exact statement that the average income of an English family has risen 10 per cent. in the last decade does imply a reasonable probability that an increase of total national welfare has taken place.¹ But it gives no information

¹ Professor Pigou, in his *Wealth and Welfare*, discusses with skill and precision the measurable influences of an increase of the general dividend upon general welfare, but omits to take into consideration the "cost" factors which enter into welfare, however that term be defined.

as to the amount of that increase, and is consistent with the fact that there may have been a decrease, owing to a worsening of the distribution of the growing income, or of the labour and other costs involved in its production.

So far upon the supposition that welfare is a quantity. It will occur to statisticians that the information to be got from averages of income may be justified by nicer discrimination. If, in addition to learning that the average income of all families has risen 10 per cent., we discovered the different percentages which had been added to rent, interest, profits, and wages, or, better still, the ratio of increase for the different income levels, we should surely then, by this extended use of averages, get nearer towards a quantitative estimate of the increase of welfare that had been achieved!

This must certainly be admitted. By the nicer and more complex application of these measures we should approach a more accurate account of welfare, so far as it is ultimately expressible in terms of quantity. If we discovered that a proposed course of national policy would not only increase the average income by 10 per cent., but would increase the lower incomes of the population in a higher ratio, we should seem to have got a scientific warrant for the policy. But even this degree of scientific authority would be purchased to some extent by an artificial simplification of the actual problem of social economy. To the statesman no problem of actual finance is capable of being set in such distinctively quantitative terms. Not merely cannot an earthly Chancellor of the Exchequer know how much can be added to the incomes of the several classes by the expenditure of so many millions upon transport, or upon any other single service; but, if he could, he would not be much nearer to the standard he requires. There are many different ways of raising the revenue in question and an infinite number of combinations of these ways. The same holds of expenditure. To take the simplest case: The ten millions that he raises may be applied to transport, or to education, or to defence—all the sum, or any proportion, to

each. Each expenditure claims to be beneficial, an outlay for public welfare. But the benefit in the several outlays is not equally presentable in terms of money income, and, so far as definitely economic gains accrue, they are not equally immediate or equally assured. It is evident that no amount of possession of statistical knowledge can possibly reduce the problem entirely, or even mainly, to one of quantitative calculation. It is equally true that when the problem is solved, its solution will appear in quantitative shape, *i.e.* so much money for transport, so much for education, so much for defence. It will seem to have been worked out by reducing the three forms of desired benefits to common terms, and then dividing the ten millions among them so as to secure an equivalence of gains at the margins. Economists will point out triumphantly the alleged fact that the last £100 spent on education produces a national return of welfare exactly equal to that obtained by the last £100 spent on gunboats, though the assertion remains inherently insusceptible of proof. In truth, the Chancellor's mind does not work in this way. So far as his statecraft is disinterested, or even allowing for every form of bias, his mind forms an ideal of social progress, of a happier or better state of things, and allots the outlay of his ten millions in an endeavour to assist in realising this ideal. Now, the ideal itself is not chiefly a product of quantitative calculus, but of his more or less informed imagination and his more or less wholesome sympathies. His views as to the means of realising this ideal can never be purely scientific, though science may here be of considerable assistance.

If, treating expenditure more widely as an act of public policy, we consider it as an operation of the general will of the community, a true act of political economy, the problem remains essentially the same. When looked at through scientific spectacles, it is a purely quantitative and mechanically ordered act, because the scientific method by its very *modus operandi* ignores the qualitative factors. So the nation is supposed to balance this gain against another, and to lay out

its revenue so as to get the largest aggregate of some common homogeneous stuff called "welfare" in such a way that the last £100 spent on education is equivalent in its yield of this "welfare" to the last £100 spent on the latest super-Dreadnought or the last line of electric trams in London. In truth, the common will no more functions in this fashion than the personal will of the Chancellor. In each case statecraft is an art, and the financial policy is an artistic or creative work in which quantities are used but do not direct or dominate.

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A CENTURY OF CHANGE IN NEW TESTAMENT CRITICISM.

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ONE hundred years ago the science of biblical criticism showed more of chaos than of order. It was still occupied with the primal struggle for existence. Semler had demanded "free investigation of the canon," but encountered a tradition little less despotic than a dogma: that the canon had been determined by divine authority. As in most disputes there was right on both sides. Had the traditionalists controlled the situation, historical inquiry, with all its light upon religious development, would have been suppressed. The religious perception that a given writing—the Fourth Gospel, let us say—is of supreme value to spiritual life would have predetermined the historical question of its date and authorship. Rational understanding and appreciation would have been precluded. Had the critics, on the other hand, had their way, the almost self-evident right of the church to determine the contents of its own literature of edification, irrespective of dates or authorship, might have been denied. For even Baur continued to define biblical 'introduction' by the term "criticism of the canon"; as if better knowledge of the historical origin of a given writing could qualify me to say to my neighbour, You ought, or you ought not, to use this book in your devotions.

There was false definition of the issue. Apologists were defending traditional dates and authorships as if Tertullian's definition of canonicity were infallible, and no Scripture could

have religious value unless it had an apostle (directly or indirectly) for its author. Critics conducted their polemic as if they too accepted Tertullian's definition and had no further concern save to prove—or more often disprove—the church's theory of origins. The result was an era of negation. The apostolic authorship traditionally attributed to all the New Testament writings, and assumed to be indispensable to canonical standing, was denied in all cases save the greater Pauline epistles. In most cases it was disproved. In admitting only Galatians, Romans, and First and Second Corinthians as certainly Pauline, questioning the authenticity of First and Second Thessalonians, Philippians, Philemon, Colossians, and Ephesians, and denying the relation of the other New Testament writings to their supposed apostolic, or quasi-apostolic authors, Baur represented the current trend of criticism. Negatively he went very little beyond other critics of his time. He differed from them, as from modern liberals, only in his greater scepticism regarding First Thessalonians, Philippians, Philemon, and Colossians. But destruction was the smallest part of his work. His name really marks an epoch in New Testament science as the inaugurator of constructive criticism. With Baur system began to prevail over chaos.

Before the formulation of Baur's theory criticism had already undermined the church's claim to possess a single document from the hand of a personal follower of Jesus. Baur's rejection of some of the smaller and later letters of Paul was a far less vital matter. It was to his mind merely a discrimination necessary to the absolute security of his positive foundation. In the four greater, undisputed, and (to his mind) indisputable, Pauline epistles Baur found his *πουν στῶ*. If he would proceed rationally from the known to the unknown the critic must make this his point of departure. Instead of contenting himself with adding a few more to the *disjecta membra* of the traditional canon by further disproofs of assumed dates and authorships, the critic must set about rebuilding the literature of the primitive church into an ordered whole. He

must pass from the literary to the historical phase of his subject. Baur undertook this reconstruction, using as the principle of unity the historical relation of each writing to the development of the nascent institution. He found for each its niche—so to speak—in the background of known events. He left to the ecclesiastic the theological standard of measurement, with its inference from edification value to apostolicity, and substituted the historical. Baur, in short, gave criticism its true place as the handmaid of history. He left the mere “critic of the canon” to debate with the apologist, and started the historian of religion on the great inquiry, What is the nature of that transition in religious thought of which these writings are the product, and to which, as such, they bear witness? As everyone knows, he followed almost in the footsteps of Marcion, the second century anti-Semite and Paulinist. He defined the transition to be that from particularism to universalism. The gospel preached by the Galilean apostles had been no more than a transcendental Judaism. The independence it achieved over limitations of race and nationality was due to the anti-legalistic application given it by Paul.

Baur, of course, did not follow Marcion into Gnostic docetism. He did not posit a divine revelation in Jesus, supposed to have been perverted and misunderstood by Peter and the Jewish party in the church and restored by Paul. But in taking the greater Pauline epistles as the real archives of the faith, more especially in appealing to Galatians, with its record of the collision of Paul at Antioch with Peter and “those who came from James,” for the indisputable proof of the great transition, Baur was only modernising upon Marcion. Paul became the real founder of the faith, whether Paul or Peter were the better exponent of Jesus. The small but radical school of critics, principally confined to Holland, who make Paul the only founder of Christianity, who ignore all relations with Palestine, and appeal to the relatively small traces of the influence of Paul during the age of evangelic tradition (A.D. 70–135) when Jerusalem was the seat of

authority as a ground for seeking the real origins of the faith at Rome in A.D. 120–140, have some justification for their claim to be followers of Baur. But it is his weaker side which they emphasise. Their relation to him is that of Marcion to Paul.

It is superfluous here to point out the overstatements into which Baur was led in the attempt to apply in detail his theory of the relation between church literature and church history. His own followers and disciples receded from his extreme scepticism regarding the later epistles of Paul. Critics of to-day recognise that Paul's first great battle for the faith, that against the Jewish legalists, was by no means his only one. Against an opposite tendency bent on assimilating the nascent faith to current types of theosophy, making of it only another of the Hellenistic religions of soul-redemption, Paul took the attitude which a Jew loyal to the hope of the prophets might have been expected to take. The later epistles exhibit Paul's own antipathy to a type of syncretistic Jewish theosophy, the forerunner of Gnosticism. Baur's rejection of these as post-Pauline was an error big with misconception. Nobody now holds to Baur's theory of the Synoptic writings, or to his extravagant dates, separated by an entire century, for Revelation and the other Johannine writings. We have one sure result of a century's criticism of the Synoptic writings. It is the dependence—I might almost say the mutually independent dependence—of Matthew and Luke on Mark. This reverses Baur's opinion. We have one surely datable writing in the New Testament outside the greater Pauline epistles—the Revelation of John. Extremely ancient tradition concurs with current criticism in dating it in 93–95 A.D. The other writings of the Ephesian canon which tradition has added to Revelation, as also writings of John, are (for their substance) not more than twenty years later. Baur dated Revelation in 66 and the Fourth Gospel a full century later. Here again was abundant room for misapplication of his theory. As already said, Baur was not primarily a critic. He never

attempted an introduction to the literature of the New Testament. He was a church historian; and his great service in both fields was to show their true relation, to lift New Testament criticism out of mere barren polemics against the despotism of tradition, into the creative service of history. It is the critic who labours in this interest, humbly loyal to the service of the history of religion, not he who applies a perverse and obstinate ingenuity to sustaining the lost cause of the priority of Matthew, who truly follows the leadership of Baur.

But church historians as well as critics have reaped some harvests in seventy-five years. Just as it is easy to-day to see the fallacies of Baur's theory of *Tendenz* when applied to the authorship and dating of epistles and gospels, so it is also easy, standing on the shoulders of Ritschl and Harnack, to criticise his theory of the interaction of parties in the church. The situation was much more complex than Baur conceived it; moreover, his idea of the opposition of Peter and Paul was extravagantly exaggerated. Galatians and Acts are quite agreed as to the complete friendliness and mutual satisfaction of Paul and the "pillar-apostles" at the critical interview in Jerusalem. On this point Baur's opponent, Lechler, was much more nearly right. Those whom Paul called "false brethren," "super-extra-apostles," "ministers of Satan" representing themselves as "ministers of Christ," are not the Galilean apostles; not Peter, not James, nor even "those who came from James." The aggressive Judaisers were really repudiated by the "pillars," as Acts declares. Paul did quarrel with Peter at Antioch; but it was not because Peter was consciously false to his previous concession—made along with John and James—of unqualified freedom from the law for Gentile Christians. One cannot seriously imagine the "pillars" assuming so self-stultifying an attitude. Peter never consciously joined in the propaganda of circumcision. Had it been, so, Barnabas, joint founder with Paul of the churches of Galatia, and fellow-champion with him at

Jerusalem of Gentile freedom, could not possibly have been "carried away with the hypocrisy." The speciousness of the plea of "those who came from James" lies in the fact that it really did represent the intention of the "pillars," and on the surface seems only a reasonable inference from the mutual compact. They only asked that the Gentile shall not "compel the Jew to Hellenise," as would inevitably result if the Christian Jew ate with his Gentile brother regardless of "distinctions of meats." Paul really stood for this compulsion, demanding at the same time that the Jew should *not* "compel the Gentile to Judaize." He does not accuse Peter of joining the "false brethren." His real complaint is only of the indirect effect on the Gentiles of Peter's vacillating conduct. The delegation "from James" had persuaded Peter and "all the rest of the Jews" at Antioch, including Barnabas, that they themselves, *as Jews*, were not personally at liberty to disregard the law. That is precisely the standpoint of Acts. We should infer it to be that of the "pillars" from Paul's own account. We have every reason to accept the Lukan representation that it was, and remained, that of Jerusalem, and of Antioch, and of the apostles generally. The error of Acts is simply in representing it to be also Paul's. It made certain concessions "necessary" from Gentile Christians when Jewish Christians were among them. But because Peter and his followers asked consideration for their own scruples from the strong-minded followers of Paul, Paul did not call them "false brethren." He called them "weak." Even the concessions of abstinence on the part of "the strong" he was willing to observe himself and to enjoin upon his followers, so long as they were not made to rest upon the permanent validity of the law, and imposed as "necessary" by apostolic decree. To admit the permanent obligation of the law on those who "being Jews by nature had sought to be justified by faith in Jesus Christ," to Paul's mind "made the cross of Christ of none effect." But the failure of Peter, Barnabas, James, and "all the rest" to see this could not result in the irreconcilable conflict Baur

imagined between Paul and the older apostles. The obnoxious propaganda of circumcision came from a wholly different quarter. Reconciliation with "those of Peter" was not only practicable within the lifetime of Paul, but even from his own epistles we have every reason to believe that it actually took place, very much as represented in Acts, on Paul's last visit to Jerusalem. It is only the interpretation Acts puts upon Paul's ritual performance in the temple which is necessarily wrong. Paul cannot possibly have performed it to prove that he himself set an example *among the Gentiles* of "walking orderly keeping the law," thus acknowledging its permanent obligation upon Jews. He may very well have performed it to prove that he so walked *among the Jews*, just because of its complete indifference.

Neither the extreme Judaising party nor the extreme Hellenistic has any direct representation in the literature of the canon. The New Testament writings are either "catholic" or Pauline. For examples of the extreme right and left we must look to the Ebionite and Gnostic literature of the second century. Baur's historical theory, like his critical deductions, was quite too vigorous and rigorous. The polemic literature of the first century survives only in the form of the Pauline letters because Paul had creative genius, while his opponents were commonplace traditionalists. But the post-apostolic generation, conscious as it was of their greatness, was also aware that they required careful handling as 'high explosives.' They contained "things hard to be understood, wrongly interpreted by the ignorant and the perverse." Relative neglect of Paul outside his own special mission-field, during the post-apostolic age, when Christianity as a whole required consolidation on the basis of apostolic (*i.e.* Syro-Palestinian) tradition, should occasion no surprise. The doctrine of great men requires dilution at the hands of the disciple and interpreter before its currency becomes assured.

What, then, remains of Baur's great antithesis of the Petrine against the Pauline conception? This: that Paul's

own religious experience led him to make the utmost of the distinction in *time* marked by "the manifestation of Jesus as the Son of God by the resurrection," while correspondingly obliterating geographical and racial distinctions; whereas the Galilean apostles admitted no new "economy" of God "changing the relation" of mankind to Himself from that of servitude to sonship, and correspondingly saw no objection to a "divided Christ," a "seed of Abraham" by descent and legal observance as well as grace, side by side with a seed of Abraham by grace and adoption only. The latter would, of course, be expected to make any concessions required for mutual fellowship. On the side of "the apostles" was the authoritative Scripture, which could only be violently wrested to fit Paul's theory of enactment for mere temporary discipline. On the side of Paul was his profounder appreciation of the religious value of the consciousness of "sonship" which had been the legacy of Jesus to the world.

Luke-Acts stands with the post-apostolic church in practically ignoring the great Pauline doctrine of the new epoch, the changed divine economy introduced by the sending of the Son and the Spirit. It takes to itself the utmost possible of Old Testament revelation, interpreting the remainder not as superseded in time, but as *racially* limited. The *ceremonial* law was meant for Jews to observe—perpetually if they saw fit—but did not concern the rest of the world. In the sub-apostolic age the breach with Judaism was continually widening. Christian Jews could be tolerated if they did not seek to impose Mosaism on their fellow-Christians. Unbelieving Jews were the murderers of the Lord.

Baur's theory of New Testament literature is fundamentally right in making the Pauline doctrine of the freedom of sonship the touchstone of classification. The true method would be to divide primitive Christianity into Apostolic and Pauline, especially if geographical boundaries were taken into account. After the great collision at Antioch Paulinism remained dominant only from the Taurus to the Adriatic, centering on

the coasts of the Ægean. Syria and Cilicia, Palestine and Egypt thenceforth looked to Peter and "the Apostles" as supreme authority. In the "East" Paul was accepted, even glorified; but—harmonised. The "apostolic" point of view is that of the Antiochian writer of our third Gospel and Book of Acts. It is not hostile to Paul, but it is utterly without understanding either of his gospel of grace and sonship by the indwelling Spirit, or of his apostleship from God. From the Taurus to the Nile Peter was supreme (or "Peter and James"). Rome and the West were debatable ground. They belonged naturally, as Paul claims, to his province; but his opportunity to occupy it was inadequate, and "they of Peter" had partially forestalled him. After Paul's death even Asia found it hard to preserve the Pauline gospel. The deeper developments of Paulinism, after Paul's death, were at Ephesus, the domain which, after the acceptance of Revelation, gradually passes from under the name of Paul to that of John. Loyalty to the great doctrines of Paul struggles with the endeavour to throw off ultra-Pauline Greek theosophy on the one side and to approximate "apostolic" standards on the other.

Baur's theory, then, of the development of Christianity was epoch-making neither for the correctness of its application in detail to problems of the origin and historical interpretation of primitive Christian literature; nor even for its masterly seizure of the great outstanding facts of truly historical significance, as the basis of a consistent view of Christian origins. These facts were the collision between Peter and Paul at Antioch, the subsequent opposition, and the consolidation of the great church in the second century under pressure of persecution without and erratic teaching within. Centralisation under apostolic authority is the inevitable note of the age, and the condition of such authority is harmonisation. That is, as Baur perceived, the characteristic of the post-apostolic age. Catholicism as we see it in Justin, Irenæus, and Clement rests upon this consolidation. Still Baur's greatest service was not in the creation of the famous formula of thesis, antithesis,

synthesis. It was, as already said, in subordinating criticism to history. But here, too, new times call for sweeping advances. As a *church* historian Baur thought of the great transition represented in the advance from a Petrine to a Pauline type of gospel, and the coalescence of both in the "higher unity" of second-century catholicism, as in the main a transition from particularism to universalism; and indeed there was an emancipation of Christianity from the swathing bands of Jewish legalism, to have free course and be glorified as the religion of the Empire. But there was something more and greater. It was the progressive evaluation of the religious significance of Jesus.

To-day our concern as biblical critics is with the history neither of church nor state, but of *religion*. Its course appears in the phenomena of religions. For us too the contrast between Old Testament and New, between "apostolic" Christianity as proclaimed in the name of Peter at Jerusalem and Antioch, and Pauline Christianity as developed in the Greek cities around the Ægean, marks an epoch. But the change is not geographical. It is not the mere breaking down of barriers to the spread of one of the existing religions. It is a qualitative change in human *religion* due to intermingling currents from various *religions*. It is intensive rather than extensive. There is indeed a widening, a transfer of the keys of the kingdom from Hebrew to Greek, and from Greek to Roman. But the change of religion itself from the political to the personal type is more significant. The epoch-making transition is the advance of the human mind from that type of religion which by emphasising the social ideal exalts moral obligation, to that type which by emphasising the individual ideal exalts mystical aspiration.

There is no more perfect type of the national religion than Judaism. The prophets made deliberate war upon the hope of personal immortality in the interest of national redemption. It could not be suppressed. After the Persian domination, and the subsequent sweeping influx of Greek influences, the

new party of the Pharisees formally admits the doctrine. But the transcendentalising of Israel's messianic hope in the later Pharisaism did not alter its fundamentally social character. Pharisaism reduced all the interests of life to the two categories of the here and the hereafter. Here to know the will of God and obey it; hereafter to enjoy the rewards of obedience. Such, to the Pharisee, was "all the Law and the Prophets." Judaism in this its dominant development was itself tending strongly to individualism, responsive to Gentile influence. But "the Kingdom of God" remains as ever its *summum bonum*, and this is a social ideal of the distinctly national type.

Elsewhere national religions had broken down. We know now, as Baur could not know, how, coincidently, the awakening sense of individual personality was throwing men back throughout the Græco-Roman world upon more primitive faiths. The welter of pantheons, philosophies, mysteries, theosophies, fell back upon the ancient chthonic cults, because these give symbolic expression to the longing of man's frail individual life for sustenance in the bosom of the divine. Hellenistic religion reduced human interests not to the categories of the here and the hereafter, but to those of the inward against the outward, the apparent against the real, "the things which are seen and temporal against the things which are, not seen and are eternal."

From the viewpoint, therefore, of the historian of religion, the beginning of our era marks indeed an immense transition. It is this new development in religion which makes it an era, the first era of world-wide acceptance. With Baur we may speak of the development as proceeding by the Hegelian norm of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. But it is far more than a mere geographical expansion, a liberation of developed Judaism through the opposition of Paul to legalism, followed by a later mutual adjustment. We should take Eusebius' *Preparatio Evangelica* as our guide-book, rather than Marcion's *Antitheses*. We stand confronting the epoch-making development of a new world-faith by fusion of the Hebrew,

social-ethical type, with the individual-mystic type of the Hellenistic religions, the "mystery" cults of personal soul redemption. Islam marks only a great reaction toward the Semitic type where the pendulum had swung too far in the direction of the Greek. Thesis and antithesis were present long before the irrepressible conflict of Peter and Paul at Antioch. The synthesis was not the work merely of Paul's peace-making journey to Jerusalem. That was only a milestone at its beginning. Neither was it the work of Western ecclesiastical diplomats, like Irenæus, who founded catholicism in the joint names of Peter and Paul at Rome. That was only one of the milestones toward the end. A greater and deeper work of synthesis had been done meantime by a nameless follower of Paul at Ephesus. It is the author of the Fourth Gospel who first showed the world how Apostolic Christianity could be transfigured by infusion of the spirit of Paul. He seeks to conserve the values of both the Apostolic and the Pauline gospel by a new interpretation of Jesus, the Christ—the Son of God. The creative epoch of Christian literature, the epoch of the New Testament, is fitly closed by the Gospel and Epistles attributed to John.

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THE EFFECT OF BIBLICAL CRITICISM IN THE WORK OF A CHRISTIAN PASTOR.

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WHAT is Biblical Criticism? (1) First, it is the scholar's lens through which the Bible is seen to be not, as to the naked eye it appeared, a compact, heavenly pronouncement, marked from cover to cover by supernatural sameness; but a gradual, expanding literature, marked from origin to climax by human fallibility and spiritual growth. (2) Secondly, Biblical Criticism is the historian's field-glass through which he, surveying the wide landscape of human achievement, can locate the Bible, can connect it with its Semitic kindred and antecedents, can compare it with the scriptures of other races and religions; so that the Bible ceases to be a lonely and unrelated portent, and has taken its eminent place among the sacred writings of mankind. Thus has Biblical Criticism wrought havoc and renewal. Verbal finality is gone, detailed and immaculate certitude is gone, the old inspiration—prodigious and singular—is gone, and with it the old outward authority; gone is the old detachment, aloofness from our common human story. But with the shedding of these faded attributes there have been unfolded in the Bible new glories and immensely fecund significance; and the very Spirit of the Book is perhaps beginning for the first time to break through its envelope into freedom.

For our purpose, therefore, Criticism has knocked from

the hand of the Christian Pastor the Bible in its literal domination, as a weapon of infallible reference; but has left the Bible in the Christian Pastor's hand as a treasury of supreme religious experience. Exact sayings, exact deeds may, many of them, be slipping out of the Pastor's reach, may one after another be silently passing beyond the frontiers of historical certainty into the vast surrounding regions of the dimly known, or the vaguely surmised, or the mythically narrated. But the great, central, saving *facts*, e.g. the Passion of our Lord, survive that exit and dispersion; they stand up more than ever sharply prominent and fixed. And the great, vital, spiritual *words*, issuing from the depths of the soul of the seers—for us Christians, issuing in ultimate disclosures from the depths of the soul of our Saviour; these luminous and mighty utterances charged with command and destiny, strangely adequate to the heart's desire, corroborated from age to age in their religious validity; these words, proof against critical corrosives, are found, we think, to tell the abiding secrets of the Eternal. That is Biblical Criticism.

What is the work of a Christian Pastor? It has varied from generation to generation even in this our native land. In the fourteenth century, Chaucer's "poor Parson of a town," devoutly teaching his parishioners, visiting the sick in his wide parish with the "houses far asunder," not let by "rain nor thunder"; or, on the other hand, Wyclif's carnal Priest, who is "covetous of worldly muck" and "a fiend of hell" and "no part of holy church"—in the seventeenth century, Mr Palmer, of the *Colonel Hutchinson Memoirs*, the Nonconformist Minister in Nottingham, who, continuing each week to preach from the grated window of the gaol, was locked therefor every Lord's Day in the coalhouse—in the eighteenth century, Thackeray's Anglican Chaplain Sampson, a reverend rake, a two-bottle evangelist—in the nineteenth century, George Eliot's Mr Irwine, Rector of the sweet old English village life in Hay-slope, kind, unpretending, a religious Clergyman even before

the Oxford Movement; or her Methodist preaching woman, of rapt vision and unearthly gentle attraction, Dinah Morris; or, to glance for a moment beyond our shores, Victor Hugo's good Bishop, Ibsen's *Brand*, Fogazzaro's *Saint*—these Christian Pastors, belonging to the same species, discover a good deal of heterogeneity in function.

A man must speak of that he knows. The present writer knows the work of an Anglican Clergyman in large rich and poor parishes of London. For our inspection that work may be cut into the following sections: (1) Preaching the gospel, (2) administering the sacraments, (3) conducting other public services of the Church, (4) teaching the young, (5) guiding individual souls; and in each section "the effect of Biblical Criticism," *i.e.* the effect of assumption by the Clergyman of the critical positions, will be noted. Observe that the entirely temporal side of a Pastor's duties, *e.g.* management of a workmen's social club or of a children's penny bank, is for our purpose rightly ignored.

1. To begin, then, with preaching the gospel. Subsections at once are needed, according as the sermons are delivered (*a*) to the educated,¹ (*b*) to the uneducated, (*c*) to the very poor in the streets, (*d*) in parochial missions.

(*a*) Educated people want—not sermons about Biblical Criticism, but sermons whose underlying assumptions are critical.

About ten years ago one hundred and sixty people of the professional and business class—lawyers, doctors, merchants, etc.—were cruising together for six weeks on a yacht in the Mediterranean. There were twelve Clergymen on board; eleven of them more or less conventional and strait, one a theological Liberal. The Sunday services, conducted first by

¹ The term "educated" here carries its light and conventional meaning, by which an ordinary public schoolboy or University man, an ordinary banker or doctor, or one of us ordinary clergymen is, in the wonderful clemency of words, said to be "educated."

one Clergyman then by another in the saloon, together with many private conversations, acted during those six weeks as a test or selective agency among those twelve clergy. The result was that on the last Sunday the Liberal Clergyman, alone, without any assistance from any of his clerical brethren, was invited to conduct the farewell service. This indicated that he met needs which the other clergy missed. He was cognisant of the passengers' perplexities and religious confusion; he knew that the older theological prescriptions would not cure the passengers' present malady; while he found that the essential purifyings, balms, and tonics of Christianity, appropriately mixed and applied, were, as ever, profoundly grateful to the souls of this average company.

The case of sermons is probably so throughout educated England. The accredited, orthodox teachers of religion stand at the entrance of the great national life. They knock at the doors of the hearts of the people, and they cry: "Lift up your heads, O ye gates, and be ye lift up, ye everlasting doors: and the King of glory shall come in." But the great puzzled nation, through its educated voices, replies: "Who is the King of glory?" And it is only in the light of heaven *to-day*—only when we have learnt, in some humble measure according to our poor ability, the intuitions of *modern* feeling, the corrections of *modern* intellect, the mandates of *modern* conscience, that we can find in the old rejoinder its latest growth, its new vitality and content, its living grandeur and everlastingness, and can say: "*The Lord of hosts, he is the King of glory.*"

The effect, therefore, of Criticism in the preaching of a Christian Pastor among the educated classes is to make him more effective and acceptable. This rule is impaired by two exceptions. Two classes of educated persons do not welcome the Liberal Pastor's gospel. On the one hand, the hard and established orthodox dislike this loose evangelist; they sniff destruction; the rivets of the ark are giving away; the planks are parting; and unknown waters yawn. Where are we?

Where are the old securities? "Where," cries the High Churchman, "are 'definite Church teaching,' and 'the first six Geneva Councils'?" "Where," cries the Low Churchman, "is 'the language of Zion'?" "Let us throw this Broad Church Jonah overboard." This orthodox taste for blood is, however, actually not common; it is found mainly among curates of a Dominican aspect and ravenous theological laymen, occasionally showing its crimson tooth in the visage of authority. What is common among orthodox persons annoyed by the Critical Pastor's gospel is more silent and more serious; it is pain felt by gentle, old-fashioned Christians; it is disturbance wrought among sisters, mothers, friends, of a piety which is unreflective but often fruitful in lovely life and deeds. Ah! we share in heart their hurt; but it is the price of advance; *per crucem itur ad regnum*. The fixed and satisfied orthodox, then, on one side break the rule that the educated classes incline to a critical evangel. There break the rule, on the other side, the offended and absent heterodox. These do not, as the phrase is, "go to Church." They have given up that particular mode of motion as hopeless. They are by no means irreligious; but their spiritual thirst is not slaked, sometimes even is aggravated, with the aridities often held to their lips from the Anglican pulpit.¹ They have heard of Biblical Criticism; that preacher apparently has not. They share in the religious convulsion, the reverend expectancy, the awful new-birth of our age; that preacher does not share in this august experience, but dwells apart in some small dogmatic chambers of his own. And so these average Englishmen, thoughtful and numerous, renounce

¹ We are engaged on an inquiry which, however humble, is scientific, and which must not be deflected or mitigated by sentiment. I will try to tell the severe truth. But the Church of my fathers is to me an object of altogether unspeakable attachment. Her clergy, even when they appear to be backward and exasperating in their doctrine, are often forward and saintly in their practice. And her genius, her corporate spirit surmounts the worst defects of us her Ministers, breathing over the lives of her children her own peculiar and (for us) surpassing benediction.

the Christian Pastors, good and bad—"renounce them all." On the whole, then, the two said grave exceptions modify, but do not annul, the rule that among educated people accepted Biblical Criticism enhances the virtue of the preacher.

(b) Among uneducated people the conditions change. Biblical Criticism here is a non-conductor. The Critical Preacher here is at a disadvantage. He does not suit his company. They crave for doctrinal colour and detail which he cannot supply. They want something definite and vermilion: he seems to offer them something hazy and grey. In the huge structure of theology he is concerned with the foundations, which he knows to be secure; they prefer the pinnacles, which he sees to be tottering. The homiletic taste of a working-class congregation is sometimes an affliction. A thoughtful preacher comes, and, in words of dignity and calm, narrates to the worshippers the divine, tender, elemental story of our most holy faith. They remain untouched and neutral; or, at best, they yield a mild, an almost condescending approval. A rampant young rhetorician arrives, straight from a theological college; a cheap-jack dealer in the questionable; he conducts a clearance sale of his wares—theological remnants and confident incredibilities; and he does a roaring trade, and his customers are delighted. Such incidents, whether of success or of failure, are, however, exceptional. In the long run only the religious temper, only spirituality tells. It tells among the uneducated sooner and more, if it approach them along the conventional theological channel; it tells among the uneducated later or less, if it approach them along the critical theological channel. But tell, sooner or later, more or less, here and everywhere, the religious spirit will. That, in our day of transition, is the Critical Pastor's hope. At heart the people want religion, not words. If, in the name of Christ, and in essential continuity with the inherited Christian experience of the eternal, the Critical Pastor, himself inwardly religious, offers to the people true religion, then the people will recognise it, even though to them the

language be strange and the messenger uncongenial. Schleiermacher discovers for us the secret and the method of teaching religion with one luminous remark : *Reality knows Reality*.

(c) Thirdly, pass to the very poor; and observe street-preaching in the slums, which sometimes is the duty of a Critical parish Pastor. Here his disability culminates. Here is a dirty, ignorant, candid, kind-hearted, spitting, swearing, sweating crowd. They gather round you — benevolent, puzzled, amused, ready for any new sensation, ready to listen. An ambassador of Jesus Christ ought to have something to say to them. I sometimes wish that writers in learned religious reviews could test their creed and their humanity with this experiment. Every man, of whatever erudition and mental distance from the mob, ought, if ever those brother men should surround him with their inquiring gaze, with those eyes so living, intent, pathetic, full of spirit, full of dumb and moving kinship with himself—every man ought then to draw from the depths of his own humanity and to impart to his hearers some word of help; some wave of charity. The Critical Preacher must overcome his own demerits here. From behind and through his own critical apparatus he can speak to them something human, something from “heart to heart” as they say; and, as Schleiermacher says, *Reality knows Reality*.

(d) Parochial missions demand a special kind of sermon, to agitate attention and to capture the hidden and determining purposes of men. Such preaching has sometimes been held to be alien from the Critical Pastor’s disposition, and even to be precluded from his endeavours. A modest experiment in disproof of that assumption was lately made in a large Northern town. In the combined Anglican mission preached there a Critical Clergyman was invited to join, expressly as a Liberal Churchman free in certain important respects from the confinement of the old orthodox constraints. His conduct of the mission in an important parish was reputed to have justified the attempt, it being declared on behalf of this Evangelical

congregation that "many had found courage to forsake cherished sins and inspiration for new tasks; that they had received a fresh and wholesome ideal of the Christian life, and an enlarged and purified vision of God."

2. In administering the sacraments the individuality of the Pastor dwindles almost away, and the power of the institution rules the imagination and the facts. The specific task of the Critical Pastor here is to help in gradually weeding out from these services of his church statements or implications which affront modern knowledge. In the services themselves he is the mere organ of the society. The little child is held in the minister's arms, and the waters of heavenly potentiality are poured on its brow; the weary pilgrim kneels at the altar of the Lord, and the bread of life is placed in his hands. The minister is nothing—critical, uncritical, hypercritical; rashly radical, or implacably conservative; it matters not. The Great Mother Church is embracing her children, or is feeding them with manna from above; and that is enough.

3. Like considerations obtain in conducting other public services of the Anglican Church; it is the institution which speaks, not the individual. In morning or evening prayer, in the marriage office, in the burial of the dead the minister must voice the spirit of the Christian centuries which breathes through the liturgy. The Critical Pastor, indeed, must strive to purge that consecrated and sublime utterance of anachronisms, of dead thought and language, and to make it the living tongue of the heart of Christendom to-day; but this duty lies on him as a Church Reformer rather than as a Christian Pastor. As a Christian Pastor he must harness himself to the use of the existing formulæ of piety.

4. In teaching the young, the aforesaid *pros* and *cons* of Criticism in preaching apply. For instance, the children of an educated home individualise, without being aware of it, that common enlightened consciousness; the children of an uneducated home insensibly partake of that educational

defect; in their religious training they must be accordingly treated. But with the young the work of the Critical Pastor has one prime merit. Those children are the adult Christians of the time to come. He, if he be true to his vocation and to the vital discriminations of his day, will plant the faith of those little souls in the rich and stable soil of Christian experience, and not in a thin, sandy layer of theological convention. In teaching the young, as, indeed, elsewhere, authority there must be, but it should be the authority of the Holy Spirit which awakes within the listening child a spiritual response and appreciation; dogma there must be—not blind, compelling, ending in itself, but such as gradually and softly opens to the child's eyes within the dogmatic wrappage hidden spiritual jewels and pearls of great price. The young are more spiritually alert, perhaps, than we think. A youth in my Bible-class may have spoken wiser than he knew, who, on being asked what was his favourite verse in the 119th Psalm, with a twinkle in his eye replied: “No. 99, *I have more understanding than my teachers.*” That stammering impeachment it especially lies on the Critical Pastor to refute.

5. The interview with single souls equals, in immediacy and moment, any part of a Christian Pastor's work. (a) A young man in your choir comes of age to-day. You send for him in the evening, and he sits there opposite to you in your study, with a look full of confidence and a life trembling with possibilities. “Charlie, my lad, you step out from boyhood into manhood to-day; you cross the line to-day. I want to remind you to be true to the holy lessons of your early years. You have had a good home; you have been well brought up; the Heavenly Voice has spoken to your heart, and you have heard it. Live out as a man those holy resolutions you made as a child. Let life be to you *that*. And may God Almighty bless you.” In this interview Criticism is not a determining factor; Criticism is a negligible factor. The determining factors are faith, prayer, and sympathy. (b) You visit a sufferer on the bed of sickness. I once read to a poor old

man in pain in a Westminster garret the parable of the Prodigal Son. He sat up, leaned on his pillow, and, gazing at me, said, "That's as pwitty a little thing as ever I 'eard i' my life: where did yer get it?" Here was a freedom from critical prejudice which might have been the envy of Van Manen. Or duty may take you to the sick chamber of a savant, a politician, a millionaire. In all cases the office for the visitation of the sick has its appropriate and marvellously adaptable meaning; and as to the Pastor, it is not his critical, but his spiritual, temperature which tells. (c) You stand beside a man facing death. As you stretch forth your hands toward the mystery, with hidden and perhaps incommunicable instincts of trust and hope, you find (in my experience) two chief instruments of insight, strength, and reconciliation, for that soul entering the dark portal: (i.) The service of the communion of the sick; (ii.) the recitation of simple Evangelical hymns, such as "Rock of Ages, cleft for me, Let me hide myself in Thee." You touch bottom here. The Pastor, critical or uncritical, can do no more than so to lay the parting spirit, troubled or peaceful, in the arms of Eternal Security.

Finally, and in brief, in the Church of England the Liberal Clergyman is clerically unpopular, is subjected, at the hands of his fellow-clergy, to quiet, conscientious, immutable repugnance and depreciation. His chief trials are loneliness and the antipathy of good men. His peculiar hope is that he is serving them in spite of themselves; that he is saving for his detractors their religion; that for many an English Christian home he is breaking the shock of startling critical disclosures; that he is bearing the critical cross ahead for the sake of his fellow-pilgrims.

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THE BOY SCOUT MOVEMENT.

CAPTAIN W. CECIL PRICE.

WHILE lawlessness, joined with the periodical strike, pursues its brisk career, nurtured by thoughtless sympathy and delicate regard for "the sacred rights of man" as belonging to the few, while they are engaged in violating the rights of the many—it will help to an understanding of the human error in this outbreak to reflect that nine-tenths of such lawlessness is committed by persons between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five.

According to an unwritten rule of all fraternities which on occasion find it opportune to employ some sort of force not sanctioned by law, disloyalty to their code is a crime, while disloyalty to law and order is only, at the worst, a misdemeanour justified by necessity. Youth is more responsive to the idea of loyalty than to any other human sentiment, because youth is social and susceptible; but the things it will be loyal to are a matter of training. If youth is not taught that family and country are the highest objects of loyalty it will be in danger of devoting loyalty to objects inimical to family and country. Lack of proper training in this elemental principle is a crying fault of to-day, and it is a lack which accounts largely for the widespread growth of sportive, wilful, and associative lawlessness.

But a means has been found to repair in part the lack of home-training for youth in the Boy Scout movement. Applicable to boys of all classes, it appeals to every natural

youthful impulse, brings every faculty into healthful action, and at the same time enforces the principle that subordination is a real happiness in human association. It teaches also that loyalty belongs first to country, and that country is only a general name for law and order.

This, the most promising association of our time, is an outgrowth of the dozen boys whom General Baden-Powell showed how to play at Indians and Knights of King Arthur. He took them into camp and taught them woodcraft, and how the birds could be distinguished one from the other, and what great secrets Nature revealed to those who would study her. Two forces combined to make the Boy Scout movement something larger and more far-reaching than its originator had ever conceived—the greatness of the idea and its appeal to our boys. Unlike the various boys' brigades, it is not a military movement. The Scouts are peace Scouts. Within a year of its inauguration there were 100,000 Boy Scouts. Now there are—nobody knows how many. They are seen everywhere—in the slums of the East End of London, in the lowliest country parishes, in every town and hamlet from Land's End to John o' Groat's. The movement has caught on in a way which has never been equalled in the case of any similar appeal to our boys. Like a wave of enthusiasm it has swept over all Europe. It has found its way into far colonies and continents, it has overspread the islands of the Seven Seas. In Malta, Gibraltar, Singapore, Fiji, Honolulu, or Calcutta you will find Boy Scouts. In Canada they can be counted by thousands. In Australia and South Africa the Governors-General are the Chief Scouts. In France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Sweden, Denmark, Servia, Japan, China, and Siam—everywhere the idea has taken root. Scouts of one country make it their business to call upon their brethren in other countries—the craft has united them in one colossal brotherhood. Thus a new method has been found for cementing the brotherhood of man. The broomstick is reft from its evil association as the magical steed of witches or the Pegasus of

the spirits of darkness. We begin to regard it as a knightly lance, gracious and potent, the legacy of one of King Arthur's blood, a kind of plebeian Excalibur. At any rate, it is the badge of a young gentleman, though he come from the slums; and just as an overhanging bush told the wayfarer that a tavern was near, these long bare branches are familiar on the dusty road to bespeak help and hospitality.

It is all so simple and yet so wonderful that it is surprising the idea was not thought of years and years before. Now, the question uppermost in the mind of the average person is, How will the Scout movement influence our future manhood? To appreciate this correctly let us examine the material as it is being fashioned in the hands of the master potter.

A lad—usually at the instigation of his “pal”—presents himself at the Scout headquarters in his locality. He is at once made heartily welcome, and forthwith his initiation begins. But there are certain things he must learn before he can be enrolled and sworn in. He must know the Scout law, the Scout signs, and the Scout salute. He must understand the composition of the Union Jack, and the right way to fly it. And he must be able to tie some of the many useful knots of which the Scouts are masters. Thus, having passed as a “Tenderfoot,” he is subjected to the test of the Scout law. On Scout law depends the whole glory of the Boy Scout idea. Scout law is a creed of honour and chivalry, a magnificent code, a true and trusty guide to life; it is the heart and soul of the movement, and is in fact the articles of every faith made fascinating.

Here are the Scout's ten “articles of faith” :—

1. A Scout's honour is to be trusted.
2. A Scout is loyal.
3. A Scout's duty is to be useful, to help others, and to do a kind action every day.
4. A Scout is a friend to all, and a brother to every other Scout, no matter to what social class the other belongs.

5. A Scout is courteous.
6. A Scout is a friend to animals.
7. A Scout obeys orders.
8. A Scout smiles and whistles under all circumstances.
9. A Scout is thrifty.
10. A Scout is pure in thought, word, and deed.

Ten laws, and the most cherished of them all is the "good turn" every day. We all do our good turns daily more or less, but Scouts are trained to think of doing them—and to do them. The natural boy loathes ostentatious piety, but the appeal to his chivalry goes straight home. There is an element of the "very perfect, gentle knight" even in the worst young hooligan, who at any rate has the soul for adventure.

Again, take Scout law number 4. The Scout of Hampstead must hail him of Southwark. Tooting joins hands with Whitechapel, Brixton no longer turns up its nose at Bethnal Green. Class distinctions are sent shivered into the scrap-heap: none the less heroic a performance because the last half-century has cleared the issue for its accomplishment.

With Scout law the boys are taught the Scout signs. These are mysterious marks with meanings. All boys love to make chalk-marks, but Scouts are trained to rub them out when made. An arrow-mark points the way of the trail to be followed. A cross means "This road not to be followed." A circle within a circle means "I have gone home." At night sticks with wisps of grass round them or stones are laid on the road in similar forms so that they may be felt with the hand. The boys are taught not only to make signs but how to put a signature to them. Each patrol has its name and its call. Foxes bark, bears growl, stags roar, storks cry "korr," plovers whistle "pee-wit," hyenas make a laughing cry, boars grunt, cobras hiss, and owls hoot. All Scouts in a patrol practise the patrol call and so may communicate with each other when in hiding. The patrol leaders carry little flags, with the head of the patrol animal or bird shown in red cloth. The Scout is taught to draw his patrol animal's head, then when he makes

a Scout sign on a road he can put his signature to it: the outline head to show his patrol, and a number to show his place in a patrol. Thus his friends, finding the sign and the signature, know who made it.

Those who may still be disposed to sneer at the agile Scout when they see him in the street fully dressed and accoutred for the pursuit of one or other forms of Scoutcraft, little know the enthusiasm that lies behind the movement. The genuine Boy Scout is really never idle. All his spare time is given up to learning or to practising some of the things that scouting has taught us. Night after night he is at it, and occasionally before breakfast as well. Take at random the weekly programme of any one troop. It utilises not only every weekday evening, but two mornings in addition. On Monday there is a lecture upon some Scoutcraft topic; Tuesday is given over to physical development exercises; on Wednesday there is another lecture on some such subject as signalling; Thursday is a sort of club night; on Friday there are gymnastic exercises; and Saturday is held for outdoor practice, cooking, tent-pitching, or the like. One morning of each week is dedicated to an observation ramble in one of the parks or open spaces, and the other is set apart for swimming practice in the local public baths. Not a bad week's work, surely!

The ceremony of "swearing in" a Scout is picturesque. The lad, having mastered the elementary details which fit him to take his place in the troop, is called upon to take the Scout pledge, really a simple promise, but as binding as any oath, because it is a promise on honour. He promises: "On my honour to do my best to do my duty to God and the King; to help other people at all times; to obey the Scout law." Saying these words the boy stands at the salute—three upraised fingers of the right hand. These are to remind him of the three obligations in the oath. Thus sworn in he is enrolled as a Tenderfoot and is accordingly entitled to wear a badge and to don the Scout uniform. And so the lad pro-

ceeds from Tenderfoot to Second-class Scout, always learning something new, mastering fresh details of his craft until he qualifies as a First-class Scout, which means that he can swim fifty yards, has at least one shilling in the Bank, and is able to signal at the rate of sixteen words a minute. As a test in self-reliance he is sent on a two-days' journey alone or with another Scout. On his return he must write an intelligible report of what he has seen. Then he must know how to render first-aid in common accidents. He must understand how to stay a runaway horse. He must prove that he can make a damper, cook a hunter's stew, skin and cook a rabbit, or pluck and cook a bird. He must be able to read a map and draw sketch-maps, use an axe for felling timber, judge distance, area, size, numbers, height, and weight within twenty-five per cent. error.

He continues to qualify until he attains the proud distinction of King's Scout, which means that he has won badges of merit in such branches of Scoutcraft as seamanship, ambulance work, and signalling, and has passed a stern test in the general craft of the guide. Another important part of a Scout's curriculum is that he may qualify in almost any calling. Thus a boy gains a badge because he has passed the Scout test as a poultry farmer, as an engineer, gardener, plumber, aviator, fireman, blacksmith, dairyman, electrician, printer, interpreter, photographer, woodman, naturalist, coastguard, horseman, leather-worker, bee-farmer, etc. Other badges of merit are awarded for proficiency in other branches of work. Accordingly, employers of labour seeking trustworthy boy service will look first among Scouts, knowing that they will find boys broken to discipline and of manly spirit. Incidentally it may be mentioned that the headquarters of the organisation have formed an employment bureau in conjunction with the Labour Exchanges, where Scouts will be assisted in securing skilled occupations when in need. The training also includes, for those boys who live near the water, organised practice of seafaring. It is not intended necessarily to send them to sea

as a profession, but to give them something of the hardiness and pluck of the seaman, again through a medium which thoroughly appeals to them. "Sea Scouts"—of whom Admiral Lord Charles Beresford is the chief—are divided into two branches—Coastguard Scouts and Seaman Scouts, and their training follows on those lines. When vessels are available for training there is no doubt that there will be a rapid development in the numbers and efficiency of the Sea Scouts. Hulks have been fitted up as guardships, and barges have been brought into service. But far too many patrols have had to content themselves with a room, or even a shed, ashore.

The ordinary naval routine practised by Boys' Naval Brigades is not the training Sea Scouts receive. They are taught to make sails, make and mend clothes, besides the manifold acts of seamanship which go to make the complete and perfect "handyman." There are three ranks of Sea Scouts:—

Waterman is a Sea Scout who has obtained badges for "boatman" and "swimmer."

Coastwarden is a waterman who has obtained badges for "signaller" and "rescuer."

A King's Sea Scout must be a First-class Scout and a coastwarden, and in addition must have a badge as "watchman" or "pilot" or "sea fisherman."

Perhaps it ought to be explained that the patrol is the unit of organisation in the Boy Scout scheme. It consists of some six or eight boys under a senior boy as patrol leader. A troop consists of at least three patrols, and to each patrol leader is given full responsibility for the behaviour of his patrol at all times. The patrol is the unit for work and play, and in camp it is usual for each patrol to be encamped on a separate spot. Responsibility and competitive rivalry are thus at once established, and a good standard of development is ensured throughout the troop. Corporate sentiment, or *esprit de corps*, is the essential condition of sportsmanship. General Baden-Powell, by means of devices at once simple and ingenious,

established that condition. The member of a corps will do for the common cause what cannot be done by himself alone. It is extraordinary how powerful a tradition has been established among the Boy Scouts during the few years since they came into being. The fact offers a remarkable proof of the inherent capacity of the race for self-organisation and its natural respect for the rule of law. The English boy or the English man is seldom at his best unless he is under discipline—it might almost be said, indeed, that in default of discipline he is at once useless and troublesome; but it must be a particular brand of discipline, which is founded and maintained on the principle of fair play, which, again, is a very different thing from the Latin conception of social equality, or the Teutonic notion of enforced obedience to an iron rule. Sir Robert Baden-Powell's idea was not new, but it was the application of an old idea to new conditions. The Church, the Navy, the Army, the Civil Service, the learned professions—all these corporate societies are held together by law and tradition, written or unwritten. General Baden-Powell has imposed the same eternal principle upon those among the youth of England who would never enjoy the opportunity of learning it at a public school.

And what is this magical movement which has so completely captivated the boyish instinct in many lands? The answer is easy enough. It is not so much the goal to which it aspires as the means by which it seeks to reach it that has made the Boy Scout movement the wonderful success it has proved. Its primary object is to cultivate all those qualities which make for good citizenship—truthfulness, integrity, honour, self-reliance, trustworthiness, discipline, and loyalty to God and country. Other organisations have similar objects in view, but the pride of the Boy Scout movement is that it endeavours to foster those attributes through channels that appeal directly to a boy's own peculiar interests. Everything prosy or dull, everything that tends towards boredom, is ruthlessly excluded. Upon his boyish hobbies and aspirations are engrafted the old

code of honour of the knights, and out of the combination the boy is gently led on to the cultivation of those qualities that go to the making of a sturdy, loyal, self-reliant citizen—not a helpless creature whom the first mischance overwhelms, but a handy, resourceful individual whom difficulties do not daunt, who can turn the humblest materials to account, who is as courteous to those beneath him as he is loyal to those set over him, who has disciplined himself to face difficulties cheerfully, who has ever before him the Scout motto, "Be prepared."

Most of us are familiar with the terrible boating accident which befell a party of Boy Scouts recently in the Isle of Sheppey and which resulted in the loss of nine boys, stout-hearted little Britishers, who showed every promise of growing up to a fine and worthy manhood. Some of them had been rescued from the slums of South London, and drilled and shaped by the Dulwich Mission into sturdy types. Tragic and pathetic to the last degree as was their death, it was not in vain. It will sow the seeds of heroism among their comrade Scouts in all parts of the country. For such a death opens the door for others to a deeper life.

It is through the Scouts that a boy is led on to the paths of success, and is enabled, instead of striving after the unattainable, to make the best use of the material at hand. Scoutcraft contains that element of romance, combined with a suggestion of possible danger, which boys love. It is helpful because it is no half-hearted scheme. It does not deal with a boy on a Sunday only, as if he had a soul with a body of no importance, or with the blissful forgetfulness of the influence of the body on the soul. The very novelty of the method of the Scout movement impressed the boyhood of the land as much as anything. Boys found that the movement fostered their natural habits of observation, encouraged all sorts of manly exercises, taught them to read the stars, to follow the tracks of animals, to note the habits of birds, to tie the knots that seamen use, to kindle camp fires, to improvise bridges across streams, to find their way

by maps, to fashion all sorts of natty articles with their hands, and to do the hundred-and-one other things that a boy loves to do if you will but show him the way.

The red-letter day in the history of the movement was when King George, who willingly consented to act as Patron of the organisation, inspected the Scouts at the Royal Review at Windsor in July 1911. The rally was a marvel of organisation; thirty thousand healthy youngsters coming from all parts of the Empire required some superintending, and it is to the lads themselves that credit must be given for the remarkable facility with which they were marshalled, cared for, and for the success of the review. Never before was there such a sight or such enthusiasm.

And so on, from the highest in the land, all have shown a keen desire to become in some way attached to the movement. Lords-Lieutenant serve as Presidents of County Associations, retired officers take up the duties of Commissioners, lords and commoners alike all evince a great desire to assist in the reclamation of the "slum child." In Germany autocratic noblemen delight in raising their own special troops, made up usually of the poorest lads they can find; the Tsar has approved of the idea; whilst the movement is hailed with enthusiasm in every quarter of the civilised world.

As to the point of view that the movement is valuable because the lads assimilate lessons in patriotism, one has to use more guarded language, since that aspect of the movement has been mischievously misinterpreted. The statement is made by a good many people that the creation of a body like this is a direct incentive to militarism, and that Sir Robert Baden-Powell is responsible for giving birth to that swashbuckler spirit which sets nations by the ears. How ludicrous this assertion is has been demonstrated over and over again, on platforms and in the public press. The movement in its essence is strictly non-military. All its ideals are peace ideals—so much so, that there are people who are ready to regard the growth of the movement in many lands

as an influence tending towards international peace. That the movement is also non-political scarcely requires to be stated, although certain Socialists have been known to look upon it with disfavour, possibly because it is not sworn to abolish or destroy anything. The very fact that men of all creeds have actively interested themselves in the movement proves beyond cavil that it is absolutely non-sectarian in its character. No doubt, the authorities at the head of the movement are all the better pleased with a Scout if he regularly attends the church in which he has been brought up; but it does not interfere in the least with a boy's religious upbringing. It leaves that to the clergy and to parents. At the same time it directly and strongly inculcates the moral virtues of truthfulness, honesty, forbearance, kindness; and were it for no more than the influence it exerts in favour of temperance and against the smoking habit, the Boy Scout movement would deserve well of the whole community. The general public have been quick to recognise the advantages of the Boy Scouts' training. There is room, however, for public aid in committee work, and in providing men who have the time and the ability to acquire and impart the varied knowledge comprised in a Scout's studies. A medical man will find a sphere of usefulness in relieving the Scoutmaster of the work of giving instruction in first-aid; a member of a swimming club may superintend the acquisition of an accomplishment which is obligatory on all Scouts, and which should be followed up by tuition in the methods of the Life Saving Society for rescue and resuscitation. Without that knowledge the would-be rescuer's life is in peril, and his gallantry is in vain if he knows not how to fan the spark of vitality.

By a recent development in the formation of Scoutmasters' training corps it is hoped that the problem of how to obtain good Scoutmasters is in a fair way towards solution. Scoutmasters, many of them workers in connection with lads' clubs, find the scouting work of unique interest. They have more

than their reward as they watch the developing intelligence of their charges, see evidence of the growth of chivalry in their hearts, and know that they have changed boys who were good for nothing into Scouts who are willing and ready to undertake anything.

By an act which met with universal public approval and sent a thrill of delight through the ranks of this great organisation, the Boy Scouts obtained a Royal Charter of Incorporation last January. Henceforward the body is known as the Boy Scouts' Association, and thus official countenance and approval is extended to the movement, which has outlived the last traces of any possible hostility or ridicule.

As to the movement itself, it stands in need of no justification. On many grounds, but chiefly on the grounds of educational training and patriotic welfare, the creation of the Boy Scouts has grown to the dimensions of a national event. Sir Robert Baden-Powell's foresight has been amply rewarded by the steady development of a scheme big with important issues, which in the eyes of those who come after us may very likely appear one of the capital enterprises of the early years of the twentieth century. The movement is essentially a training, a discipline, a suppression of unregenerate instincts, a first education in the difficult school of unselfish citizenship. Let any close observer of the habits and customs of our young people ask himself if he does not think the habits of obedience inculcated by this and similar movements are just what is necessary for the rising generation. The boys and girls of to-day are the men and women of to-morrow, and because the Scout movement is helping to build up a brave and self-reliant race in this country it should commend itself to the whole-hearted approval of the people. It is a great work, and General Baden-Powell will be famous as the originator of the Boy Scout movement at some period when the defence of Mafeking is but a memory.

W. CECIL PRICE.

DISCUSSIONS

N.B.—The contributions under this heading refer to matters previously treated in the "Hibbert Journal." Reviews of books are not open to discussion. Criticism of any article will, as a rule, be limited to a single issue of the Journal. The discussion ends with a reply from the original writer.—*Ed.*

"THE DEMOCRATIC CONCEPTION OF GOD."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1913, p. 294.)

PROFESSOR OVERSTREET has given a very fair indication of the tendency of much of the thought of the present time. Whether it is to become the ultimately prevalent one is a question of much wider moment and of gréater issue. We are shown in the article how in human society the care of the pack changed into the importance of the class and then into the value of the individual. Through action and reaction, Society is reshaping itself. In former times the few were masters, the many obeyed; but we are tending to a period when there shall be free scope for all, and in that full equitable society, where each individual shall enjoy abundant life, God shall be found in the spiritual unity of the mass life. That this law of evolution extends throughout the Cosmos, including the so-called inorganic elements, the author aims to show. Life is movement, God is in the making, man as the self-conscious part of Nature has to help in the progress, and in the end he will recognise God as himself. That there is any perfect Being to whom man can lift up his eyes will be discovered to be an error. Well, some of us have heard the same gospel from Mr Bernard Shaw.

Now, it is quite possible to agree with the whole trend of Professor Overstreet's argument, and yet demur to the conclusion because some very important factors have been overlooked.

We are not told whether there is any will in the universe apart from man's. We may ask, therefore, whether this law of evolution, considering its already achieved results, must not be deemed purposive? And can we think of a purpose without postulating will? Unless that will be intelligent, how can we account for its results and look forward with assurance to the great consummation presented to us? Limiting our outlook at the moment to Nature apart from man, we must all recognise that law prevails there which is not of man's making. The law of gravitation did not come into being when Newton discovered it, nor were the lands round the South Pole called into being as Amundsen journeyed there. However we may fine down the laws of matter to a process of action and reaction, for all practical

purposes Nature and man have stood apart and will continue to do so. Nature becomes man's servant in so far as he learns her laws and can harness her. But only in obedience lies his safety. One false step, one act of inadvertence, and with, it may be, terrible results to himself, she asserts her independence.

Now, when we turn to man himself we must ask, From whence does he derive that urge in his nature which continually prompts him to develop better conditions? In other words, How does he come by his ideal? No man has ever said, "Go to, let me make an ideal." He could not have coined the word had not the thing itself been given him first.

Take another faculty of humanity, such as the perception of beauty. Is not the pleasure we feel derived from a sense of something given, something which lifts the soul to the height of ecstasy which could never be derived from the self? In the silent Arctic night, when the stars shine with a brilliancy that can hardly be imagined, and the mystic rays of the Aurora Borealis flash their beams as from an unseen hand into the still firmament, the consciousness of the presence of an unseen power can hardly be resisted. And if that feeling be changed into terror, as a floating palace representing man's last word in mechanical inventiveness meets destruction against an iceberg, does not the conviction become overwhelming that man must always reckon with the laws of another?

These arguments may be old-fashioned, but they are not exhausted, though they may be overlooked in crowded cities. But if they do not appeal to all, it is through insensitiveness and not because they have arrived at a higher range of thought. Whether we look at man's environment or at his own nature, we find something given and not created by him. But that does not debar him from possessing the creative faculty within limits.

Then, again, the conception of God as the spiritual unity of the mass life has its own difficulties. We are not told, for instance, that the individuals themselves will have attained perfection, but in the unitary life which they enjoy will reside their God. As I follow the argument, the combined life may not be perfect, but it will be higher than themselves, and as such will be *objective*. It is difficult to see how the whole can be greater than its parts, especially when we are dealing with individual souls, every one with an independent will. But, to take an illustration, of which, so far as it favours the Professor's argument, I make him present: in a musical piece played by an orchestra each part may be harmonious in itself or otherwise, but there will be a harmony of the whole which depends upon the combined action; I am not certain that the players themselves are conscious of that harmony to the extent that a listener at a distance may be, in which case, as we all have our parts to play in the orchestra of life, no one will see his God. But, in any case, before that piece of music can be played, some one mind must have conceived the whole. If we say that has been by Society, we are faced again with the problem of the origin of ideals.

But is there any evidence that Society will form and be obedient to such an ideal unless it feels the constraining influence of a power which makes for righteousness? Is not every human invention applied to evil purposes as well as good? And are we so certain that the worth of the individual which later times are said to have developed is going to be respected if man is sole master of his destinies? In the United States it is becoming recognised that the power of a few super-wealthy men is greater than the State, and might be used for evil. Year by year brings fresh evidence of the power of capital to draw the riches of the earth to itself and to nullify any rise in wages by raising the price of materials. The simple law of action and reaction is just as likely to lead to a new serfdom as to the full enjoyable development of the individual.

If such a disaster does not occur, it will be because there are factors at work which the author of "The Democratic Conception of God" has not brought to the front. All that the writer says can have our fullest assent, but only when we put it in its proper focus, and regard it as the work of an immanent God who is also transcendent and self-revealing. Through His transcendence we believe in His reserve of power to make the crooked paths straight and the rough places smooth, and through His self-revealing we believe He makes Himself known to man just so far as the mind of man is prepared to receive Him. It is not through a blind law of evolution that humanity will rise to its goal, but by obedience to the law of righteousness and the revelation of the spirit. As in the material world, so in the moral and spiritual, perfect freedom is only to be obtained through perfect obedience. And transgression means more or less destruction. It is in the power of such a belief that men and women have worked for the redemption of Society.

In the theory of a God in the making, nothing is said of the destiny of the countless souls whose lives have helped to build the edifice though they have not seen the vision. It is therefore imperfect.

The kingdom of the Spirit is at hand, we are told, and we give our joyful assent—the qualities of the Spirit were defined of old. But neither the kingdom of the Son nor the Father has passed. The kingdom must be the reign of goodwill which was incarnate in the Son; without goodwill the kingdom cannot come, and faith in the Father's power is the guarantee of the kingdom. Through it was the Son perfected, and without its check the Judases of Society will be ever ready to betray. And if with Paul we believe that God is He "in whom we live and move and have our being," so let us also believe with him that in the final consummation "we shall know even as we are *known*."

EDWARD CAPLETON.

LONDON.

“MODERNISM AND THE CATHOLIC CONSCIOUSNESS.”

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1913, p. 329.)

MR COORE fails to distinguish between the two aspects of dogma which relate severally to the intellect and the religious sentiment. Yet such distinction is vital.

The claim of dogma to be the expression (as far as it goes) of absolute intellectual truth can no longer be maintained, except its historical origin and development are ignored and the claim be based on philosophical and theological assumptions which will not bear the test of criticism. On the other hand, religious sentiment requires no such absolute support, regarding dogma merely as symbolic. The first part of Mr Coore's paper bears eloquent testimony to the fact that such deep, underlying sentiment is the real basis of religious ideas.

The potent spell which the Mass exercises upon all who have come under its influence depends upon a complex of such sentiments, some very primitive. But what Catholic, when he kneels before the altar, troubles himself about questions of Metaphysics or History? Transubstantiation may symbolise the close interrelation between the material and the spiritual, the seen and the unseen, the temporal and the eternal. In any case it will represent the Real, perpetual and worshipful, Presence of Christ in His Church, in its double aspect as an extension of the Incarnation and of the Atonement. Both these great ideas owe their power, not to the irrational rationalism of dogmatic theology (seen especially in the various theories of the Atonement), but to the strength of that appeal: “*Sic Deus dilexit mundum.*” It is undeniable that these, as all other sentiments, have their intellectual counterpart, and the ideas to which they correspond are equally wide, and therefore common to all great religions; while, so far as those ideas are capable of being stated in terms, they are neither dogmatic nor final. But, in relation to mere theological propositions or dogmatic definitions, it is sentiment which supplies the real life of the religious idea at the base of them. If this is so, it is surely fatal to seek to defend the faith by identifying it, as does Mr Coore, with a particular dogmatic interpretation of history. For, without entering at all into questions of “Higher Criticism,” it is quite evident that, with our imperfect knowledge of events as they actually occurred in the past, it is often possible to interpret early records in more ways than one. Under these circumstances, to claim for a particular interpretation the absolute truth denied to its rivals is tantamount either to an assumption of personal infallibility (as in Anglicanism and other forms of Protestantism), or to the less unreasonable, because more modest and undivided, claim that it resides in the official Head of the Church. The latter, of course, is Mr Coore's position. It is one which, as an orthodox Catholic, he is quite justified in maintaining. Where, however, he makes an undoubted and great error is in writing as if he imagined that

Can a claim could "share" a divided empire with scientific method (p. 347). This last can be reconciled with "the Catholic consciousness" regarded as religious sentiment. From this aspect, that "consciousness" cannot be shaken by historical criticism, but, on the contrary, receives support from it; for, even though Christ did not (as a dry historical fact) institute the Mass, it has developed (with assimilation of Hellenic elements) from the farewell meal, and its unbroken stream of liturgical tradition and worship is the outcome of the original impulse and influence of His whole life and teaching.

But, from the point of view of science, there can no more be dogmatic history than dogmatic mathematics or chemistry. Science concerns herself not with what ought to have happened from the standpoint of a religious, a materialistic, or any other "consciousness," but with what actually did happen. This may be, and often is, very difficult to determine, but it is the only question which interests Science, whose methods, while indifferent to sentiment, are the exact antithesis of infallibility, whether the latter be personal or ecclesiastical.

H. C. CORRANCE.

'HOVE.

"CONSCIOUSNESS AS A CAUSE OF NEURAL ACTIVITY."

(*Hibbert Journal*, January 1913, p. 378.)

THE author of the above article says: "The whole of mental therapeutics depends on recognising consciousness as an efficient cause." He then refers to "faith-healers" and "hysterics." There are, however, the so-called "magnetic" healers, who require no "faith" on the part of their patients and need use no "suggestion" on their part. Where should they be classed? The present writer has two friends who have done an immense amount of good by the wonderful healing powers they possess. The patients often come as a last resource, having been given up by doctors.

Similarly, in the very interesting article by Mr F. Carrel in the *Nineteenth Century* (December 1909, p. 1076), the opinion is given that "the supposed curative effects (vainly evoked by Mesmer) have not been proved unless it be in the form of suggestion."

One of the two has been good enough to answer some questions as to the character of his power and what it has effected. He has replied as follows below. The patients referred to are all living, and either they or many others would verify Dr T. D'Aute-Hooper's statements about them if desired. I will only add that, knowing him very well and being in frequent correspondence with him, I am quite satisfied that he is writing in perfect good faith and that what he here says is true.

It was with the view and hope of advancing scientific knowledge of this remarkable phenomenon, that I prevailed on him to allow me to publish this communication in reply to my questions.

"Yes, I have had a good deal of experience extending over nearly twenty years. Literally, thousands of cases have passed through my hands. They have come from all parts of England.

"As to 'suggestion,' I very rarely use it, except in mental cases where I feel it is necessary.

"My curative powers require no 'faith.' Patients have not minced matters in telling me beforehand that they have none. Yet in spite of this lack of faith I have cured them. Twelve months ago a Mr. — came. He had a most painful form of paralysis in his right hand and arm. He had had six months' daily massage treatment; his hand and arm had been useless for sixteen years. He did all his writing with his left hand, as he could not hold a pen with his right. He was terribly hard-headed and sceptical, and told me he had no faith whatever, but had come as he had been very strongly urged to do so. I gave him treatment *without contact*. He was amazed at the influence and sensation, which he had never experienced before with the previous treatments he had had. I have his first attempt to write after the first treatment, and each week afterwards. After only *four* treatments his writing was perfect.

"Another case was Mr Thomas —, who came to me from Cheltenham. He had seen sixty specialists and had had 1028 massage and electrical treatments without any beneficial result. Yet in twenty minutes, after magnetic passes, I gave him a useful arm in place of a useless one. He was an ex-pugilist. There was not much material there for suggestion!

"Yesterday a Mr — came to see me. He had been a terrible cripple for about five years, and had been operated upon and had seen the best specialists he could. He also told me he had no faith; but that his sister, who was a school governess, insisted upon his coming. Well, all I can say is, he is a credit to magnetic-therapeutic treatment.

"The above cures will show that neither 'faith' nor 'suggestion' is by any means necessary; for the patient *feels* the influence proceeding from my finger-tips. If they do *not* feel it, then nothing can be done for them.

"You next ask as to the nature of the cures. I believe I have treated pretty well every known disease with beneficial results. I have cured warts with a single touch. They take two or three weeks to die away. I have cured many different kinds of tumour, paralysis, rheumatism, liver, kidney and stomach troubles, fits, insanity, skin diseases, ulcers, blindness, deafness, and even cancer.

"I do *not* treat malignant cancer, as I am afraid of contracting the complaint myself. Some years ago, after treating a case, my arms broke out with sores, because I omitted to wash my hands immediately after the treatment.

"I have had a great number of cases that were *really incurable*; but magnetic treatment always eased the pain and has given sleep.

"Your next question was, 'How does the power seem to act in myself?' However cold my hands may be, a few minutes after commencing a treat-

ment they get very hot, and my body *seems* to be filled, as it were, by some power from an *external* source, and the magnetic 'fluid' pulsates, something like this — — — — —, the blanks being pauses. The influence does *not* pass in a continuous stream, but pulsates, as stated. This action seems to last twenty minutes and then gradually subsides, until I know that I cannot do any more good and I regain my normal condition, or, if it has been a hard case (low in vitality), my temperature is below the normal for some hour or so.

"Within five minutes after commencing treatment I can tell if I can do any good; as there is an (shall I say) unifying or intermingling or sympathetic intermixing of magnetic forces.

"I always like to leave my patients as soon as possible after treatment; as, if I do not, the magnetic force seems to return to me.

"With regard to the patient's sensations, if I am treating a painful or acute case he complains of an intense cutting pain the moment my fingertips come directly over the injured or diseased part. This I find to be very useful, especially in obscure cases, in locating the mischief—which quickly changes to a warm, soothing glow pervading the whole body, and generally accompanied with the desire to sleep.

"Some describe the influence as being like a cool and soothing breeze; others say it is as if I were spreading cobwebs over them and gently pulling.

"If I am treating the spine for paralysis, the patient sways as if the magnetic influence were pulling him.

"With regard to mesmerism and hypnotism, I have had a good deal of experience with them, but I have made no use of them for several years, as I had such peculiar effects myself that it made me timid. In one case, if the patient was in one room and I in another, I could put up my hand without a word and produce catalepsy in her, although she still retained her mental faculties. I have, in fact, had many similar cases. I will give one more case of paralysis.

"A baker fell from his van and injured his spine; he became deprived of all movement from the shoulders downwards, nor could he sleep. He left the hospital after eight days, still very weak and suffering great pain. I then saw him; after sponging the back with vinegar and water, I made passes, *without contact*, from the head down the spine and off the hips, taking every third or fourth pass off the heels.

"Immediately my fingers came directly over the injured part, the force proceeding from my finger-tips made him groan. I made many passes with my hands *closed*, but when over the injured part no effect whatever was produced; this, therefore, proved that the pain was not produced by the imagination, as it was quite impossible for him to see if my hands were open or closed, as he was helpless and lying upon his face.

"After magnetising him for fifteen minutes he spoke of a soothing influence and a warm glow pervading his whole body. Two minutes afterwards he was fast asleep, and remained so whilst I finished magnetising,

bandaging, and turning him over—he did not awaken during the whole process, nor for seven hours.

“I treated him every night for a week, then every other night for a fortnight. At the end of three weeks he was able to sit up; in a month he got about with sticks, and afterwards the progress was most rapid.”

My other friend, living in South Wales, and High Sheriff of his county, has much the same curative powers. He simply cures by “passes” of his hands over the patient. I asked him if he would cure my servant of chronic neuralgia in the head. He “treated” her twice. She has never had any return since; that is now upwards of two years ago.

I myself was troubled with gastritis and much abdominal pain. I wrote to ask if he could cure me at a distance. In a few days I received a letter asking me, “Did you feel free from pain on Saturday?” I had noticed that the pain *did* leave me on that day, and wrote to tell him so. He replied that he *had* been treating me, and felt for some time *all my pains himself*!

This “cure” took place half a year ago, and I have had no trouble since. I find it is of common occurrence for the operator to have to bear the pains of his patients!

In his last letter he tells me of a remarkable cure of his servant’s foot. It is as follows:—

“Our cook upset some boiling gravy and scalded her foot badly. Blisters were formed, one being as large as a four-shilling piece. I made passes over the foot, when she felt it become quite free from pain. She worked her foot about and then walked across the room.

“Next morning she actually forgot she had a bandage! On removing it the blisters were all gone, the flesh being free from inflammation and quite normal.”

This is only one of very many patients he has cured.

In all these cases, sometimes the patient *knows* that the healer is making passes, though there may be neither faith nor suggestion: yet in others the patient is quite unconscious of his efforts, so that “consciousness as a cause of neural activity” may be totally absent.

GEORGE HENSLOW.

BOURNEMOUTH.

SURVEY OF RECENT PHILOSOPHICAL AND THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE.

PHILOSOPHY.

PROFESSOR G. DAWES HICKS.

I PROPOSE to devote attention, in the present issue, first of all to a number of works dealing with the philosophy of religion. Leaving aside the second volume of Dr Bosanquet's great book, which will be dealt with by another pen, there have been recently many contributions to the subject that call for notice. In the forefront may be placed the two volumes of Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Glasgow in the years 1910-12 by Professor John Watson, well known by his works on Kant and other writings, entitled *The Interpretation of Religious Experience* (Glasgow: Maclehose & Sons, 1912). The ten lectures comprising the first volume are historical, and discuss the speculations of Plato and Aristotle, of the great Christian theologians, of Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume, of Kant and Hegel. Interspersed with the exposition is much acute criticism. Aristotle's conception of "matter" as the persistent element which prevents the perfect realisation of the "form" leads logically, it is argued, to the severance of any real connection between God and the world; a world which from an ultimate point of view is imperfect cannot be the product of a perfect being. In reference to Spinoza, the author maintains that, whilst it is true that intellect and will in God ought not to be conceived as separate, it does not by any means follow that they cannot be distinguished, and that the denial of such distinction leads to a denial of self-conscious intelligence. As against Leibniz, it is contended that the nature of God must involve his relation to the world, and the nature of finite beings their relation to one another and to God. The criticism of Hegel is made use of in dealing with the Kantian philosophy, and the latter is blamed for first reducing reality to pure being, and then condemning the concrete system of nature because it is not identical with this ghost of abstraction. Hegel himself holds not that all particular things must be minds, but that all particular beings exist, and can only exist, in a universe that is in itself intelligible or

rational, without implying that every thinking being must be even dimly and blindly aware of this fact. The second volume contains thirteen lectures, the aim of which is to present a constructive theory based upon what the author takes to be the essential principles of Hegel's speculation. The ground is prepared by an examination of the position of radical empiricism and of that which is called the new realism. By the former, the fallacy is committed of first admitting, under the guise of particular facts, the unity and intelligibility of the world, and then plausibly denying such unity and intelligibility just because it has been assumed. The objections urged against the "new realism" seem to me to miss the mark. For example, it is laid down, as though it were an incontestable fact, that "'green' has no existence apart from wave-lengths of ether in contact with the ocular nerve," which is just exactly the dogma most of the thinkers referred to would call in question. According to the idealism developed by Professor Watson, the religious interests of man can be preserved only by a theology which affirms that all forms of being are manifestations of a single spiritual principle in identification with which the true life of man consists. I think the main difficulty confronting this mode of philosophising is exhibited when one asks for explanation of a term which is constantly recurring in the pages of the present work—the term *manifestation*. What precisely is meant when it is said that an infinite self-conscious being *manifests* himself not only *to* but *in* the realm of finite minds and of nature? No idealistic writer, so far as I am aware, has ever come seriously to close quarters with this question, and until that is done the whole idealistic construction is left hanging in the air. From the pen of Professor Josiah Royce there has been published a thoughtful and suggestive little book, *The Sources of Religious Insight* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1912). Defining religious insight as insight into the need and into the way of salvation, Professor Royce discusses individual and social experience, reason, will, life, and sorrow, as sources of such insight. Particularly valuable, in view of some current controversies, is the chapter on "The Office of Reason," in which it is shown that abstract conceptions are, in the living and actual work of thought, a preparation for intuitions and experiences that lie on higher levels than those which, apart from abstract conceptions, we men can reach. The way too in which the thesis is defended that sorrow and evil ought not to be abolished but to be idealised is distinctly fresh and helpful. A different point of view is presented by Dr G. F. Barbour in a carefully written essay on *The Ethical Approach to Theism* (Edinburgh: Blackwood, 1913). The chief characteristic of theistic, as contrasted with pantheistic, religious thought, is, he urges, that it finds the final reality in the Good rather than in the Whole. Its method is selective and teleological, and it discerns the answer to the problem of the universe less through an induction than through an imperative,—the imperative of the Good upon the will of man. Dr Barbour calls to his aid in developing this position the doctrine of "degrees of truth and reality," but unfortunately he does not attempt to grapple with the many

perplexities that beset that doctrine. The essay concludes with an interesting treatment of Aristotle's theology, and an attempt to show how transcendence and immanence may be seen to be two phases or moments of man's deeper experience. In the volume of essays by Professor G. Santayana, *Winds of Doctrine* (London: Dent, 1913), several religious problems are discussed, but somewhat slightly and contemptuously. "What," it is asked, in dealing with "Modernism and Christianity," "is this whole phenomenon of religion but human experience interpreted by human imagination? And what is the modernist, who embraces it all, but a freethinker, with a sympathetic interest in religious illusions?" Modernism, we are assured, is an ambiguous and unstable thing. "It is the love of all Christianity in those who perceive that it is all a fable. It is the historic attachment to his church of a Catholic who has discovered that he is a pagan." To any reader of Tyrrell's *Autobiography* this will appear a singularly inept and unwarranted judgment. The essays on the philosophies of Bergson and Bertrand Russell contain some well-said things, but do not get within sight of the main principles of either of these philosophers. This is the way in which Mr Russell's ethical doctrine is rendered: "In the realm of eternal essences, before anything exists, there are certain essences that have this remarkable property, that they ought to exist, or at least that, if anything exists, it ought to conform to them. What exists, however, is deaf to this moral emphasis in the eternal; nature exists for no reason. . . . This good, however, is somehow good notwithstanding; so that there is an abysmal wrong in its not being obeyed." The essay on Shelley seems to me the best in the book. The author has evidently here a congenial theme. Shelley's own nature, he thinks, was the purest, tenderest, richest, and most rational nature ever poured forth in verse. Principal W. B. Selbie's monograph on *Schleiermacher: A Critical and Historical Study* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1913) will supply a want that has long been felt. Whilst drawing chiefly from the *Glaubenslehre* and the *Reden*, Dr Selbie makes use also of the other works in his very careful account of the philosophy of religion and the theology of his author. Emphasis is laid upon Schleiermacher's conception of religion as an original endowment of human consciousness as such, upon his method of taking actual religious experience as the subject of his investigation, and of building upon the data which it provides. The way was thus prepared for a psychology of religion and for the comparative study of religions. As an interesting piece of psychological analysis one may refer to Professor Royce's paper on "George Fox as a Mystic" in the *Harvard Theological Review* (January 1913). Professor Royce tries to show the place that the experiences of silent worship occupied in the mental life of Fox himself, and why Fox found this form of what is technically called mysticism a valuable feature of his religious consciousness. I would call attention also to Canon Hastings Rashdall's treatment of "The Problem of Evil" in the *Interpreter* for January. Canon Rashdall seeks a solution of the problem by means of the conception

of an internal or original limitation of power on the part of a perfectly righteous divine will. Just as it is not necessary to the omnipotence of God to suppose that He can change the past, or render the equation $2+2=4$ false, so it is not necessary to His omnipotence to suppose that He can bring about, in the world of existing fact, anything or everything whatsoever. In short, if God is creatively active, He necessarily and *ipso facto* limits Himself.

The appearance of the remaining volumes of the new edition of Renouvier's *Essais de critique générale* has to be recorded. The second essay, *Traité de psychologie rationnelle d'après les principes du criticisme* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1912), fills two volumes. The book is divided into three parts. In the first, which deals with man and his constituent functions, the subjects handled coincide more closely with those that are commonly described as psychological; in the second, which is concerned primarily with the problem of certitude and its foundation in liberty, there is worked out the doctrine, characteristic of Renouvier, of contingency, and a theory of the classification of the sciences; and in the third, which treats of the probabilities touching the moral order of the world, the themes discussed are immortality, liberty, and God, where Kant is followed in taking the practical reason as the clue to the unseen world, but is departed from in regard to the non-phenomenal nature of that world. The third and concluding essay, *Les principes de la nature* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1912), occupies one volume, and in it Renouvier develops his theory of matter, of life, and of the origin and destiny of man. The new edition of *Schopenhauers sämtliche Werke*, edited by Professor Paul Deussen, of Kiel, is making steady progress, and Band ix. has just appeared in two separate parts (München: Piper & Co., 1913). It contains the *Philosophische Vorlesungen*, now for the first time collected together and published in complete form. Much of the material of these lectures was incorporated in Schopenhauer's various treatises, but the lectures have an interest of their own which quite justifies their inclusion in Professor Deussen's sumptuous *Ausgabe*. The first part presents a "Theorie des gesammten Vorstellens, Denkens und Erkennens," and the second part a "Metaphysik der Natur, des Schönen und der Sitten." Another volume of the valuable *Neudrucke seltener philosophischer Werke*, undertaken by the *Kantgesellschaft*, has been issued—namely, Salomon Maimon's *Versuch einer neuen Logik oder Theorie des Denkens*, edited by B. C. Engel (Berlin: Reuther & Reichard, 1912). Maimon was an acute critic of the Kantian philosophy, and in this book, which was originally published in 1794, stress is laid upon many of the difficulties which have been pressed by writers of quite recent times. In the current number of *Logos* (iii. 3) there is contained an elaborate article on "Salomon Maimons theoretische Philosophie und ihr Ort in einem System des Kritizismus," by Friedrich Kuntze, in which justice is done to Maimon as a thinker and writer.

Now that Nietzsche's books have been translated into English, it is, I suppose, inevitable that there should appear expositions of his teaching and

estimates of its significance. For myself, I cannot see that his productions belong to the literature of philosophy at all. But that opinion is not shared by those who find in them what I cannot find. An enthusiastic admirer, Dr G. Chatterton Hill, has given to the press a goodly volume, entitled *The Philosophy of Nietzsche* (London: Ouseley, 1913), which will no doubt reach a large circle of readers. The author considers Nietzsche's idea that our concepts of knowledge, and the categories of the understanding, are empirical in origin, and take their rise as instruments of the Will to Power of the species in the struggle for existence, to be certainly more rational than Kant's theory of the origin of the categories. The central thought of Nietzsche he takes to be that the Superman has the task of creating new values, and must look on the masses as *Werkzeuge*, as tools, which he, the sculptor, needs in order to shape an ideal for humanity in the coming generations. Dr F. C. S. Schiller writes in the *Quarterly R.* for January also on "The Philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche," and maintains that both in his theory of knowledge and in his theory of morals Nietzsche is immensely suggestive, and even by his very errors stimulates to further progress. The theory of knowledge is apparently this. Truth itself is false; all the objects that the intellect respects are illusions. Truth is merely that kind of error without which a certain species of living beings cannot exist. But one wonders wherein either the novelty or the suggestiveness of this kind of thing is supposed to lie. The little volume by M. A. Mügge, *Friedrich Nietzsche*, in "The People's Books" (London: Jack, 1913), deserves to be mentioned. In four chapters on "Nietzsche's Life," "Beyond Good and Evil," the "Antichrist," and the "Superman," there is given a carefully written account of Nietzsche's doctrines. As an antidote to those doctrines, perhaps one can hardly do better than read Professor Rudolf Eucken's article on "Knowledge and Life" (*Phil. R.*, January 1913), written, as he tells us, to introduce his new book, *Erkennen und Leben*, to his American friends. Eucken protests against a conception of life that is centred upon the natural conditions and welfare of man, and denies that from this point of view knowledge, especially a theory of knowledge, can arise at all. In order to explain knowledge, he argues, a life is demanded which is not merely the fulfilment of man's desires, but which transforms and ennobles him, freeing him from the narrowness and littleness which pertain to his natural species. Such a life-principle he believes to be inherent in the spiritual nature of man, and to be involved in the history of the human world. All the possessions of the spiritual life—the social, the ethical, the aesthetic—are not mere means to human well-being, but ends in themselves. By their very nature they are separated as widely as possible from utility, and reveal the nature of reality.

The most important paper in the current number of *Mind* (January 1913) is the first part of an exhaustive article by Professor S. Alexander on "Collective Willing and Truth." Proceeding from the position previously elucidated by him that every mental process is a form of conation, Professor Alexander advances here to the consideration of good-

ness and truth in their affinity to one another—a problem which emerges when collective willing is taken into account. Good conduct and true thinking are departments of right willing in general, and both imply the stripping off from the individual will of personal idiosyncrasy. Both goodness and truth depend in the first place on the recognition by one man of consciousness in others, and secondly upon intersubjective intercourse. The recognition of other minds as conscious subjects depends on *direct* experience to that effect. The clue would seem to be furnished in those elementary experiences, on the level of instinct, where co-operation, reciprocation, or rivalry, is necessary in order that the experience should have its full flavour. We cannot *contemplate* even our own minds, much less the minds of others, and while we *enjoy* our own we do not *enjoy* the mind of another (contemplation and enjoyment being understood in the author's technical sense). We know *that* there is a foreign mind, something of our own rank, not a mere physical thing; but our knowledge of *what* it is is symbolic. We transfer the contents of our own enjoyment to this foreign being, and thus obtain assurance of it grounded on direct experience. Intersubjective intercourse does not account for the *objectivity* of knowledge; it accounts only for its impersonality. The fully known object is a contribution from many minds which bring their various information about the same or like or unlike things into a common stock. But the objects in question are recognised from the beginning as extramental. Goodness is the coherence of wills of real persons, and its result is the coherence of persons into a moral society with the attendant disapproval of divergent action as evil. Correspondingly, truth consists of coherent beliefs—coherence both in the collective speculative will and in the individual. Just as, in practice, coherent willing submits to the limits of social welfare, so truth consists of propositions cohering in certain ways determined by real existence.

In the same number of *Mind* there appears an interesting article by Mr G. H. Langley on "The Metaphysical Method of Herbart." The writer shows very clearly how Herbart's method leads him to the assumption that the Real is made up of a plurality of simple elements, in the manifold groupings of which our experience is founded, and adds some pertinent criticism of Herbart's procedure. I hope Mr Langley will continue to work at Herbart, a thinker whose writings have been unduly neglected, although from them I believe there is much to be gained that would be helpful in regard to our present speculative problems. The two articles on "Hegel's Criticism of Fichte's Subjectivism" (*Phil. R.*, September 1912 and January 1913) by Professor E. L. Schaub are written to show that Hegel's strictures are in substance valid. Fichte's highest principle, it is contended, may be described as subjective subject-object, but the *an sich* aspect of things falls entirely beyond it; the ghost of the thing-in-itself was not laid. Infinite striving, as conceived by Fichte, clearly presupposes not only what Hegel calls a "want" or "need," but even something foreign against which it strives and which guarantees that its activity is genuine

and not a hollow show. Professor G. Simmel's article in *Logos* (iii. 3), on "Goethe's Individualismus," is full of suggestive reflection. One can, he thinks, describe Goethe's *Weltanschauung* as the most gigantic attempt ever made to comprehend the unity of the cosmos as immediately and in itself *wertvoll*. God is for Goethe the name for the *Wertmoment des Seins*, nature the name for the *Wirklichkeitsmoment*, and both these live together as one reality.

The Sidgwick Memorial Lecture at Newnham College was delivered last year by Professor James Ward, who took for his subject *Heredity and Memory*, and the lecture has been published by the Cambridge University Press. Professor Ward maintains that, provided we look at the world from a spiritualistic and not from the usual naturalistic standpoint, psychology may show us that the secret of heredity is to be found in the facts of memory. Individual progress, it is shown, implies habit, and habit means that function perfects structure. For a solitary immortal individual without ancestry, structure would be wholly the result of function. But for the many mortals—who have a racial history as well as a personal history—function will be the result of structure, so far, that is, as the embryonic stage of their existence is concerned. Further, in the life of the individual the latest acquisitions will be the least automatic and the least fixed; in the race, therefore, the specific characters, which are acquired later, rather than the generic, upon which they are superposed, will be peculiarly liable to variation. Those who reject the theory of the inheritance of acquired characters often lose sight of the last-mentioned circumstance. Weismann and his followers, it is contended, have produced no conclusive evidence against the old theory of inheritance. Even admitting the *modus operandi* of the transmission to be at present inconceivable, yet there are other actual operations almost as mysterious (e.g. the adjustment of skin-coloration to ground-surface brought about through the organs of sight). Moreover, Weissman's counter-doctrine of germinal continuity, involving as it did in its first form of presentation complete isolation of the germ-plasm from the body-plasm, fails altogether to render intelligible the way in which the higher levels of life are reached. Weismann's later theory of intra-germinal selection virtually surrenders his whole position. Assuming, then, that the body does influence the germ-plasm, Professor Ward holds it to be highly probable that in the germ-plasm the cell-nucleus plays a part analogous to that of the brain in the body-plasm, and that ontogeny—the building up of the embryo—is actually and literally a habit. But this mnemonic theory, as it is called, requires not merely physical records, but living experience or tradition, i.e. minds. It will only work for those who accept a monadistic interpretation of the beings that make up the world.

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THEOLOGY.

THE REV. PROFESSOR JAMES MOFFATT, D.LITT.

It would require more than the entire space at our disposal to review with any adequacy the fifth volume of Dr Hastings' *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*, but some of its contents may be selected to form a convenient starting-point for our survey this quarter. In the sphere of comparative religion, to begin with, it contains articles on the Chinese Feng-shui (a geomantic and spiritualistic faith which is said to underlie most Chinese religion), the Indian Dravidians, Egyptian religion (by Mr Flinders Petrie), Etruscan religion (by Dr Gustav Herbig), and the Druids (by Canon MacCulloch), besides notices of less central items. The worship of Mother Earth by the Northern Dravidians is of particular interest, in view of recent discussions upon the tinges of this belief in Hebrew religion. In describing ecstasy (p. 157) Dr Inge speaks of the dancing and howling dervishes as belonging to the lower forms of religious ecstasy; but in the preface to his *Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine* (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark), Dr F. J. Bliss acknowledges he has learned that, "in spite of the wild demonstrations which travellers witness for a fee in Constantinople and Cairo, the controlling motive of the dervish life is the hunger and thirst after righteousness." This, by the way, is only one instance of the fresh corrections which Dr Bliss's valuable volume necessitates in many of our Western views of the East. It is written not only from first-hand knowledge, but with a true catholic spirit, like Professor E. C. Moore's essay on the "Relation of Liberal Theology to Missions."¹ The same spirit characterises two shilling monographs on comparative religion which have recently appeared: one by Dr F. B. Jevons in the Cambridge Manuals, the other by Dr Estlin Carpenter in the Home University Library. Zoroastrianism, to which Dr Jevons devotes his chapter on "Dualism" (the *Encyclopædia* article covers a much wider field, naturally), also forms the subject of an essay by P. Dhorme in the *Revue Biblique* (pp. 15-45), though, as its title indicates ("La religion des Achéménides"), it deals rather with the primitive forms of the Persian religion than with the later. Dr Carpenter's manual, whose value is out of all proportion to its size and price, has not, as Dr Jevons's has, a special chapter on Buddhism, but Indian religions are prominent in his pages. The Jains, to which he twice alludes, are described by Mrs Stevenson in the Hastings *Encyclopædia* (875-879) under the heading of "Festivals and Fasts," which may be supplemented by Mr Herbert Warren's *Jainism* (Madras, 1912), a shilling pamphlet designed to represent the teachings of this curious sect in Western garb. The Theosophist office at Adhyar has also issued two pamphlets, one by A. Mahadeva Shastri on *The Basic Truths of Vedic Religion*, and one by J. Shrinivasa Rao on *Some Forgotten Truths of Hinduism*; the latter is a defence of the Theosophical Society's propaganda against Indian critics

¹ In the *American Journal of Theology* (January 1913), pp. 22-46.

who accuse it either of consolidating or of evaporating the caste system. Among the forgotten truths which the Society is held to revivify are the brotherhood of religions and the expected advent of the world-teacher or Jagat Gurū. The former pamphlet protests against the debasement of sacrifice and of womanhood in the conventional religion, and charges the specialisation of caste with the physical and moral degradation of the Hindus.

"Eschatology" in the *Encyclopædia* is written by Canon MacCulloch; in this connection we may note a second edition of Professor Charles's *Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life*, and Mr C. W. Enimet's paper, originally delivered at the recent Leiden Congress,¹ on "Is the Teaching of Jesus an Interims Ethik?" (*Expositor*, November, 423-434). The question is answered in the negative. The *Encyclopædia* article on "Eternity," by Professor J. S. Mackenzie, is one of the most remarkable in the volume. It suggests that "time is simply the form of succession in a developing process" which may be eternal, not in the sense of being timeless, but as including the whole of time; and then, in the concluding paragraph, declares that "if philosophy is to escape from those difficulties and self-contradictions which have been brought out in the course of its history, it must, we think, return to something more or less akin to this doctrine of the Trinity [*i.e.* the Johannine doctrine, *e.g.* in ch. viii. 58]." The author ends by saying that the further pursuit of this theory would involve a consideration of the being of God and of His relation to the world, which lies beyond the scope of the article. We hope the editor will give Professor Muirhead some opportunity later on of developing his thesis.

In the article on "Extreme Unction," Father Thurston observes that the Papal decree *Lamentabili sane* condemned the modernist error of refusing to see any sacramental unction in Jas. v. 14 f. This condemnation forms part, though only an incidental part, of the defensive policy of the Papacy, as readers of M. Albert Houtin's new *Histoire du Modernisme Catholique* (Paris, 1913) will readily understand. The history leaves a somewhat depressing impression on the mind. The author writes with characteristic verve, but he has lost faith in more than modernism, and the prospects of the latter movement, which he calls more than once "sentimental," within the Roman Church are depicted as gloomy in the extreme. The reactionary propaganda, headed by the Jesuits, is said to have crushed practically all the life out of it. M. Houtin traces modernism mainly² to the theological school founded in Paris in 1878; he describes the early suspicions which fell even upon M. Duchesne; then he traces the movement in various countries, along its biblical, sociological, and philosophical lines. He endeavours to be fair to the authorities of the Roman Church, but his pages disclose a sorry state of matters even to

¹ Summaries of the work done at this Congress are furnished in the *Theologische Literaturzeitung* (1912), 610-619, in the *Revue de l'histoire des Religions* (1912, pp. 233-252, by M. Alphandéry), and in the *American Journal of Theology* (1913, January, pp. 80-89, by Professor Bacon).

² It is decidedly curious that "moderniste" was first used by Rousseau, as a synonym for "materialiste."

those who are familiar with the treatment of Tyrrell and Loisy. The propaganda of panic against liberal theology is analysed with a candour which sounds all the more deadly as it comes from one who now takes the attitude of an outsider both to modernism and to the Papacy. M. Houtin's fears are unfortunately corroborated by the recent attack, instigated by an Italian Jesuit, upon the great French scholar Lagrange, whose commentary on Mark, one of the best in any language, naturally did not square with the subsequent assertions of the anti-modernist Biblical Commission. It is a satisfaction to learn from the latest number of the *Revue Biblique* that this admirable journal is not to be stopped meanwhile. We may still hope that Lagrange will be permitted to continue his contributions to it and to theological literature. But the Biblical Commission has decided that all these synoptic gospels were written before 70 A.D., that Mark is not prior to Matthew, that the appendix to Mark is authentic, and, among other things, that there is to be no recognition of any document like Q among Roman scholars. The last-named pronouncement will be a sad blow to the worshippers of Q, but they will probably survive it, at least if they breathe outside the Roman Church. Even inside, they may perhaps say, as Baur is reported to have said in similar circumstances, "As dying, and behold we live."

The general principle underlying such ecclesiastical conflicts is discussed by Professor Dunkmann in the *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift* (1913, pp. 65-81), and by two writers independently in the *Biblical World* (1912), where an editorial article on "The Relation between Religion and Freedom" is followed by a paper on "Theology and Biblical Criticism," in which Professor G. B. Smith points out that "as one traces the history of the experience portrayed in the biblical books, one becomes aware that a virile theology was never produced merely by the repetition of an authorised message, but that, on the contrary, the greatest books of the Bible owe their origin to a determined attempt to find an adequate expression for a living faith in opposition to a dead formalism." This is the thesis which illustrates the aim of a notable study of Schleiermacher¹ (London: Chapman & Hall) by Dr W. B. Selbie. The volume appears in a new series called "The Great Christian Theologies." The author, in his treatment of Schleiermacher, has considered the interests of doctrinal reconstruction; it would be unfair to call Schleiermacher's theology dynamical in opposition to the static theologies of the Roman and Anglican Churches, but his conceptions of faith and revelation contain elements which are vital to any successful advance upon traditionalism (although this is denied by Troeltsch, for example), especially his insistence upon the independent reality of Christian experience as a response to the divine spirit.² Dr

¹ Schleiermacher is also prominent in Professor W. P. Paterson's Baird Lectures on *The Rule of Faith* (Hodder & Stoughton), a volume which deserves special notice for its dogmatic grasp.

² M. Eugène Ménégoz, in a recent number of the *Revue Chrétienne* (Nov. 1912, 929-944), makes the same point in defending "Fidélisme" against its critics. Cf. also the *Encyclopædia* article on "Faith" (p. 693).

Selbie, in a series of penetrating arguments, restates the value and limitation of this break away from the formal conception of faith as the result of an intellectual process in the region of doctrine. His monograph is thus valuable, not simply as a historical study, but as an indication of the spirit in which healthy reconstructive work in modern theology must be carried on. Dr H. S. Nash in the *Harvard Review* (1913, pp. 12 f.) singles out Schleiermacher also in this connection.

One of the salient contributions of Schleiermacher was his restatement of the doctrine of election. He was confronted by much the same dogma as that which had already stung the youthful Shelley, his contemporary, into satirising the Christian God by attributing to him this plan of salvation:—

“I will beget a son, and he shall bear
The sins of all the world; he shall arise
In an unnoticed corner of the earth,
And there shall die upon a cross, and purge
The universal crime; so that the few
On whom my grace descends, those who are marked
As vessels to the honour of their God,
May credit this strange sacrifice, and save
Their souls alive: millions shall live and die,
Who ne'er shall call upon their Saviour's name,
But, unredeemed, go to the gaping grave.”

The German theologian recoiled, like the English poet, from the thought of final reprobation. Schleiermacher, in the *Glaubenslehre*,¹ argued that election involves the purpose of God ultimately to redeem the whole race, and that the election of the Church is simply a means to this end. A position, not essentially different from this, seems to be taken by Professor W. P. Paterson (*op. cit.*, pp. 307 f.), and by Mr A. S. Martin in an article on “Election” in the Hastings *Encyclopædia*, with which Wernle's discussion of Troeltsch's strictures on Calvinism (*Zeitschrift für Theol. u. Kirche*, 1913, 33 f.) should be compared. In an article on “The Fall,” Professor Denney discusses frankly the cognate problem raised by Paul's use of the Genesis-myth (*Encyclopædia*, pp. 701–705). Theoretically, as he points out, Paul does not really transcend the problems presented by the theodicy of 4th Esdras. “Sin in its unity and universality may be taken for granted, and it may be also overcome; but not even on the basis of the Bible—O.T. or N.T.—will its origin ever be explained.” When Paul said that “as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive,” he disregarded the fact that the connection in the last case is entirely different. The modern interpretations, which appeal to heredity and evolutionary ethics, are set aside by the author as inadequate to Paul's view. These interpretations, however, may have their own value, in the absence of any light thrown on the problem by Paul, and they are restated by Professor J. Y. Simpson, tentatively though incidentally, in his thoughtful *Spiritual Interpretation of Nature* (Hodder & Stoughton; see especially

¹ A new edition of the *Grundriss der philosophischen Ethik* has just been issued by Schiele, at Leipzig.

chapters xii., xv.), and by Mr S. A. McDowall in *Evolution and the Need of Atonement* (Cambridge, 1912). The former is written from the standpoint of a trained biologist.¹ The latter study, which has some unconscious and independent coincidences with Bergson's theories, appeals specifically to the data of personality, and finds sin in the refusal of the will to co-operate with the creative growth which impels man to union and likeness with the divine spirit of freedom. Theology recognises not only purpose, but divine purpose, in the universe. Man must co-operate with this purpose, and Christ, it is argued, by his death and resurrection "somehow" made it possible for men to be reunited to the will of God. The essay uses "consciousness" in several different senses, but it ranks as a suggestive contribution to the statement of the modern problem on the scientific side. For a somewhat similar emphasis on the need of conceiving God as purpose rather than in terms of substance, Professor H. R. Mackintosh's recent study of *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ* (Edinburgh, 1912), one of the outstanding contributions made last year to speculative theology, is criticised by Professor Warfield in a long, incisive review (*The Princeton Theological Review*, 1913, pp. 141-156). Professor Warfield's learning and uncompromising Calvinism are shown at a more genial if not more congenial task, however, in his article on Jonathan Edwards and the New England Theology, in the Hastings *Encyclopædia*, which is a model of sympathetic, historical appreciation.

In a volume on *Die Christliche Schöpfungsglaube* (Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht), which discusses from the theological side some of the problems handled by Professor Simpson, Herr R. Eckhardt emphasises the paramount significance, for a Christian philosophy of the universe, of the person of Jesus Christ. The experience created by the historical Jesus affords the norm by which the Christian views the world as containing a continuous, divine process. Christ is his guarantee for this belief, and the appearance of Christ in history is held to afford the only basis for a Christian conception of creation and providence. This is presupposed by Professor Adams Brown in the section on the Christian doctrine which he contributes to the composite *Encyclopædia* article on "Expiation and Atonement." He finds two main types of interpretation in the Church, one making the death of Christ an incident in his incarnate life, the other regarding it as the end of the incarnation. "The former is characteristic, on the whole, of the theology of Greek Catholicism; the latter, of that of Roman Catholicism and of Protestantism."² On the other hand, the sceptical side-wind still blows in puffs from the school of Drews and W. B. Smith. Thus a Dutch pamphlet, by Dr G. A. Van den Bergh van Eysinga, has been translated under the title *Radical Views about the New Testament* (London: Watts & Co.). The writer believes that Paul's epistles were

¹ Another first-rate statement is that of Professor Punnett in the *Encyclopædia* article on "Evolution (Biological)."

² In this connection the chapters on "The Gospel of Protestantism" and "The Genius of Roman Catholicism" in Professor Paterson's volume (already mentioned) are of special value.

the product of a second-century gnostic circle, and that therefore their evidence in favour of a historical Jesus is worthless. The main polemic of the book is against the liberal theologians whose "Ecce Homo" is met by an "Ecce Deus" which tallies only in name with the motto of the orthodox school. In addition to Professor Shirley, Case's reply, which was noted in our last survey, a careful refutation of this Drews' theory has been published by Dr T. J. Thorburn (*Jesus the Christ, Historical or Mythical*) along rather more orthodox lines than those followed by Professor Vischer's acute *Jesus Christus in der Geschichte* (Tübingen), and Professor Denney states what he conceives to be the Christian position in the *Expositor* for January (pp. 12-28). Like Vischer, he insists that Christianity is to be judged in the light of its history as a *datum* which implies historical facts in connection with Jesus Christ, but, unlike Vischer and Troeltsch, he sees more in the historical Jesus than such a personality as might be inferred from the Sistine Madonna or Beethoven's Sonatas. "It is not a matter of opinion, but a matter of fact, that to read Cæsar's Commentaries is one thing, and to read the gospels another; the relation of the reader to Cæsar is a relation to a person who is historical and no more; his relation to Christ is a relation to a person who is historical, certainly, and who certainly died, but who is certainly not 'as dead as Julius Cæsar.' He is far more living than that. In some way or other he belongs as truly to the present as to the past." In the *Biblische Zeitschrift* (1912, pp. 370), Dr Ludwig Schade patiently refutes Erbt's extraordinary attempt (*Das Markus-Evangelium: eine Untersuchung über die Form des Petruserrinerungen und die Geschichte der Urgemeinde*) to apply Winckler's astral mythology to the Marcan narrative.¹

The date of the Fourth Gospel is incidentally discussed in two articles in the *Journal of Theological Studies* for January; Mr C. H. Turner (pp. 161-195), writing on the Gospel of Peter, argues that this gospel (which he dates between 115 and 130 A.D.) presupposes the Fourth Gospel as well as the synoptists; Mr H. J. Bardsley (pp. 207-219) restates at length the conclusion which the present writer outlined in his *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* (pp. 577-579) that the Ignatian epistles as well as Polycarp's epistle presuppose the Johannine writings. In the *Biblische Zeitschrift* (396 f.) Dr H. J. Vogels writes upon the spear-thrust in John xix. 32 f., not only from the point of view of textual criticism, but in the light of the patristic tradition, which goes back to Origen and Chrysostom, that the lance pierced Jesus before his death.

Comparatively little has appeared on the theology of the New Testament. There is a constant stream of articles on Paul and Paulinism, most of which are second rate. But a refreshing exception to this will be found

¹ In the eighth number of the Freiburg Theological Studies another Roman Catholic scholar, Dr Edmund Kalt, has been engaged upon a similar task. His *Samson: Eine Untersuchung des historischen Charakters von Richt.* xiii.-xvi., is a learned and uncompromising refutation of the mythological theories; he amasses data to prove the early date and reliable character of the story, then discusses its interpretation by the later church, and finally deals with the legendary or so-called legendary aspects of the narrative.

in the series of papers which Professor H. A. A. Kennedy has just completed in the *Expositor* upon "St Paul and the Mystery Religions." The conclusion is that already reached by critics like Von Dobschütz and Schweitzer, but Dr Kennedy differs from Schweitzer in the estimate of Paul's eschatology,¹ and the special value of his papers lies in the carefully weighed statement of evidence against the fashionable theory which postulates a predominating influence of the cults upon the sacramental views of the apostle. The second volume of Father Prat's work on *La Théologie de Saint Paul* (Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne) is more learned than suggestive. Ample account is taken of most modern researches, but the dogmatic standpoint of the writer tends to prevent him from seeing Paulinism except through the windows of the Tridentine formulas. His representation of "faith," for example, in the Pauline soteriology has nothing that is not familiar to readers of Newman's *Lectures on Justification*. Heitmüller's article on the problem of Jesus and Paul (*Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft*, 1913, 320-337), and Dr G. Vos' learned essay in *Biblical and Theological Studies* (Princeton) on the relation of Paul's doctrine of the Spirit to eschatology, are of more critical significance. Dr Vos approximates to Professor Kennedy's position on eschatology. The Marburg professor lays stress upon the influence of Hellenistic Christianity, such as was developed in the church of Antioch, upon Paul; it is through this rather than through Paul's relation to the primitive Jerusalem church, that the apostle's attitude to Jesus is to be understood. Dr Machen's article, in the Princeton volume, on "Jesus and Paul," however, makes Heitmüller's article seem slight. At the close of a popular lecture on *Die Papyrus Urkunden der jüdischen Gemeinde in Elephantine* (Töpelmann, Giessen), Professor August F. von Gall notes that while the papyri are a warning against exaggerations of literary criticism such as the theories of the unauthenticity of the Ezra and Nehemiah literature, they confirm the fact that "the Law is later than the prophets, νόμος δὲ παρεισήλθεν, as Paul had already felt by his religious intuitions."

In the *Princeton Theological Review* (1912, 529-589) Mr J. G. Machen shows that belief in the Virgin-birth of Jesus was deeply rooted in the early years of the second century, and argues that the subsequent denials of it were due to dogmatic or philosophical prepossessions rather than to any basis in genuine tradition. Mr A. R. Stark, in his thesis on *The Christology of the Apostolic Fathers* (Chicago), finds that the subordination of Christ to the Father is characteristic of writings like Clement's epistle, the Didache, and the Papias fragments, in contrast to the development of Christological interest in Ignatius, Polycarp, and 2 Clement; in Barnabas, Hermes, and Diogenetus he traces the rise of the cosmological functions which are ascribed to Christ, although, as he admits, these are implicit, and even partially explicit, in the earlier literature. The evolution is

¹ Unlike Windisch who, in reviewing some recent manuals on New Testament theology (*Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1912, 289 f.), laments their failure to "eschatologise" Paul sufficiently.

carefully described, but it is hardly possible to differentiate the stages with much precision, or even to classify the extant literature genetically when a writer like Justin is left out. The anti-gnostic interests of the later second century are discussed in a French monograph upon the Acts of Paul.¹ The quality of Dr Émile Amann's edition of the *Protœvangélium Jacobi* raised great hopes of the new edition of these Acts which M. Léon Vouaux was announced as preparing in the new French series of the N.T. Apocrypha, of which Dr Amann is one of the editors. The edition fulfils these hopes. It is a critical, competent piece of work, which fills a real gap. In an appendix, the originals of the epistles to the Laodiceans and the Alexandrians, together with the correspondence of Paul and Seneca, are printed, with French translations and notes; but the primary interest of the volume lies in the introduction and notes to the Acta themselves. M. Vouaux regards them as the work of a Catholic priest in Asia, perhaps in Pisidian Antioch, and ventures to date them approximately about 160–170 A.D. He attaches little or no value to the efforts made by Lipsius, Corsen, and Sir W. M. Ramsay, from various sides, to discover some historical nucleus in the Acta. The English critic's attempt is dismissed with special disapprobation. "La méthode de Ramsay est tout simplement arbitraire, elle repose d'abord sur une simple supposition. . . . Elle permet à chaque critique d'exercer sur ce texte, suivant son caprice, toutes les mutilations qui lui conviennent" (pp. 94–95).

The New Testament "Acts" have been edited by Dr E. Preuschen² in Lietzmann's *Handbuch* (Tübingen; Mohr), the main interest naturally lying in the linguistic rather than in the historical aspect of the book; and we may further chronicle two volumes which have been added to *The Cambridge Greek Testament for Schools and Colleges*, an edition of Jude and 2 Peter by Dr M. R. James, and an edition of Romans by the general editor Mr St John Parry. Dr James has produced a readable commentary. He inclines to accept the authorship of Jude, c. 75–80 A.D., but he sums up in favour of its priority to 2 Peter at any rate, and of the latter's position among the pseudepigrapha of the second century. It is a little alarming to find Mr Parry devoting a section in the introduction to "Imperialism," but he fortunately resists the temptation to read statesmanlike plans into Paul: "We do not think that a case is made out for attributing to St Paul far-sighted views of the relation of the Church to the Empire." The notes are clear, and seldom too abstruse for their audience; from a theological point of view, they would have been all the better for a study of the two short and brilliant commentaries on the epistle by Professor Jülicher and Professor Denney.

JAMES MOFFATT.

¹ *Les Actes de Paul, et ses lettres apocryphes. Introduction, textes, traduction, et commentaire.* Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané, 1913.

² Norden's *Agostos Theos* (*Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede*), to which he refers in the preface, is reviewed warmly by Reitzenstein in *Neue jähbücher für das klassische Altertum* (1913, pp. 146–155). The first part opposes Harnack's theory of Acts.

REVIEWS

Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought.—By seven Oxford men: B. H. Streeter, R. Brook, W. H. Moberly, R. G. Parsons, A. E. J. Rawlinson, N. S. Talbot, W. Temple.—Macmillan & Co., London, 1912.

THE publication of volumes of essays by a number of writers connected with one or other of the Universities has become the recognised method of registering and presenting to the general public the main results of theological thought and study. It cannot exactly be said that each volume of such essays makes a distinct advance on its predecessors, if “advance” is to be used in the technical sense of the word; for the first of such volumes, *Essays and Reviews*, has not been surpassed in the boldness of its rather vague and negative and at times rather aggressive Liberalism. But, if we put aside *Essays and Reviews*, the present work undoubtedly represents a steady growth and development in general theological opinion, whatever may be thought as to the exact position of individual writers in the two series. In *Contentio Veritatis* it was necessary to defend and apologise for critical views which the writers of *Foundations* can take for granted.

The series opens with an article by the Rev. N. S. Talbot. It is chiefly occupied with a gloomy picture of the present religious situation, together with some rather contemptuous and patronising criticism of the religion of the Victorian age. The point which the writer apparently wishes to establish is that the illogical compromises of the Victorian age are now impossible. The present generation can no longer be Liberal and yet Christian, or retain Christian morality when it has parted company with Christian theology. The Liberals and the Agnostics of the Victorian age were kept comparatively respectable by “the *Nachschein* of Evangelical piety.” The present age has to choose between “Christ” and some very black and immoral form of infidelity, the nature of which is not precisely indicated, but is apparently something of the type represented by Mr H. G. Wells. The writer does not very clearly indicate his own theological position, but from his general tone it would seem to be something very different from that of the other writers. The essay is impressive in its

way, but it seems to have been written as an introduction to some quite other work—such a volume of Apologetics, for instance, as might have been produced under the editorship of Dr Figgis or Professor Orr. It forms a most unsuitable introduction to what (with no desire to affix a party label to the book) is a volume of quite progressive theology.

I confess I should like to have it made a little plainer who are the people who in the Victorian age failed to find Christ because they “did not need Him.” Mr Talbot can hardly mean the disciples either of the original Oxford Movement or of the *Lux Mundi* aftermath of it to which his own father belonged. It is clearly “Liberals” of some kind against whom the attack is directed, but I cannot make out what sort of Liberals I can hardly believe that he would so speak of the more liberal theologians of that age—the Maurices, the Robertsons, or the Stanleys, or of such characteristically Victorian poets as Tennyson and Browning. If he means merely the agnostic men of science, I very much doubt whether he is right in expecting that their successors will be more favourably disposed to Christianity because some of them have given up belief in morality as well as in theology. Nor can I see any but a psychological explanation of his conviction that things are going to be better simply because they are worse. “The times of the impotence of Jesus Christ are passing. He was ever powerless with those who did not need Him.” The “impotence of Jesus Christ” does not strike me as either a particularly orthodox or a particularly just expression. If Christ was impotent in the days of Newman and of Maurice, of Dale and of Spurgeon, of Lord Shaftesbury and of General Booth—in the age which witnessed the regeneration of the Church of England, an enormous extension of missions and a long course of social reforms promoted on the most definitely Christian grounds, and in large part by definitely Christian agencies,—I confess I do not know where in history (at least since the conversion of Constantine) to look for an age in which Christ was not impotent. If Christ is to be considered impotent in any age in which He is not universally obeyed, surely the most sanguine of Christians will hardly expect the twentieth century to differ in that respect from any previous century. Mr Talbot will attract many readers by his unquestionable earnestness and his vein of prophetic, if somewhat “slangy,” eloquence; but I am afraid I must confess myself too hopelessly “Victorian” in my ideas to appreciate or even to understand this essay.

Mr Brook’s essay on “The Bible” supplies the most remarkable testimony to the theological progress of the last fifteen years. The usual critical positions are not proved or apologised for, but simply presupposed. We fear, in view of the recent explosions at Church Congresses and a recent vote in the Lower House of the Canterbury Convocation, that Mr Brook is assuming a somewhat more rapid advance in Church opinion on the subject than has actually taken place; but he is probably right in deciding that it is not worth while trying to convert a generation that elects to be led by the Dean of Canterbury and Canon Newbolt; and he

prefers to address himself to men under fifty. He assumes the critical conclusions, and goes on to ask, "What in the light of these conclusions is the religious value of the Bible?" On the whole, the task is well performed. Degrees of inspiration in the Bible and the existence of inspiration outside the Bible are duly recognised, and a very reasonable view is taken as to the meaning of the term. To my own mind (though to many this will be no defect) the weak point of the essay is that it is based on an extreme view as to the "immediacy" (in the strict philosophical sense) of the knowledge of God possessed by religious minds. In one place he actually goes so far as to speak of a "perception" of God. It may be thought pedantic to insist that "perception" is a term which should only be applied to what can be apprehended by the senses. But, without pressing this point, perception surely stands for a kind of direct and immediate vision which is hardly reconcilable with the declaration that we know God by faith. It is admitted that this kind of experience belongs to the few rather than to the normal human consciousness: average men must depend on the proofs afforded by reason or rely on the experience of the few. Mr Brook hardly seems to realise the possibility that what would be claimed as immediate knowledge by the unphilosophical person may nevertheless really depend upon unconsciously accepted traditional beliefs or involve a certain element of inference. He seems to suppose that we know of the existence of our friends immediately or intuitively. In this he will find some philosophers in Oxford to agree with him, but I very much doubt whether one of the great classical philosophers can be quoted in favour of such a view. Those who think that communion with a friend may be close and intimate enough in spite of the fact that our belief in the friend's existence rests on inference, will not assume that even very religious minds must necessarily have arrived at their knowledge in a strictly intuitive way. Mr Brook quotes the famous passage in which Newman speaks of God and his own soul as the "two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings."¹ It will be observed that Newman did not suppose himself to know other souls intuitively, and a study of *The Grammar of Assent* will show that Newman (like many others who use such language upon occasion) must not be understood too literally. It is clear that Newman thought the knowledge of God to rest upon a sort of inference—an inference necessarily, spontaneously, and (in a sense) unconsciously, made but still quite distinctly an inference, an inference mainly from the existence of conscience. The same disclaimer of immediate knowledge is to be found in many, perhaps most, of the great religious thinkers.

Mr Streeter's essay on "The Historic Christ" is on the whole the most remarkable, as it is the boldest, in the volume. Mr Streeter writes with a mastery of his subject which can hardly be claimed for all the contributors. He accepts the usual analysis of documents. About the historical value of

¹ So Newman writes in the printed volume, but he must have written, or at least ought to have written, "absolutely." Even Newman's loose philosophy can hardly have recognised two (and inferentially countless other) "absolute beings."

the introduction to Matthew and Luke, we are told only that it is "hotly debated." As to the Fourth Gospel, Mr Streeter feels "that the mystical and theological interest of its author dominates, if it does not swallow up, the biographical." It "should primarily be regarded not so much as an historical authority as an *inspired meditation* on the life of Christ." His acknowledgments to the recent eschatological theories are all that the most modern of Modernists can demand: he accepts apparently—to my own mind too, easily and too confidently—all the more explicit sayings of Jesus as to His coming at a certain date in the near future; he admits that they were intended literally, and he recognises that they have had, and (by implication) that they are destined to have, no literal fulfilment. Our Lord deliberately rejected the political conception of Messiahship and accepted the apocalyptic conception. and He eventually came to think that the kingdom was to be established by His death, and went up to Jerusalem facing the probability of death, but without any attempt to "force the hand" of the heavenly Father. The psychology of Christ's attitude towards the apocalyptic conception is very delicately and skilfully handled, but I shall not attempt to summarise it here. Mr Streeter regards it, very much in the way in which moderate Eschatologists like Professor von Dobschütz have done, as the husk in which a conception of eternal truth and value was embodied; but exactly what that truth was, is not, I confess, made very plain.

The part of the article which will attract most attention is the treatment of the Resurrection. Mr Streeter regards the story of the empty tomb as historical, but adds:

"The discovery of the empty tomb, assuming the story to rest on adequate historical evidence, which personally I believe to be the case, is often supposed to determine the decision in favour of the traditional theory. This, however, is not really so, for with a little ingenuity it is not difficult to imagine more than one set of circumstances which might account on purely natural grounds for the tomb being found empty" (p. 134).

It is clear that Mr Streeter believes that the body which was buried did not rise again. At the same time he tries to avoid accepting the "Subjective Vision theory," and offers the following suggestions:

"Only if the possibility of personal immortality be dogmatically denied can there be any real difficulty in supposing that the Master would have been able to convince His disciples of His victory over death by some adequate manifestation;—possibly by showing Himself to them in some form such as might be covered by St Paul's phrase, 'a spiritual body'; possibly through some psychological channel similar to that which explains the mysterious means of communication between persons commonly known as telepathy; or possibly in some way of which at present we have no conception. On such a view, the appearances to the disciples can only be styled 'visions,' if we mean by vision something directly caused by the Lord Himself veritably alive and personally in communion with them" (p. 136).

Many of us who will agree with Mr Streeter in (1) accepting the historicity of the Vision while denying the miraculous disappearance from the tomb, (2) leaving the nature of the Vision an open question, will feel that in suggesting that the only possible "difficulty" as to the acceptance of his theory must spring from the doubt or denial of personal immortality, he does less than justice to other views. He scarcely seems to recognise the existence of the difficulty of proving by historical evidence a real violation of the laws of nature. Surely his own maxim, "When a natural explanation of an event is at all possible, there must be very special reasons for falling back upon an explanation of a supernatural character," must apply to other theories besides that of a literal resuscitation of the body laid in the tomb. No doubt that admission does not exclude the possibility that the Vision may not be subjective in the sense of being caused merely by the eager longing and excitement of the disciples. One of his illustrations—what we may call the "telepathic" explanation—need involve no violation of the laws of nature, though we may have to admit that we do not know fully the conditions under which such manifestations occur; but the idea of a "spiritual body," in the sense in which doubtless St Paul himself must have used the term (*i.e.* a body of some attenuated material substance, though not of "flesh and blood"), would surely involve a physical miracle no less signal than the reanimation of the material body. A writer who does not think the evidence for the latter sufficient can hardly claim that the historically established facts require anything more than the telepathic explanation.

On the more general issues raised by Mr Streeter's paper my only complaint is that it is so short. He is emphatic in rejecting the theory of an *Interimsethik*, but he has told us very little about the moral and religious teaching or about the character of Christ, and (strange to say) the subject is not dealt with by any other of the Essayists. We are familiar, of course, with that view of Christ's "Person and Office" according to which His whole function was to be supernaturally born, to work miracles, to fulfil the Messianic prophecies, to offer a substitutionary sacrifice by His death, and to rise again in a manner stupendously miraculous. Such a view is hardly open to a writer who passes over in silence the miraculous birth, who admits that there was an element of delusion in the Messianic and eschatological ideas of Jesus as understood by Himself, who apparently thinks that He died for sins in the sense in which other men have won benefits for mankind by self-sacrifice, and who is not clear that the Resurrection may not be explained by something like telepathy. Surely from this point of view the chief significance of Christ's life and personality must lie in His revelation of the Father by His teaching, by His example, by His character. Yet about these little is said, though what little he does say is excellent—certainly not enough to explain the unique place which Mr Streeter, as it seems to me quite rightly, claims for Christ in the religious history of the world. Would an intelligent Hindu or Japanese who wished to know why Christians thought so much of Christ

find his question satisfactorily, however briefly, answered by what Mr Streeter tells us about Him? I very much doubt it. Mr Streeter would probably claim that this was not the subject of his essay. The omission—not merely in this essay but in the whole book—is none the less significant. In spite of all their critical modernism, Mr Streeter and most of his colleagues seem unwilling to recognise that, on their view of the historical facts, the unique Divine Sonship of Jesus must be justified and explained mainly by the moral and spiritual influence of Christ rather than by His own claims to Messiahship, however clearly and however justly made by Himself, or by any supernatural accompaniments of His earthly career. Mr Streeter is so preoccupied with the attempt to find a permanent meaning in the Messianic and eschatological elements in the teaching of Jesus that he has no room for what is of much more importance. This does not, however, destroy the value of his most sober, reasonable, and reverent handling of the problems with which he actually deals. Those who are puzzled and perhaps distressed by the new eschatological ideas will perhaps get more help from Mr Streeter than from anyone else who has written upon the subject.

The essay on "The Interpretation of the Christ" by the Rev. A. E. J. Rawlinson and Prebendary Parsons sketches in a very scholarly way the development of Christological ideas in the New Testament. The writers are, indeed, more anxious to discover the vital and permanently important truths in the teaching of St Paul, the Epistle to the Hebrews, and the Johannine writings, than to reduce the theories of their writers into coherent intellectual systems: but there is no attempt to disguise the difference between their intellectual outlook and ours. At the same time I think the writers are disposed to underrate the element of intellectual theory which was involved in the doctrine of the early Church and especially in the characteristically Pauline teaching. "It is of the last importance," they say, "to recognise that the development which is traceable in early Christian ideas about Christ was not the product of abstract speculation in the study" (p. 152). "Thoughts and beliefs alike sprang out of their experience." Quite true—but not, I venture to say, the whole truth. The writers are far from denying that the interpretation of the experience was expressed in the categories supplied by the thought of the time: but they hardly seem to realise the possibility that the expression in some cases went somewhat beyond, or failed wholly to correspond with, the experience, or even that the experience itself was to some extent produced or modified by the theory. They hardly recognise what seems to me the determining influence exercised upon the early theology of the Atonement by Jewish prophecy. They contend, for instance, that it was by the Resurrection and the coming of the Spirit "alone that the disciples were finally convinced that Jesus was verily, and indeed the Christ." By these mainly, and in the deepest way, no doubt; but surely what was regarded as the exact fulfilment of the prophecies about the Messiah had its share even in producing this conviction—still

more in the development of the theory that the death of Christ had brought about the forgiveness of sins and (in St Paul's view) the abrogation of the Mosaic law. The writers are confident—more so perhaps than Mr Streeter—that the disciples' faith certainly involved not merely the sight of the Risen Lord, but also the knowledge of the empty tomb. They hardly face the possibility that the belief in the emptiness of the tomb may have grown out of what was originally their theoretical explanation of the experienced Resurrection Vision, and that the detailed stories may be the eventual embodiment of this conviction. This is the more curious inasmuch as they are willing to admit the possibly subjective character of St Paul's greatest experience—the vision on the road to Damascus. "The vision of the Christ on the Damascus road, for all its apparent 'objectivity,' might quite well turn out to be more or less explicable along psychological lines, as a product of auto-suggestion induced by the inner conflict of Saul's spirit" (p. 166); and here they add some words of high wisdom which are worth transcribing: "It may be remarked in passing, that it is high time that a protest was made against the prevalent notion that we ought not to see the work of God in the processes of the human mind, such as go to bring about a great spiritual crisis. God is not a God of disorder—the words are St Paul's own,—and the laws which govern human thought and affection and work themselves out in character are just as much God's laws as are the laws by which the flowers grow or the stars move in their courses" (p. 167). This represents a principle of profound importance; only it must be remembered that if experiences are due to psychological laws, while they *may* be vehicles of a real divine revelation, they *need not* be so; and we cannot trust to subjective emotional experiences as necessarily revelations of absolute objective truth, nor can we refuse to recognise that the experiences themselves may have been in part due to pre-existing intellectual beliefs—that, for instance, St Paul's sense of being released from the burden of the law by the death of Christ was in part produced by intellectual ideas which made the law a burden to him, and by a theory about the necessity for the Messiah's death, which he derived from the study of prophecy. The two writers hold that "St Paul was not a strictly logical thinker, still less a theologian constructing a system," and they fully admit, or rather perhaps assume, that we are not bound to accept all St Paul's intellectual theories. Their account of the modern meaning contained in St Paul's teaching, and in the other early writers dealt with, is excellently done; my only criticism would be to suggest that St Paul was rather more of a theorist than they admit, and that it is possible to discriminate rather more sharply than they do between the intensely Jewish theoretical apparatus of his teaching and the element of eternal truth which it embodies.

No positive judgment is pronounced as to the authorship of the Fourth Gospel; but the idealising element is fully, if soberly, admitted: "His work, even if it be regarded as history, is surely history as seen through a medium of Christian experience and reflexion; a 'spiritual

Gospel,' as Clement of Alexandria called it long ago, the work of one of those 'men of the Spirit' in whom the early Christian communities recognised a peculiar faculty of insight and illumination" (p. 203). After this it seems to me a little difficult for the author to say "it is emphatically not the case that the writer is consciously idealising." It may be quite true that he "does not deliberately substitute parable for history, neither is he indifferent to historical truth" (p. 205). I have always myself been indisposed to admit that the historical elements of the Gospel, where they go beyond the Synoptists, are pure, deliberately invented romance; but if the writer expresses the results of his own "experience," "all that wealth of meaning which Christians had discovered in His Person and in His work" (pp. 204-5), in the form of objective fact, by means of incidents which may not have occurred and speeches which were certainly not delivered, "because they were sure that all this was actually implicit from the beginning in the historical facts of His life and mission," what is this but idealising, and an idealising of which the writers could hardly have been wholly unconscious? If idealising means "deliberately seeking to make the Christ seem greater or better or holier than he believed Him as a matter of history to have been," then no doubt "conscious idealising" would be an unsuitable phrase; but this is surely not what is meant by at least many of the writers who have used that expression. Here and there many of us will differ from the writers in points of emphasis or detail; but it would be hardly possible to give a better account of what the Fourth Gospel is and of what it is not in the same number of pages. Their judgment that the Apocalypse "as a whole . . . is the record at first hand of an immediate personal experience" (p. 199) will strike many readers as more surprising and as quite opposed to the results of recent researches in apocalyptic literature.

When we come to Mr Temple's article on "The Divinity of Christ," we come to the most ambitious article in the volume. There is assuredly no lack of boldness about his attempt to express in modern language what is meant, or what ought to be meant, by modern Christians in calling Jesus Christ "divine." Perhaps it is the boldest attempt that has ever been made by one who is quite enthusiastic and ungrudging in his acceptance of the doctrine. With much in the article I find myself in sympathy. But at the same time I find it rather difficult to put together in my mind all that Mr Temple tells us about the person of Christ. Such a statement as the following seems exactly to hit the mark: "The wise question is not, 'Is Christ Divine?' but 'What is God like?' And the answer to that is 'Christ.'" But wise practical religious utterances like this are mixed up with metaphysical theories of a very much more disputable character. Mr Temple, as it seems to me, reads the theology of the Early Church a great deal too much, or too exclusively, with the eyes of Harnack. He, on the whole, prefers the Western theology to the Eastern. Such an attitude is natural enough in Harnack, who habitually judges the Fathers by the degree of their approximation to Luther: consequently he

hates philosophers like Clement of Alexandria and Origen, prefers Athanasius to the other Greeks, and loves Augustine as a not unintelligent anticipator of Luther, a little spoiled by the ecclesiasticism of his environment. I doubt whether Mr Temple—being a philosopher and not being a Lutheran—would really agree with Harnack, if he had read large masses of both Greek and Latin Fathers with his own eyes. He greatly exaggerates, I cannot but think, the extent to which the Eastern theology is made unavailable to modern minds by being a “substance-theology,” and still more undeniably he exaggerates the extent to which this was not true of Augustine and other Westerns. There is as much dubious philosophising about Substance in St Augustine’s *De Trinitate* as in any of the Greeks: for instance, in his attempt to show that the Love of the Father for the Son is a “substance.” Mr Temple accuses the Greeks of a “relative neglect of the moral problem” (p. 232). This seems to me an astounding assertion. It is true that they try to give a really ethical meaning to their doctrine of the Atonement, but this is simply a proof that the ethical interest was always uppermost in them. “Western theology,” Mr Temple continues, “represents a very real advance on the Eastern, because it is always consciously concerned with the moral problem.” It is true that the Westerns, especially St Augustine, were always preoccupied with the Atonement; but when we remember the very unethical character of their theories of Original Sin and Justification, it is questionable whether this can fairly be described as a pre-occupation with morality. Mr Temple’s own theory about the Divinity of Christ, though he declares he will be “psychological,” is really metaphysical in the extreme. It is true that it centres in the Atonement, but his theory of the Atonement is itself intensely metaphysical. It all turns upon the very disputable doctrine that Christ was “not generically but inclusively,” or, as we may paraphrase the words, ‘Christ is not *a* God (or *a* Divine Being) but God; Christ is not only *a* man but Man’ (p. 247). If this last assertion means that He represents “the highest ideal of manhood,” few who are prepared to recognise in any sense the Divinity of Christ will be disposed to quarrel with him; but it appears to be meant in a strictly metaphysical sense. And if that is the case, we are bound to ask what it really means, and what is the evidence for it. Mr Temple shrinks from the well-known thesis that Christ was man, but not *a* man at all. But in either form the doctrine seems at bottom to involve precisely that bastard-Platonic and mediæval-realist doctrine of Substance which the writer elsewhere treats as the main cause which makes the traditional theology of the Church in so much need of re-interpretation to modern minds. Yet Mr Temple seems prepared to stake the whole of his theology on this piece of metaphysic. “We can only regard Him as Divine and supreme over the world, if we can regard Him as somehow including in His Personality all mankind” (p. 146). I am afraid that most modern readers of this work—whether among metaphysicians or among “plain men”—will find Mr Temple’s new scholasticism almost as much in need of

interpretation as the old. Moreover, they will find one difficulty about this scholasticism which is absent from the old. The old scholastic always gave us their premisses—passages from authoritative writers from which the doctrines were deduced. Mr Temple has not told us what are the premisses of his doctrine, so far as it rests upon anything but a quotation from Dr Moberly's *Personality and Atonement*. Mr Temple does not believe in the final and absolute authority of the passages in St Paul upon a very liberal and at the same time a very literal interpretation of which such a doctrine might possibly be based. It will hardly be pretended that such a doctrine is involved in any well-attested saying of our Lord about Himself. Mr Temple would possibly say, "It is a hypothesis which is necessary to explain Christian experience." But can any experience prove a doctrine which so obviously goes beyond what any individual can properly be said to "experience," and can it be said to be "explained" by a doctrine which is really unintelligible? For at bottom the doctrine implies that a Universal can be entirely present in one of the particulars in a sense in which it is not present in all of them, and, further, that not only the universal qualities of the genus may be present in that one particular but all the *differentiæ* of each individual. Is this intelligible? In another passage Mr Temple talks about a "Particular (Jesus of Nazareth) which is a perfect instance of its own Universal (the Deity)" (p. 252). The view seems to imply that the universal "humanity" and the universal "Deity" are really the same, but even if a meaning could be found for such an assertion, it does not help us to understand how, if Christ represents ideal humanity, Judas Iscariot and Cæsar Borgia can also be said to be "included" in Christ, except in the obvious sense in which *all* individual men may be said to be partakers in one and the same universal "humanity." Mr Temple, following the lead of Harnack and all the Ritschlians, is very contemptuous about the theology of Chalcedon. "The formula of Chalcedon is, in fact, a confession of the bankruptcy of Greek Patristic theology" (p. 230). But there is nothing in the Chalcedonian doctrine of a union of two "natures" in Christ half so difficult as this, even if that doctrine is understood in a very strict metaphysical sense. Something of the same metaphysical doctrine underlies the theology of Mr Moberly, but this is going beyond Mr Moberly. Mr Moberly (like many other philosophers) regards God as a Mind which includes all other minds, but Mr Temple boldly transfers this conception to the human soul of Christ. The philosophers who will most agree with the idea of an all-inclusive Absolute are those who will probably feel least at home with the idea of a single human Being who includes all others. I have profound sympathy with the general spirit in which the essay is conceived, and a great admiration for much that Mr Temple has written—including parts of this essay; but I am bound to say that there is much in it which I do not understand. No doubt there will be many who will be prepared to accept Mr Temple's views without any very close scrutiny in view of his obvious earnestness in trying to unite a cordial adhesion to the central

doctrine of traditional Christianity with an open-minded attempt to face modern problems; while even those who cannot believe that the ultimate "restatement" that we all desire will be effected exactly on Mr Temple's lines may recognise that he has indicated the spirit and tone in which the subject should be approached.

Mr Temple contributes another article to the volume—one on the Church, and this it is possible to praise almost without qualification. We find here what we so seldom find in the treatment of this subject—a combination of the large-mindedness which refuses to identify the Church in its highest, ideal sense with any single visible organisation, and a due and adequate appreciation of the fact that the idea of the Church is useless and ineffectual except so far as it can be realised in some actual, visible, institutional form. Mr Temple fully appreciates the fact that religion is social, and all the practical consequences which follow a recognition of that truth. A philosophical conception of God, as is shown in another essay, requires us to regard the world and its history as essential to the very life and being of God. The Church is "a community, whose life is nothing less than the life of God." Yet "we cannot limit the pre-Christian Church to Israel any more than we can deny the presence of Christ's Spirit in persons and bodies other than Christians and the Church. Abraham and Isaiah, Socrates and Phidias [this strikes us as no very happy conjunction], Buddha and Confucius, must all be reckoned as, *each in his degree*, a representative and organ of the eternal Church" (p. 341, *note*). And the relation between the different branches of Christ's Church is conceived in a very similar spirit. What Mr Temple says about the authority of the Church is quite reasonable in principle; still, when he writes, "It is always possible that the Church is wrong, but the weight of probability is always on its side," I am not sure that he does not go a little too far. If he is thinking of *purely* ethical or spiritual matters, the statement might perhaps be accepted; still more so, if we think of some solitary, perhaps ignorant, individual, maintaining a thesis of his own against a united Christendom. But that is not commonly the way in which these collisions between private judgment and authority occur, and there is an unreality in pretending that it is. When on some question of history or science we have the majority, or a considerable body of scholars, or men of science, at issue with the Church in any of its visible and tangible expressions—whether general council, bishops, clergy, convocations, or a simple majority of lay believers, the number of occasions on which "the Church" in this sense has been wrong in the past would certainly warrant a considerable hesitation in assuming even an *a priori* probability that it will be right now. Mr Temple will plead that he is thinking of really religious questions; but the difficulty is that the representatives of conservatism always insist that every new collision between science and authority involves a religious question; though, when the battle has been fought and lost, they are ready enough to admit that it was after all a mere question of science. It is to be feared that the Church, if appealed to

to-morrow in any of its visible expressions, would decide by an overwhelming majority against many things in *Foundations*: yet if he knew nothing about the authors except that they were seven young Oxford men engaged in teaching theology and philosophy in that University, would not "the man in the street" be justified in attaching more importance to their opinion about critical and historical questions than to that (say) of a majority in the Lower House of the Canterbury Convocation?

On Mr Temple's treatment of the Sacraments I will only remark that he seems hardly to appreciate the weakness of the critical foundations upon which his rather strong assertions rest. "It is the whole point of the Sacrament that Christ gives and we receive. No other 'aids and helps' can ever take the place of these, because they are the means appointed by Himself, and carry us back to the moment of His supreme revelation of the Father in the Passion" (p. 345). What evidence is there of that "appointment" or of a promised "gift"? In view of the discrepant versions of the words of institution, can we really say that we know historically that Jesus ever prescribed the perpetual celebration of the Eucharist, to say nothing of attaching any particular effects to it? These historic doubts do not, of course, affect the spiritual value of these ordinances, provided that these effects are rested simply upon experience and the tradition of the Church, but Mr Temple sets up a theory which presupposes an express command by our Lord Himself of a perpetual celebration by His followers. I cannot believe that Mr Streeter or Prebendary Parsons would admit that this fact was established by good historical evidence, even apart from the question whether our Lord made arrangements during His earthly life for the regulation of a Church of indefinite duration—a view expressly repudiated by Mr Rawlinson in the next essay. In another place Mr Temple speaks of the "prayer in which the Lord Jesus dedicated Himself for the final sacrifice," as though we really had a verbatim report of it: surely no portion of the Fourth Gospel has less ground to be so regarded, even upon the assumption of the Johannine authorship. But this tendency to build up theories upon uncritical assumptions represents almost the only serious defect in this excellent essay. Mr Temple has many high qualifications for the philosophical interpretation of Christian doctrine, but I cannot help feeling on almost every page of his work that he has never really thought himself into the critical attitude which he would perhaps nominally accept.

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whether the authority in question happens to be that of the parish priest, the nonconformist preacher, or the 'naked Bible'—as inevitably as he imbibes his political views from the leading articles of his favourite newspaper" (p. 374). But he adds that "normally all educated persons ought, in their measure—in religious as in secular matters—to emancipate themselves from tutelage *pari passu* with advancing knowledge and experience" (p. 375), and recognises the duty in some cases for the discoverer of new truth to publish and maintain it against the decisions of authority. As to the ministry, the idea of the apostolical succession, as a matter of historical fact, is entirely abandoned. Episcopacy is defended merely as representing the principle of "historical continuity," and the author parts company still more decidedly and emphatically from ordinary "Catholic" ideas by the admission that "a close critical examination of the New Testament documents is making it more and more difficult to conceive of the Master as having definitely and explicitly *legislated* upon this or any other matter with regard to His future Church" (p. 385). Mr Rawlinson tries, indeed, to differentiate himself from the ordinary Protestant view by treating the Protestant conception of the ministry as essentially "prophetic," and the Catholic as primarily priestly or sacerdotal. He admits that the true conception ought to include both, but he is himself disposed to treat the priestly as the more important. My only criticism upon this view is that it is difficult to say exactly what functions are left for the "priest," from a point of view which so completely gives up all magical conceptions about orders and sacraments, except those pastoral functions and that leadership in worship which certainly enter into the most strictly Protestant conception of the ministry. No doubt Mr Rawlinson would like his parishioners to come to confession—perhaps habitual confession—which the Protestant pastor might deprecate; but the difference between them would be—on Mr Rawlinson's view of the nature and source of priestly authority—merely a difference of opinion as to the expediency of this particular ordinance, or as to the frequency of its use. Mr Rawlinson seems to me to have brought out in a quite admirable manner the truths underlying the usual High Church doctrines about the Church and the Sacraments (though others have attempted to do the same thing on much the same lines who would never dream of calling themselves High Churchmen), but the doctrines themselves—everything for denying which Evangelicals and Liberals have hitherto been regarded as "bad Churchmen"—are completely abandoned. If the better educated among the younger High Church clergy follow the lead so courageously set them by Mr Rawlinson, the appearance of this essay will indeed represent a turning-point in the history of the Church of England. For some time to come there will probably remain differences of taste, of tone, and of emphasis between High Churchmen of the new school and other sections of the Church, but difference of principle there will be none.

Mr Moberly is the philosopher *par excellence* of the group, and his essay on the Atonement is a serious piece of thinking on a high level.

Seldom, indeed, has a writer on such subjects more definitely faced the philosophical issues involved, and seldom has a philosopher written in a more religious spirit. I may add that seldom has a young Hegelian written with so much modesty. His method of dealing with the subject is to set forth on each division of the subject—the nature of sin, “the conditions of a solution,” and the efficacy of Christ’s work—what he calls the Conservative view and the Liberal view, and to state with great clearness and definiteness how far he agrees with each. I am not sure that the presentation of the two cases is quite fair, since he takes as a representative of “the Liberal view” so very extreme an exponent of Liberalism as Sir Oliver Lodge with his doctrine that the man of to-day is too busy to think of his sins and has really no occasion to do so. Nothing like this has ever been defended by anyone who can claim to be regarded as a Liberal theologian. The Conservative, on the other hand, represents by no means the most extreme or irrational type of opinion which has been maintained in the name of orthodoxy. The “inclusive view,” by which Mr Moberly hopes to combine the elements of truth in both extremes, contains, up to a certain point, much more of the Liberal than of the Conservative solution: and the appearance of the contrary is brought about chiefly by crediting the “Liberal” with all sorts of absurdities and treating anything that corrects these absurdities as “Conservative.” In so far as Mr Moberly insists that the “Atonement would seem to consist in the thoroughgoing moral regeneration of the sinner,” and that this is brought about by the effects of Christ’s whole work upon the sinner’s consciousness—including His death but not His death only, there is little that would not be heartily followed by such representatives of the liberal view as Abelard, Maurice, Westcott, Ritschl. All these would substantially agree that it is the love of God exhibited by the death of Christ which causes sorrow for sin and produces that change of character which can alone constitute real reconciliation with God. And, as far as it goes, Mr Moberly accepts this view. But he seeks to combine this (a) with his father’s theory of “vicarious Penitence,” and (b) with a revival of the old view—which dates from Irenæus and has a long history in the writings of Fathers and Schoolmen—that the solidarity of the human race is such that in Christ’s sufferings the whole human race has really, and not on a mere legal fiction, suffered too.

The last of these theories I have already touched upon in connection with Mr Temple’s essay; but I should like to say something about the first, which he thus defends: “How is vicarious penitence saving? It is by doing more perfectly what punishment does imperfectly; namely, destroying the sin-taste in the sinner by ‘showing up’ sin and so producing such an intense realisation of the true nature of sin and goodness as must find outlet in action. This happens best in our experience when we come to see our sins through purer eyes than our own, and this is made possible by mutual affection. Thus, when we see the trouble and suffering that our faults have brought on those whom we love, our eyes are most likely to be

opened to a true understanding of spiritual values. And this will be so most when the trouble and suffering thus produced is least the accidental or external consequence of sin, but just the shame which mere knowledge of our sin produces in those who love us" (p. 309). There is little in all this which could not be covered by the language which has been used by those who have rested the Atonement upon the subjective effects of Christ's death, except that Mr Moberly employs (as they have not done) the, 'to my mind, quite unsuitable term "vicarious penitence" for the sorrow which Jesus may no doubt reasonably be supposed (though, after all, there is little direct historical evidence of this) to have felt for the sins of the whole world. But Mr Moberly is not satisfied with such an explanation. He insists upon an objective or "intrinsic necessity" for Christ's death. I have read through several times the pages (pp. 310-316) in which he tries to explain this "intrinsic necessity," but I have wholly failed to understand them sufficiently to venture on reproducing their drift in any words but his own, and for that there is no space. I can only notice isolated points.

Mr Moberly insists that not merely the voluntary surrender to death, but death itself, was necessary to perfect the character of Christ. That the *suffering* was necessary to perfect the character of Christ is a thought which will seem bold to the modern orthodox reader, though Hebrews v. 8 can be quoted on its side. But that an actual death can be necessary to the perfection of character is a very difficult contention. I fail to see upon what the necessity can rest. That there is no such effectual way of convincing another of the sufferer's love ("Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends") is intelligible enough; but here we have only to do with the subjective effect on another, not an effect upon his own character. Then Mr Moberly goes on to insist that the fact of Christ's divinity gives a peculiar efficacy to His death, but I cannot see that he has explained why there should be any intrinsic efficacy in the death even of God, unless he is really meaning to adopt Anselm's view of the superabundant volume of merit accumulated by the voluntary death of One who possessed such value. There are phrases which would seem to point in that direction—"It is rather true that death 'counts' uniquely; and that, in spite of the apparent paradox, death is the most fruitful experience in life,"—but such an interpretation would hardly be in harmony with the general tenor of Mr Moberly's thought. The words at which Mr Moberly seems to come nearest to stating a definite theory on the subject are as follows: "The spectacle of Jesus bearing the sins of His persecutors, and, by so bearing them, initiating their overthrow, is the guarantee that God is bearing the sins of the world; that sin exists only to be caught up and transmuted in the love of God; and that such a heart-subduing, world-conquering sacrifice is an eternal 'moment' in the Divine Life, an essential part of the activity whereby God is God" (p. 315). Now, if what is meant is that the suffering of Christ assures us of His love, that is precisely the theory which Mr Moberly regards as so insufficient;

and it has often formed part of this theory that in some sense the sufferings of Christ may be regarded as actually the sufferings of God. I cannot stay to discuss the difficulties involved in this thought (which were fully appreciated in the patristic period); and will only say that, so far as it is accepted, we can understand how the contemplation of such sufferings by the sinner should serve as a "guarantee" of God's love: but we are still as far off as ever from understanding what can be meant by saying that "God is bearing the sins of the world." This was the very point which Mr Moberly set out to explain, but he has left it as dark as ever. The explanation is circular. The "objective" necessity is really due to a subjective effect on the mind of the sinner, while the explanation given of that subjective effect postulates an objective necessity. And, after all, Mr Moberly has never told us what are the premisses of his theory. Granted that such an objective "Atonement" is thinkable, what are his reasons for believing that it has taken place?

Mr Moberly has in general attempted to state with fairness the position of the "Liberal" whom he criticises, but there is one remark against which I must enter a respectful protest. "It is natural," he tells us, "that the Liberal should not easily accept any distinctive doctrine of Atonement, for he does not feel the need of salvation" (p. 333). With another view of "salvation" than that which Mr Moberly adopts, there might be some excuse for such an assertion; but with a writer who distinctly recognises that salvation means essentially "moral regeneration" the remark is really quite inexcusable. The Liberal may be no less conscious of such a need because he does not believe in the possibility of such a regeneration being effected by any sort of magic. Does he really mean to say that men like Maurice or Ritschl or Hermann or Bishop Westcott—all of whom must be considered "Liberals" as against Mr Moberly—felt no such need?

Mr Moberly's other essay, "God and the Absolute," could only be at all adequately criticised in a long article. It shows the same power of philosophical writing which characterises the essay on the Atonement, and the same tendency, as it seems to me, to attempt the fusion of wholly heterogeneous and incompatible modes of thinking. His philosophy is avowedly the "Absolutism" not of Hegel (who may be interpreted in many ways), or of Green or Caird (whose general attitude was not only religious but specifically Christian), but that of Mr Bradley and Professor Bosanquet, between whom he seems to see only resemblances and no differences. He is aware that the conclusions of those writers not only fall short of but in some ways contradict what he would himself regard as the requirements of Christian Theism. And yet Mr Moberly's own attitude is uncompromisingly Christian. By what process are the conclusions of Orthodoxy grafted upon the premisses of Mr Bradley? Chiefly or entirely, it would seem, by an appeal to "Christian experience." Lack of space compels me to say no more than that the attempt, in spite of all Mr Moberly's ability and earnestness, is singularly unconvincing. If anyone could perform such a feat, Mr Moberly would have done it. As it is, he hardly

attempts to put the reconciliation into words. It must be felt that a theory of the universe which does not admit of being explained in articulate language can hardly be called philosophy or theology. And if we are asked to accept the reconciliation on the strength of Mr Moberly's personal experience, we should find it hard to account for the fact that most of those who would claim something like Mr Moberly's "experience" would emphatically repudiate his philosophy as pantheistic and profane. And then I cannot help remarking that this appeal to "an immediate experience," this acceptance of a theory of the universe on the strength of some isolated "immediacy" (be its nature what it may), is opposed not merely to the ultimate conclusions of Mr Bradley's philosophy but to the fundamental principle of the philosophy which is professedly accepted.¹ Mr Bradley expressly distinguishes between the Absolute and God, and refuses to invest the Absolute with the moral predicates which the Christian creed has always attributed to God. Mr Moberly expressly identifies the Absolute with God, and yet deliberately regards the God who includes in Himself the minds of Cæsar Borgia and Napoleon Buonaparte as a Person who was revealed in Jesus Christ. This seems to me to leave nothing of the Bradleian philosophy standing. You cannot accept the "supermoral" Deity of Mr Bradley and yet believe that God is Love. The two points of view are declared to be both true—"somehow," perhaps Mr Moberly would add; but to my mind they are simply left standing side by side without any reconciliation at all.

Mr Moberly's blind reliance upon an "experience," the nature of which is not anywhere explained, examined, analysed, or even described, seems to me—from an intellectual point of view—the great defect of the whole book. A tendency towards it characterises all the writers more or less, though some much less than others. The situation is all the graver since we were promised by Mr Brook that this last essay would state the grounds upon which one who, like Newman or Martineau, does not claim any immediate intuition of God can rationally be a Theist. Yet, after all, Mr Moberly gives us no grounds which do not presuppose just this experience. In one sense, no doubt, all religion which does not rest on external authority may be said to rest on some kind or other of "experience"; but one ought surely to be told what sort of experience it is which is constantly invoked to prove things otherwise unprovable, and even to explain things otherwise unintelligible. An examination of what "experience" can and what it cannot prove should surely have formed part of a book in which so much rests upon it. A very significant feature of the writers' thought is that conscience or the moral consciousness is mentioned comparatively seldom. Little importance appears to be attached to it, and its relation to the specific "Christian experience" is quite undetermined. The effect of the

¹ "A metaphysical theory which warrants us in an intuition of His [*i.e.* God's] existence, we take to mean some kind of unreasonable appeal to an uncritical conviction. . . . And that suggestion is *prima facie* an intellectual offence to us."—Bosanquet, *The Value and Destiny of the Individual*, p. 22.

omission on one in whose religious belief the particular experience called moral experience plays a large part is to make him feel less at home in their work than when he is reading Origen or St Thomas, Kant or Green, Newman or Martineau, Maurice or Ritschl, or even (in this particular respect) the writers in *Lux Mundi*.

There are some questions of great importance on which the writers are silent, and on which—in view of the state of opinion in the Church of England and of the divisions in their own ranks—their silence is probably quite wise. The Virgin Birth is not once touched upon; nor is there any declaration on the subject of miracles which would commit the authors to positive agreement or disagreement with such a position as that of Mr Thompson. To be silent about these things in a book which is expressly put forth as “a statement of Christian belief in terms of modern thought” was perhaps the best way of meeting the petty persecutions and the fulminations of the Bishop of Winchester and the Bishop of Oxford. The authors are probably not in entire agreement with one another, and the fact that, without being so, they can regard the book “as, in the main, the expression of a corporate mind” puts these problems into their proper place.

I am sorry that I have been compelled to be so critical in my notice of a work with the aims and (within limits) even the conclusions of which I feel in so much sympathy. Serious criticism is the best compliment which one can pay to a book which deserves to be treated very seriously. The ability of the individual writers is of a high order, but the importance of the work as a whole is much greater than that of any individual essay in it. And that importance is not merely intellectual but religious. For these men have a following which will be ready to welcome this book. They are in very close touch with practical religious work. Many of them, for instance, are closely identified with the Christian Student Movement; they have had great influence over it and have been influenced by it. The strength of the writers lies in an intense religious earnestness which cannot but appeal even to those who are generally disposed to assume that “Professors” are as a rule godless persons whose opinions may be disregarded by serious Christians. Their weakness consists—I must confess—in a somewhat excessive eagerness to think themselves, not merely into the religious attitude but even into the theories and the formulæ of circles whose general intellectual outlook they are far from sharing. This attempt may occasionally have interfered with perfect intellectual lucidity in some of the writers; but from the practical point of view it will give them an enormous advantage. They will be accepted by thousands who would be repelled by a more avowed sympathy with the previous liberal theology to which the book owes so much. If a large body of young men are prepared to take holy orders in the Church of England as missionaries or home clergymen, or to engage in lay religious work, on such lines as these, then we shall see a movement which will be at once liberal and religious to a degree quite unequalled in the previous history of

the Church of England, and the influence of which will not stop with the Church of England. The fact that some at least of the writers have based even their Theism upon a philosophy which will seem to many destructive of their strongest beliefs is the most serious deduction from the usefulness of this book. But it will be far easier for others to correct the intellectual deficiencies of their theoretical position than to originate a really religious movement of equal promise. *Foundations* is a real attempt to construct a theology which shall be at once liberal and constructive. It is one of its best features that it would be difficult to characterise the whole book, or even each individual writer, as distinctively high, low, or broad. It may be that this book will constitute a turning-point in the history, not of a party, but of the Church of England and of the Church in England.

HASTINGS RASHDALL. •

HEREFORD.

The Meaning of Christianity.—By Frederick A. M. Spencer.—
Fisher Unwin, 1912.—Pp. 420.

THIS book is an attempt to outline a Christian theology as determined by modern knowledge and ways of thinking. It is doubtful whether the attempt has ever before been made on so comprehensive a scale. In spite of the difficulty presented by the mere scope of the undertaking, the result may at once be pronounced interesting and suggestive. It is evident that theology has again entered upon the constructive stage, and there is perhaps no sufficient reason why a positive and highly organised system of religious truth should be more difficult of achievement than it was in the last great constructive era which culminated in the thirteenth century. If science and revelation were not then in such acute conflict, the passage from Neoplatonic to Aristotelian conceptions of reality in the interests of religion was none the less difficult to negotiate. Then as now the critical period had lasted some centuries. There seems no reason why the critical preparation should not be followed now, as then, by a period of successful constructive synthesis.

Every Christian theology must be founded on the theology of the Bible. But our present need is of a theology which, as Mr Spencer puts it, will discriminate between that in the theology of the Bible "which arises out of religion and religious experience," and "that in it which is the product of the beliefs and ways of thought of the time." And it will be the function of a living contemporary theology "to develop the former by means of the best science and philosophy we can obtain." But here at the outset the question presents itself: Is a theology possible? "Is it possible to make valid inferences to such realities as those with which theology is largely concerned?" Mr Spencer's answer is that it is possible on the assumption which is at least tacitly present in all religious experience, that there are in our own personalities analogues of those realities.

Mr Spencer begins by establishing the existence of the spiritual as a realm of being which constitutes man's fullest consciousness. This realm penetrates and utilises his conceptual or mental consciousness, just as the latter penetrates and utilises the perceptual consciousness, and it again the merely physical. But how are we to conceive of the evolution of the lower realms of existence into the higher? How for instance did chemical existence develop into organism or organism into consciousness? The conditions of such development would seem to include at least a potentiality of the higher and as yet unattained type of being in the lower. But they must include more than that. For all chemical atoms, for instance, might be conceived as possessing separately a latent potentiality of organic life, but organism depends on something more, viz. their due combination. It is easier, therefore, to assume that a supreme spiritual Consciousness has presided over the different stages of the development of reality, and that creation is as it were the living of this supramundane Consciousness in and with the different forms of mundane life. Thus all grades of being are related from within and are finally included in their Source, the Spiritual Reality whose consciousness transcends and is independent of matter, and whose fullest expression is the love of spirit for spirit, the perfect communion of soul with soul—in other words, God.

Mr Spencer's Christology is a bold attempt to appraise the merits and defects of the traditional Christological doctrine and to suggest a conception which will include all the values which it has preserved while eliminating what was necessarily temporary and defective in its form. He holds that all the defects of the early Christology are traceable to an inadequate conception of personality, while none of the positions maintained by the early Christian thinkers, even of those who were definitely branded as heretical, was without value as a witness to some essential element in the nature of Christ. Briefly, his own view is that "the spiritual nature and life of souls are Christ"; that "all these units of life belong to a great process of Divine incarnation, and, potentially at least, are spiritually interconnected"; that this life which eternally proceeds from God and was "typically incarnate in the Jesus of history" is extended downwards from the historical Jesus into all the souls who have communion with Him in the fullest spiritual life, and upwards from Him into the Divine nature so that He is the revelation of God's suffering in and with His creatures. He holds, too, that the traditional view that Jesus pre-existed in a heavenly state, and that He has exerted a directly personal influence on mankind since and in virtue of His resurrection, may be held without establishing more than a difference in degree between Him and other human souls. Mr Spencer finds in the spiritual communion between God and human souls as made possible by the Christ-life, by the life of Divine suffering in and with humanity, the typical experience which shaped the Christian doctrine of the Holy Spirit. So the doctrine of the Trinity "symbolises the truth of the Universe considered as purposive and growing," but symbolises also the Eternal as comprising within *Itself* purpose

and growth. It is a doctrine of the Divine nature determined not merely by its various activities and effects in time, but by its own necessary and eternal activity. "The Eternal Love fulfils Itself in love working and developing and coming to blissful fruition."

The conception of the Atonement is in the same way to be determined by the experienced exigencies of the spiritual life. The realised fact of sin leads to a craving for the Divine mercy which has its perfect fruition in a confident faith in the Divine forgiveness. But this sense of forgiveness demands abandonment of the merely personal will and self-consecration to the Divine Will. And again through union with the Divine Will that will gains content for man and becomes devoted service of the Divine life in men. This is the atonement of man to God wrought by the revelation of God in Jesus Christ—in His teaching, in His life of suffering and death, and in His resurrection. But the Atonement is also the symbol of a "change" wrought in the will of God towards men. "Since God loves souls, He must enter into their experience of suffering and limitation, and in virtue of that intimacy in suffering and limitation He is victorious in love."

Mr Spencer's appreciation of the institutional element in Christianity as the supreme expression of the spiritual life in mankind is sane and balanced. As the Church of the Creeds, the Holy Catholic Church in which we profess our religious faith, is the intercommunion of the human and the Divine, so the actual churches of history are the necessary instruments of preparation of that communion, the societies which educate and discipline mankind towards the fulness of the spiritual life in Christ. The ministry is not only entrusted by the community with the function of religious teaching and exhortation and the conduct of its common worship, but is also the special guardian of the Christian tradition. "Christianity grows through fresh revelations and through applying itself to the growing life of humanity. It grows through combination of old and new. Now, in general, the ministry, or men so far as ministers, are pre-eminently the guardians of the old; while the laity, or men so far as laymen, bring new elements of experience whereby the old is developed." To the Sacraments Mr Spencer does not deny an "invisible sanctifying influence" attaching to the consecrated elements, but he considers that such influence is subordinate to their character as *efficacia signa*, as "signs that assist in producing and maintaining that of which they are the signs."

The remainder of the book is occupied with a speculative but deeply interesting and suggestive treatment of the doctrine of the "last things," of which it need only be said that it justifies itself as the necessary pendant of that view of the spiritual life as the Divine destiny of man which Mr Spencer has made the central motive of his re-thinking of Christian theology.

A. L. LILLEY.

Within: Thoughts during Convalescence.—By Sir Francis Younghusband, K.C.I.E.—London: Williams & Norgate—3s. 6d. net.

“THE Kingdom of God is within you” are the words prefixed as a motto to this modern Book of Job, in the course of which the author tells us how he came to discover their truth for himself, and to attach to the words a pregnant meaning not commonly suspected by the orthodox. A year or so before the publication of the volume Sir Francis Younghusband, as his many known and unknown friends learned with regret, was run down and severely injured by a motor-car. His leg was badly broken, besides other injuries, and he had to lie up for eight months, to undergo several operations, and to suffer prolonged and intense pain. Out of this experience the book was written—out of the helplessness and the torment, out of the yearnings of the spirit for any prop, any belief, to fortify it against the irrational cruelty with which he seemed to be tortured, and also out of the love and sympathy with which the sufferer was surrounded, and which revealed to him something in humanity which he had never realised before. The value of this sincere and courageous book lies just in the fact that it is not a philosopher’s attempt to theorise about the mystery of evil—the author appears to have read scarcely anything on the subject—but comes, as it were, raw from life. It shows us a man of great practical intelligence, of proved capacity and courage, suddenly compelled to turn his eyes not on the world without, where he had worked so long with confidence and success, but on the far more difficult problems of the world within, and to find for the riddle of the universe an answer by which a man might live, and love, and work, without, on the one hand, propping his spirit by impossible superstitions, or, on the other, resigning himself in angry or cynical contempt to the futility of the whole performance.

The starting-point of the book is the question, Why am I suffering all this? Can there be any good reason for it—for it; and for all the other agonies, defeats, and frustrations of the world? Why do the monsoons fail in India and cause untold suffering to millions? Why did Gordon fail and die miserably in the Soudan? Why does a *Titanic* run on a submerged iceberg? Why does a man like the author’s friend, Major Bretherton, after doing more work than any other man for the success of the expedition to Lhasa, get drowned in the Sampo River three days’ march from his goal? All these “whys” amount to an indictment of the order of nature, on the assumption that there is some responsible Being to make answer. Answers have been made on his behalf, and the author reviews some of them and rejects them. Could a personal Ruler of the Universe, omnipotent and righteous, have created such an order of things as we actually see? Colonel Younghusband concludes that he could not. There is no such being. If there were, he could and would have made us perfect without recourse to the chastening and strengthening influences attributed to pain and loss. By his mere will every desirable endowment might have been given to humanity. But the author clears away the Judaic conception of

the Deity only to substitute for it the conception of another Power which is neither irrational nor blindly cruel. This Power, of which we ourselves are manifestations, is to be apprehended by us as endeavouring to express or fulfil itself through Nature; even as an artist, with pain and effort, with many failures and rejections, endeavours to express himself in creative art :—

“Whether we look within ourselves, whether we observe other individuals, and masses of men, or whether we trace the history of mankind, the animals and the plants, we see everywhere the evidence of an inherent, impelling spirit, and evidence that that impulse strives for what is good.

“The existence of an outside Providence who created us, who watches over us, and who guides our lives like a Merciful Father, we have found impossible longer to believe in. But of the existence of a Holy Spirit radiating upward through all animate beings, and finding its fullest expression, in man in love, and in the flowers in beauty, we can be as certain as of anything in the world.

“This fiery spiritual impulsion at the centre and the source of things, ever burning in us, is the supremely important factor in our existence. It does not always attain to light. In many directions it fails: the conditions are too hard, and it is utterly blocked. In others it only partially succeeds. But in a few it bursts forth into radiant light. There are few who in some heavenly moment of their lives have not been conscious of its presence. We may not be able to give it outward expression, but we know that it is there. And where it comes most perfectly to light may not be in the great men of the earth or in the most renowned, but in simple unknown lovers.”

It is the privilege of man to further with conscious will the mighty impulse towards life and love of this divine Power, mysterious in its nature, profoundly obscure in its relations to the world of sense, but abundantly revealed in the phenomena of physical life, and still more to those who seek it “within,” in the heart and conscience of man. The latter half of the book is taken up with a discussion of the definite ways in which, at the present day, civilised man can bear his part in this life-movement. He is to widen the bounds of liberty—especially in the relations of the sexes—to foster the spirit of love, the appreciation of beauty, the capacity for toil and endurance.

There is, of course, nothing very new in the author's creed either on the negative or the positive, the philosophic or the ethical side. But a summary such as we have given conveys no idea of the quality of the book, which is extraordinarily vital, close to fact, abounding in personal reminiscence—headlong very often, with none of the scholar's timidity about involving himself in verbal contradictions, and naïve to a degree that sometimes provokes a smile. The affair of Major Bretherton, for instance—with what simplicity it is assumed that a God, if a God there were, would naturally be a British tribal deity with no sympathy for the Tibetan view of the expedition to Lhasa! The remark about the Queen Victoria Memorial in St James's Park is another case in point. To hate “felt and known” the beauty of this work is, we are told, to have “reached something which is pure good.” The author has probably never dreamed that there could be two opinions about the value of the kind of art of

that you are to be guided solely by the results of observation; that your conclusions must be in accordance with your experiment; that the accuracy of your conclusions is commensurate with the accuracy of your methods of investigation; that you are justified in going a little—very little—beyond the limits of observation and only in a suggestive and not in a dogmatic manner. In a word, to be scientific means that there must be complete harmony between what you see and what you say. How far are these mechanistic biologists true to their principles? Take, first of all, one of Professor Schäfer's statements—which really forms the pivot on which the whole theory of the mechanists turns. "The problems of life," he says, "are essentially problems of matter. We cannot conceive of life in the scientific sense as existing apart from matter." Another biologist expresses the same idea thus: "There is no protoplasm apart from life, and no life without protoplasm." These are not scientific statements; they are merely dogmatic assertions which have no foundation in fact. For Professor Schäfer has not defined what he means by life except in the sense that it does not include "soul"—a term which he likewise leaves undefined. If he means life in the universal sense, then it is not in accordance with experience to say that we cannot conceive of life as existing apart from matter, for that means that problems of mind and spirit, of consciousness and intuition, are not problems of life. If, however, he merely applies the term "life" to the material manifestations of vitality—that is to say, to the physical and chemical changes taking place in living things, then the statement is meaningless. Further, it is not scientific, and therefore not in accordance with experience, to assert that there is no protoplasm apart from life: for there is such a thing as dead protoplasm—the only kind of protoplasm that the chemist has ever been able to analyse. Take another instance of this sin of false reasoning. Referring to the chemical constitution of protoplasm and its possible synthesis by the chemist, Professor Schäfer maintains that "when the chemist succeeds in building up this compound, it will, *without doubt*, be found to exhibit the phenomena which we are in habit of associating with the term 'life.'" It is a statement, this, which reveals at once the weakness of the mechanist's position. A more cautious and more logical way of putting the point would be to say that if the chemist ever succeeds in bringing together the various elements in the proportion and under the conditions found in protoplasm, the manufactured compound may exhibit the phenomenon of life. That, however, would by no means signify that the chemist had manufactured life. Professor Goodrich goes even further and asserts that "if any stage in the development of living substance were artificially made, it would probably be so different from the protoplasm of modern plants and animals that we should scarcely recognise it as living at all, even if we had it before us."

• Professor Tyndall, in his Belfast address, pointed out that many of the organic compounds which are the by-products, so to speak, of vitality have been successfully produced by the chemist in the laboratory. We have made practically no advance in this respect during the last forty years

except in increasing the number of such compounds and in getting slightly more reliable analyses of protoplasm. But, to quote from *Recent Advances in Physiology and Bio-chemistry* (edited by Professor Leonard Hill), though "many organic compounds have been synthesised by the chemist, all proof is wanting that this is done by the same process as the cell does it. The conditions in the cell are widely different, and at the temperature of the cell, and with such chemical materials as are at hand, no such organic syntheses have ever been artificially carried out."

Another favourite argument of the mechanists is to draw out a list of *special characteristics* of *living matter*, and then to take these one by one and show that they are also characteristic of dead matter! Hence, they conclude, there is no essential difference between living protoplasm and dead matter. For example, Professor Schäfer says: "The most obvious manifestation of life is spontaneous movement. We regard such movement as indicative of the possession of life; nothing seems more justifiable than such an inference. But physicists show us movements of a precisely similar character in substances which no one can regard as living. It is therefore certain that such movements are not specifically 'vital,' and that their presence does not necessarily denote life." In a similar way the advocates of the mechanist theory enumerate other "characteristic and essential properties of life," and then proceed to infer that, since these properties are shared by inorganic matter, they are not characteristic of living matter. For instance, they point out that living cells grow by assimilation of matter from their environment—that is, by feeding—and reproduce themselves, transmitting all their powers and character to the young cells so formed. They show that crystals perform very similar operations. All this is, of course, very true, but the reasoning cannot be called scientific. For it simply deals with the properties of matter associated with life, and surely one would not expect matter to lose its ordinary properties under those conditions, though it might possibly develop new ones. All that these observations prove is that molecules of matter keep their properties even when they are the vehicles of vital manifestations.

The fundamental basis of the mechanist theory, and of the biotic energy theory, is the principle of the conservation of energy. In terms of this principle Herbert Spencer endeavoured to work out a complete theory of Evolution and had to admit that, owing to his failure to account for the connection between mind and matter, the world of thought and spirit was "unknowable." The mistake which he made, and which his followers make, is to suppose that this principle accounts for every purely material phenomena. Physicists know that the theory of the conservation of energy is inadequate to explain the properties even of dead matter. Some other principle involving the interaction of matter and its environment is always necessary to give a complete solution. The fundamental error of the mechanist theory of life is to refuse to admit the influence of this second principle. And it is in this respect only that they differ from the vitalist school represented by Dr Alfred R. Wallace, Sir Oliver

Lodge and others. It is this second guiding principle which the latter understand by the term "life." The manifestation of it in living things these thinkers call "vitality." Perhaps it were better to adopt the term "life-force," or "vital-force," for that elusive but substantial something which gives direction and purpose to the physical and chemical changes characteristic of living matter.

What is the nature of the problem we have to solve? Here is an illustration—an analogy, which will present very similar features. Imagine some huge extra-terrestrial being—from Mars, or anywhere else—to be studying this world by observing it through his microscope and analysing bits of it in his crucible. Suppose the limit of his vision to be such that any town or city like London would appear to him just as a single cell from a plant or animal appears to us through a microscope. Suppose that his idea of time was such that our days were like minutes to him. Then he would notice very peculiar features in this cell life. He would observe that this city-cell was full of activity and had a definite outline. The cell-wall would be gradually increasing in size, and the cell would presently by a budding process produce a new cell—a suburb—presenting the same features as the parent cell. He would see that when no sunlight fell on it, a beautiful glow emanated from it which he would interpret as a phosphorescence. For this glow would immediately disappear during the day and could only be seen at night. Having probably studied the phosphorescence of luminous paint and such-like substances on his own planet, he would at once conclude that the glow he observed on this terrestrial cell was due to the same cause. "It is entirely due to atomic reaction," he would say, "such reaction being produced by response to the stimulus of sunlight. There is no need to invoke the aid of any intelligent unseen power to explain the fact." Now, of course, *we* would identify the immediate cause of the phenomenon as the conscious act of an intelligent lamplighter or electrical engineer. This giant is in exactly the same position as the advocates of the mechanist theory of life, and it is surprising that they do not see the trap into which they have fallen. For they know hardly anything at all about the physical properties of the living cell. Professor Schäfer makes much of the phenomenon of osmosis and says that it obeys the same laws exactly as hold in non-living matter. This certainly has not been experimentally proved. The laws of osmosis have been deduced by studying the passage of certain solutions through a dead membrane. Is it not certain, however, that osmosis in a living cell is a different thing—a more complex phenomenon and, possibly, a purely molecular one? Physiologists have not investigated the matter thoroughly, and there are any number of physical properties of cells about which they know next to nothing. And as to the chemical composition of protoplasm—the various analyses are those of dead protoplasm, and Professor Schäfer himself states in his treatise on physiology that the molecular state of living protoplasm is probably very different from that of the dead substance. Why, even the very methods used to examine

living cells under the microscope—the usual methods of staining—produce violent molecular changes which may obliterate the actual physical characteristics of the substance under examination.

Fortunately there are men who still possess the mystic sense; who can see the significance of symbolic things; who through the visible form can perceive the potent directing power of an invisible vitality. As to the origin of life they say nothing, for knowledge of the ultimate origin of life or matter can never be attained by the ordinary methods which are at present at our command. Everyone knows that the pressing of an ivory button will cause an electric current to flow through the wires connected with a bell and cause that bell to ring. Whence is the energy of the electric current? Physicists will tell you that it can all be accounted for by the chemical action that occurs in the battery. But ask them why that chemical action does not start until the button is pressed though the chemical agents are all present, and no scientist can answer you. Further, there are half a dozen entirely different ways of generating an electric current. It would be easy to generate a current at a remote distance from a room, convey it there along wires and cause it to ring a bell, and you could defy any scientist present on the spot to indicate the origin of that current. So it is with regard to life: only the mystery is deeper. We have no direct knowledge of the immediate cause of vitality in matter, and it is quite possible that life may have originated in many different ways under as many different circumstances at different times and in different places.

Personally I am much attracted by Mr Bernard Shaw's Life-Force theory—taking it as a very convenient and satisfying way of describing the ways of nature; and remembering always that the description is from our point of view and not from that of the Life-Force. The Life-Force is something which has been always striving for a fuller expression of itself. It first created forms of inanimate matter, and perhaps the phenomenon of crystallisation was one of its unsuccessful attempts at finding a means of producing vitality. By the process of inorganic evolution, one or more peculiar agglomerations were evolved which seemed suitable for the manifestation of vitality. Ever since the Life-Force has specialised in this particular branch of evolution, and its latest triumph is man. What the future has in store, we do not know. All that the theory entitles us to say is that there is some directive purposeful influence at work which is capable of producing different forms of life from the same material substance. Matter is the medium chosen and made by the Life-Force for the manifestation of vitality, and the properties of matter as such remain, and its means and power of acquiring and transmitting energy remain, the new element introduced being the guidance and direction of that energy. The cells in a seed are divided into two similar portions. Both are exposed to the same stimuli, and one becomes a root, the other a stem. What is the cause of this differentiation? The closest histological examination fails to discover any difference in the ova of different types of mammalia. There is very little difference between the animal and

vegetable cell originally, and yet what a marvellous divergence there is in their subsequent history ! The singular power of adaptation to environment, the wonderful ways in which obstacles and difficulties are overcome, the peculiar and intricate organisation of particular functions all working towards the one common end of perpetuation of the species—all the exquisite activity associated with the various forms and phases of life—compel us to look beyond the range of mere uncontrolled mechanical action. The existence of the Life-Force seems to me as essential to the successful explanation of the phenomenon of life as the presence and intelligent action of the driver of an express train are essential for the successful guidance of the train to its destination. A complete scientific theory of the train is impossible if you deliberately ignore the driver, and it is equally absurd to attempt to describe or explain the much more complex train of living things by ignoring altogether the spiritual guiding, controlling, and driving influence without which there is no life. As Mazzini says in one of his essays : “Because certain manifestations of life are displayed before us, shall we confound them with life itself? No, life is immortal: through the indefinite series of its manifestations it assumes form after form, according to the intermediate and secondary aim which it has to reach in the course of its journey towards the supreme final aim.” The beautiful lake of Gwynant rests calmly and peacefully in the exquisite bosom of the Gwynant vale, and under the immediate protection of the towering heights of Snowdon—that majestic emblem of eternal steadfastness. But I have seen all that inspiring panorama dissolved out of view by a drenching rain and a driving mist. It had put on its cloak of mystery; and the mountain, which had brought down the mist, had abandoned its passive stolidity and become an aggressive power. The beauty of the lake—no more to be seen—was a thing to be felt like the beauty of a soul. Life, in all its various perplexing moods, is very much like that; calm, beautiful, complex, powerful, elusive, and mystically aggressive. The process of its progress is baffling, and the cause of its mystery is the stupendous loftiness of “its supreme final aim.”

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CRICKLEWOOD, LONDON.

Heresy and Schism: A Plea for Universalism.—By T. F. G.—Bristol: Arrowsmith; London: Simpkin, Marshall, Kent & Co., 1911.—1s. 6d. net.

THE writer of this unassuming little book—less than one hundred pages—refers to the present failure of organised Christianity with charity and breadth of view, and deals with the cause and the remedy. It is therefore a book that will not appeal to the narrow-minded of any sect or creed, but it will call forth a response from the hearts of many devout men and women who are wistfully dissatisfied with the so-called orthodoxy and religious life of to-day; it is valuable also as showing the trend of thought that is quietly deepening and spreading among thinkers of all classes; and

for such the book seems to be meant. As it is written in homely language, at times is even lacking in grace and dignity of style, it is neither a scholarly appeal to scholars nor a literary essay for the learned, but it is written with a force which is the direct outcome of earnest conviction, and for this reason, and for the truth that lies behind it, it will call forth many an answering echo.

In the Introduction the writer questions what there is in theology that should make it able to stereotype the Truth and to deny it any development or evolution for nineteen centuries; whole-hearted seekers have found that Truth is ever evolving; the scientist of 1911 is nearer the truth than he of 1511; the theologians of to-day have, in the same way, a larger field for deduction, and are nearer the truth, than they of the time of the Reformation, who in their turn knew more than the early Fathers, as they in theirs knew more than David the Psalmist. The writer points out that there are innumerable souls who never have been, and never will be, able to fulfil the conditions necessary to salvation as laid down by priestly authority or orthodox community, and questions what of these souls? where are they now? and he demands that those who profess to teach religion give answer, and that the truth or error of such answers be open to test by anyone, scientifically, doctrinally, historically, theologically, and experimentally.

Universalism, or the ultimate redemption of every one of the myriads of souls born into this world, is upheld as the religion of the future, and the ground for belief in it is based upon a Scriptural consideration of the Godhead, under the aspects of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost, and upon the fuller light now vouchsafed to inquiring souls, to whom is being imparted a deeper and more perfect knowledge of the attributes of the Godhead, of His methods and of His mind towards us. Further, Universalism satisfies as the old concepts failed to satisfy, gives rest in place of unrest, and in the future an explanation of the eternal "why?" of to-day. There are objections to Universalism, writes the author; "let them be stated as fully and freely as possible, for the matter is a very crucial one, and more depends on it than the mere upsetting of yet another heresy." The objections are stated, criticised, and answered; and the failure of the old orthodoxy to appeal to that God-given spark of the divine implanted in every human soul is contrasted with the incentive to Christlikeness of a belief in Universalism. The question at once arises, The sacraments, the rites, and the ceremonies of the sacerdotalist, are they then of no value? Their place and value are briefly shown as helps, but not as essentials.

Under the head of Schism, the writer lays the responsibility of the division of soul from soul, and of soul from its God, on the clergy and ministers of all denominations, more especially "the priesthood of the sacerdotal party"; but a few pages further on we find: "Nor can Non-conformity show a much better record, with trust-deeds that confine the truth to old, musty, worn-out creeds and conventions, where political

exigencies and the need to placate an arbitrary diaconate force the preacher to . . . cramp his message. . . . How is divine truth to struggle to the light through the mass of material refuse and energise as the Truth of the Holy Spirit of God?" But the hopeful, optimistic tone rings out again in the words: "Yet the true Church of Christ—that nobler, grander concept that worthily merits the name 'Church Universal'—is not so riven asunder"; the Roman Catholic, the Anglican, the Non-conformist, the one of no denomination, are each and all recognised as separate stones being utilised in the building of the true Church.

In Part III., entitled "The Priesthood of the Laity and Tolerance," we find: "Not a more harrowing parody of the all-embracing Christ . . . could be found than in the mutual want of charity and fellowship obtaining among those peculiarly exclusive communions of latter-day Christianity, which pride themselves on their catholicity, and represent to the world that sad mixture of hatred, strife, malice, and all uncharitableness depicted by Roman Catholicism, Anglicanism, and Nonconformity"; and the priesthood of the laity is unknown among them, "they all unite in claiming a divinely appointed exclusiveness for the performance of sacramental acts of their own priesthood, and any endeavour to extend the prerogative to lay members would be met by varying intensity of refusal." As there is no recognition of the priesthood of the laity, and the power of excommunicating has been so much used and abused—"No priest, no sacrament; no sacrament, no salvation; no salvation, no hope of eternal blessedness"—it becomes a necessity to inquire outside professional channels how much of divine sanction lies behind this claim of the priesthood. This the writer proceeds to do concerning the two chief sacraments of the Churches. The attitude of the worshipper is shown to be the essential factor in the one service, and the simplicity of its institution stands out in startling contrast with the modern celebration; but he recognises at the same time the difficulty that "the trained ecclesiastic" has in seeing "these facts whole and without prejudice. . . ." "The Church may still excommunicate and issue its ban and its threatenings, but, thank God, it has lost its power universal. The growth of education and the knowledge of science have taken from it, for ever, its ancient, deadly, and satanic power. Light, divine light, has flooded the earth, . . . and the true power of the inward Spirit of Christ is the dominating force of the future, not the official utterances of an effete oligarchy dependent on material ordinances for their authority."

Part IV. is a strong plea for Unity, based on the fact that, face to face with a still "submerged tenth, grinding poverty, slow starvation, despairing suicide, and hideous crime," Christianity, as organised to-day, and after nineteen centuries, appears a failure, and this failure is due to a straining after uniformity rather than unity. There follows a beautiful passage describing the spiritual unity between the Red Indian, the Roman Catholic ecclesiastic, and the Quaker maiden, who are all feeling out into the unseen after the Divine Reality; all real worshippers of the one

Divine Majesty reach Him from every quarter by different means and different routes, so widely apart as, to quote but a few, "soft music, traditional ritual, priestly authority, solemn mass, the quiet words, the shades of evening, an infant's prattle, a flower, a loving word"; the different worshippers all "feel in their hearts a sacred touch from a live altar, and know that they have worshipped in a very real Presence."

The Conclusion is a plea that we should discard the old ways which have led to so much division, to so much failure; that we should cease from arrogantly exalting our own as the only right way, should hold fast to the relationship as children of one Father, even God, with the Divine Brotherhood of Christ, and the emerging of the Holy Spirit, as further bonds of Unity.

RACHEL FAIRBROTHER.

BOURNEMOUTH.

Vital Lies.—By Vernon Lee.—London: John Lane & Co.—
Two Volumes.—1912.—Pp. 262 + 211.

IN the past there have always been reformers who would corrupt the world to establish one good custom. In the future such benefactors, if there are any, will be the more dangerous that the field of their work is bound to be less restricted. To-day they are in vigorous action in many directions. The vote or the general strike, as the case may be, is the one thing in the universe that is of any worth, and no goodness or happiness achieved apart therefrom is desirable or even conceivable.

Of the large, vague, mystic *idées fixes*, or, as she calls them, dynamo-genetic ideas, which are hypnotising great numbers of people in the present generation, Vernon Lee has discussed the most important at some length in these volumes; but she has given her exposition of them a historic background, and shown how there have always been potentialities for evil in every doctrine that has commanded the reverence of mankind. In bygone times these ideas took the form of a command or a symbol which at first, but only at first, had a definite and literal meaning. Formally and seemingly the same as they were at the outset, they have been differently interpreted by every individual who has adopted and worshipped them throughout the ages, and are therefore the creations of later times masquerading as the "eternal truths" of earlier ones. "Commandments and ideals," writes the author, "are among the automatic mechanism (*sic*) of an unceasing, unintentional transformation of desires and efforts. And by the associative virtue of mere words, the drum-or-church-bell-power of often-repeated phrases, sophisms have acquired the utility of promissory notes; lying statements if taken literally, but with a humble use of eking out credit among a race of beings still very lacking in the substantial wealth of knowledge and self-control."

She demonstrates "not only the unchanged emotional and practical

powers of symbol," but also "its continuous and often increasing dynamo-genetic property"—or its power, as the devotees of the various religions would themselves say, of

"Sweetening and gathering sweetness evermore,

By beauty's franchise disenfranchised of time."

But our philosopher is determined to expose the ungracious partiality and pretension of the cherished survivals of past beliefs in God and immortality, predestination and providence. They are due, she complains, "to life's roundabout practicality, the brutal need, the stupid barbarous hurry" of everyday life. "They sacrifice a portion of truth, they blink some part of reality, and every such disregard of truth entails a sacrifice of many individuals and their powers for good: the Magdalen, had she been duly stoned for her adulteries, would neither have brought her ointment for Christ's feet, nor watched, as we see her on the frescoes, by the side of the cross."

Over against the idols and fictions into which the worshipper "magnifies but also distorts the solid, small, decent realities of life" she sets "the facts which take none of our habits and likings into consideration"; and in so doing she deeply deplores William James's truth in so far forth as it is useful or impels one to action, Father Tyrrell's sacramentalism, the anthropologist's belief in religion as a providential agency for promoting vitality and tribal unity, the syndicalist faith in class warfare, the mystic's "emotionally irradiated mental void" which he identifies with the whole universe, and the Tolstoian fusion of all science into morality. In particular she deprecates James's pragmatism as a perversion of the doctrine which Mr Charles Peirce originated and first called by that name, and which was a rather dull method of "making our ideas clear" by reference to the consensus of opinion at which all men would arrive on all points if they could carry their investigations far enough. She points out that dogma is, after all, the life and soul of symbol and sacrament, and that when that has become invalid, no ritual, no elemental need, and no authority will ultimately suffice to maintain them. She mentions the dramatic breakdown of religious revivals, Napoleonic outbursts of glory, and enthusiasms like Garibaldian patriotism and Renan's truth, light and reason which answer neither to "the multiplicity and complexity of reality," nor "to the permanent energies and organised habits of the individuals and the crowds" who are intoxicated by them. It is to excitements like these that, in words that are well worth very serious consideration, she attributes the cynicism into which religion has merged in France, the administrative incapacity of the Italians in the face of national danger or disaster, and the base anti-clericalism into which the moral splendour of the Dreyfusard movement has died down.

She maintains that art supplies all the benefits and satisfactions of religion without the disingenuous reasoning and unwholesome frenzies to which the devotional temperament is apt to give rise. She advises the

man who cannot live by bread alone to exercise "the will to contemplate" the works which the artist creates, not as evidences of truth existing apart from the human mind, but as ideals made without supernatural aid "to suit the heart's desire." Free from the utilitarian magic on which prayer and sacramentalism are based, for her these ideals represent the spiritual element in religion. Dynamogenetic they are in a high degree, but not dangerously so, because they are due to "the permanent and co-ordinated preferences" of those who cherish them, and who dwell on, or rather in, them, not in order to translate them directly into action, but to find in them the delight and repose which are a necessary though an indirect preparation for rational action. For the rest, she would trust for the salvation of humanity to "the gradual, steady impinging of fact on fact, interest on interest, and will on will, which infinitely slowly, but inevitably, rolls away the various loads of human horror."

Both in style and argument this work reminds one of Carlyle, for the former sometimes becomes rugged and picturesque, and not infrequently the latter degenerates into scolding. Emphatic protests are made throughout against the truth which William James describes as the outcome of the will to believe. But had the writer read his essay on the subject less angrily, she would probably have come to the conclusion that that brief piece of work had contributed more to the destruction of private truths and idolised falsehoods than the entire literary output of the empiricist press and the intellectualist philosophy. In that essay the great pragmatist expressly rejects such guarantees of truth as revelation, the *consensus gentium*, and the inconceivability of the opposite; and states that the pragmatists treat every one of their beliefs as hypotheses. Had *The Will to Believe* never been written, it is quite possible that there would have been but few people armed with enough courage and scorn of mere conviction to read *Vital Lies*.

Nevertheless, the book is a timely warning against the realistic idealism of the priests of mankind who would neglect, or even create, a hundred evils to cure a single malady of the body politic; and their mistakes and infirmities are set forth with a humour and pathos which give the work a high rank not only as philosophy, but also as literature.

M. E. ROBINSON.

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